null, 'at' => ' [at] ', 'dot' => ' [dot] ', 'css_id' => '', 'css_class' => '', 'the_content' => 1, 'the_meta_key' => 1, 'the_excerpt' => 1, 'comment_text' => 1, 'widget_text' => 1, 'java' => 1, 'load_java' => 1, 'opt_linktext' => 0, 'autolink' => 1, 'alt_linktext' => '', 'alt_linkimage' => '', 'http_linkimage_title' => '', 'alt_linkimage_title' => '', 'excludedIDs' => '', 'metaBox' => 1, 'alt_uploadedimage' => '0', 'c2i_font' => null, 'c2i_fontSize' => 10, 'c2i_fontRGB' => '#000000', 'echo' => 1, 'exemptAddresses' => '', 'whiteList' => 'jpeg,jpg,png,gif', 'disable_rss' => 1, 'encryption_mode' => 'secure', 'encryption_password' => null, 'image_token_secret' => null, 'image_token_secret_previous' => null, 'image_token_secret_previous_until' => 0, 'secrets_rotated_at' => 0, 'use_secure_encryption' => 1, 'iterations' => 10000, 'link_mode' => 'data', ]; /** * An array of filter names used within the application. * These filters are commonly applied to various types of content, * including posts, comments, and widgets. */ private const FILTERS = ['the_content', 'the_meta_key', 'the_excerpt', 'comment_text', 'widget_text']; // Define the actual widget filters that will be used when widget_text is enabled private const WIDGET_FILTERS = [ 'widget_text', // Legacy text widget (pre-4.9) 'widget_text_content', // Modern text widget (4.9+) 'widget_custom_html_content' // Custom HTML widget (4.8.1+) ]; private array $options; public function __construct(array $options = []) { $this->options = array_merge(self::DEFAULT_OPTIONS, $options); } public function getActiveFilters(): array { return array_filter(self::FILTERS, fn($filter) => isset($this->options[$filter]) && $this->options[$filter] ); } public function isMetaBoxEnabled(): bool { return (bool) ($this->options['metaBox'] ?? false); } public function isAutolinkEnabled(): bool { return (bool) ($this->options['autolink'] ?? false); } public function getLinkTextOption(): int { return (int) ($this->options['opt_linktext'] ?? 0); } public function getFontSettings(): array { return [ 'font' => $this->options['c2i_font'], 'size' => (int) $this->options['c2i_fontSize'], 'color' => $this->options['c2i_fontRGB'] ]; } public function getCssSettings(): array { return [ 'id' => $this->options['css_id'], 'class' => $this->options['css_class'] ]; } public function getEmailReplacements(): array { return [ 'at' => $this->options['at'], 'dot' => $this->options['dot'] ]; } public function getImageSettings(): array { return [ 'url' => $this->options['alt_linkimage'], 'title' => $this->options['http_linkimage_title'], 'uploaded_id' => $this->options['alt_uploadedimage'], 'uploaded_title' => $this->options['alt_linkimage_title'] ]; } public function getExcludedIds(): array { $ids = $this->options['excludedIDs']; return $ids ? array_map('trim', explode(',', $ids)) : []; } public function getVersion(): ?string { return $this->options['version']; } /** * Get the actual widget filters to be applied * * @return array */ public function getWidgetFilters(): array { return self::WIDGET_FILTERS; } // updateFromShortcode() and restoreOriginalOptions() used to sit here. They // had no caller anywhere in the plugin -- CryptX::cryptXShortcode() does // that job on the static option list -- and they were the more dangerous of // the two implementations: they merged shortcode attributes straight into // $this->options, which is what getEncryptionPassword() and // getImageTokenSecret() read from and what save() writes to the database. // Whoever revived them would have made key material settable by anyone // allowed to write a post, and the guard added to cryptXShortcode() would // not have covered it. Dead code that only waits for someone to call it is // worse than no code. public function save(): void { update_option('cryptX', $this->options); } public function update(array $newOptions): void { // Convert checkbox values to integers foreach (['the_content', 'the_meta_key', 'the_excerpt', 'comment_text', 'widget_text', 'autolink', 'metaBox', 'disable_rss', 'use_secure_encryption'] as $key) { if (isset($newOptions[$key])) { $newOptions[$key] = (int)$newOptions[$key]; } } $this->options = array_merge($this->options, $newOptions); $this->save(); // Save immediately after update } public function get(string $key, $default = null) { return $this->options[$key] ?? $default; } public function has(string $key): bool { return isset($this->options[$key]); } public function getAll(): array { return $this->options; } /** * Resets all options to their default values. * * Careful before wiring this up again: it has had no caller since 4.1.0, * because the settings screen resets through SettingsSchema instead. This * method sets the whole array to DEFAULT_OPTIONS, in which * encryption_password is null -- and then saves. That discards the secret * every already delivered link was encrypted with, so those links stop * resolving until the pages are regenerated. SettingsSchema::defaults() * covers only the editable options and leaves the secret alone, which is * why the REST route uses it. * * @return void */ public function reset(): void { $this->options = self::DEFAULT_OPTIONS; // Set version and default font $this->options['version'] = CRYPTX_VERSION; // Set default font if available $fontFiles = glob(CRYPTX_DIR_PATH . 'fonts/*.ttf'); if (!empty($fontFiles)) { $this->options['c2i_font'] = basename($fontFiles[0]); } $this->save(); } /** * Retrieves the encryption mode configured in the options. * * @return string Returns the encryption mode as a string. Defaults to 'secure' if not set. */ public function getEncryptionMode(): string { return $this->options['encryption_mode'] ?? 'secure'; } /** * Checks if secure encryption is enabled in the options. * * @return bool Returns true if secure encryption is enabled, false otherwise. */ public function isSecureEncryptionEnabled(): bool { return (bool) ($this->options['use_secure_encryption'] ?? true); } /** * Retrieves the encryption password configured in the options or generates a secure password if not set. * * @return string Returns the encryption password as a string. */ public function getEncryptionPassword(): string { // A stored password is returned untouched and is NEVER regenerated. // The password is baked into every link this plugin has ever emitted, // so a new one would turn all already delivered and cached pages into // undecryptable garbage. Only a missing (or empty) value is filled in. if (empty($this->options['encryption_password'])) { // Random secret instead of a value derived from the WordPress keys. // Rationale: this password is published. It is handed to the browser // as the second argument of the generated // javascript:secureDecryptAndNavigate(...) link and therefore sits // in the HTML of every page in clear text. Deriving it from AUTH_KEY // and SECURE_AUTH_KEY was not reversible, but there is no reason to // publish anything at all that is a function of the site's secrets. // // bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) is the choice because random_bytes() is // the platform CSPRNG (always available on the required PHP 8.1+, // not filterable by other plugins) and hex output is pure [0-9a-f]: // it survives every escaping stage on the way into the JavaScript // string literal and into the option row unchanged. 32 bytes = 256 // bits, matching the AES-256 key later derived from it via PBKDF2. try { $this->options['encryption_password'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(32)); } catch (\Throwable $e) { // random_bytes() throws when the system has no usable source of // randomness. wp_generate_password() then provides the fallback; // 64 chars without special characters keeps the value safe to // embed unescaped. $this->options['encryption_password'] = wp_generate_password(64, false, false); } $this->save(); } return $this->options['encryption_password']; } /** * The secret behind the image tokens -- and the one that is never published. * * getEncryptionPassword() above is handed to the browser with every link; * it has to be, because the visitor's browser does the decrypting. Anything * keyed with it is therefore readable by whoever reads the page, which is * exactly the audience the image variant is hiding from. So the tokens in * the image URLs get their own secret, and this one stays on the server. * * Stored rather than derived from the WordPress salts: rotating those -- * which an administrator may do at any time, and which only logs everyone * out -- would invalidate every image URL in every cached page at once. * * @return string The secret, minted on first use and then kept. */ public function getImageTokenSecret(): string { if (empty($this->options['image_token_secret'])) { // No fallback to wp_generate_password() here, deliberately -- and // that is the difference to getEncryptionPassword() above, which // has one. If random_bytes() throws, random_int() throws too, and // wp_rand() then falls back to a source that is not cryptographic. // For the link password that costs nothing, because the value is // published in every link anyway. For this one it is the whole // protection: a guessable secret would let anybody rebuild the // tokens and read the addresses back out of an access log, while // the site went on reporting itself as protected. // // Returning nothing instead means ImageToken mints nothing, and // getImageFromText() renders no picture. The link around it still // works and the address is still hidden. Missing a picture is the // better failure. try { $this->options['image_token_secret'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(32)); } catch (\Throwable $e) { return ''; } $this->save(); } return (string) $this->options['image_token_secret']; } /** * How long a replaced image secret keeps working. * * Long enough to outlive any ordinary page cache, short enough that a * secret somebody wanted rid of does not stay usable indefinitely. */ private const IMAGE_SECRET_GRACE = 30 * DAY_IN_SECONDS; /** * Replaces both secrets with fresh ones. * * The two behave completely differently under a change, and that is the * whole reason this method exists rather than a line of code somewhere: * * The link password can be replaced at any moment with no consequence at * all. It travels inside every link -- data-cxk, or the second argument of * the javascript: call -- so a link already sitting in a cache carries the * password it was made with and goes on working for ever. Measured, not * assumed: the note in updateCryptXSettings() claiming that a new password * kills cached links describes a format that no longer exists. * * The image secret is the opposite: it never leaves the server, so a token * in a cached page can only be read while the secret that made it is still * known. Replacing it therefore keeps the old one for a grace period, and * ImageToken::read() falls back to it. * * @return void */ public function rotateSecrets(): void { $previous = $this->peekImageTokenSecret(); unset($this->options['encryption_password'], $this->options['image_token_secret']); if ($previous !== '') { $this->options['image_token_secret_previous'] = $previous; $this->options['image_token_secret_previous_until'] = time() + self::IMAGE_SECRET_GRACE; } // Minted here rather than left to the next page view, so that a failure // is visible while an administrator is looking at the screen. $this->getEncryptionPassword(); $this->getImageTokenSecret(); $this->options['secrets_rotated_at'] = time(); $this->save(); } /** * The replaced image secret, while it is still within its grace period. * * @return string The previous secret, or an empty string. */ public function previousImageTokenSecret(): string { $until = (int) ($this->options['image_token_secret_previous_until'] ?? 0); if ($until < time()) { return ''; } return (string) ($this->options['image_token_secret_previous'] ?? ''); } /** * Drops a replaced image secret once its grace period is over. * * Separate from the getter above, and called only from the settings screen, * because the getter runs on the image endpoint -- on an unauthenticated * request from a stranger. Writing an option there is the same mistake that * was taken out of ImageToken::read() one round earlier: a stranger should * not decide when this site writes to its own database. * * Returning '' is already enough to stop using the value. This is about not * leaving a retired secret sitting in wp_options for ever next to the one * that replaced it -- hygiene, not a hole: whoever can read that table has * the current secret anyway. * * @return void */ public function forgetExpiredImageTokenSecret(): void { $until = (int) ($this->options['image_token_secret_previous_until'] ?? 0); if ($until >= time() || empty($this->options['image_token_secret_previous'])) { return; } $this->options['image_token_secret_previous'] = null; $this->options['image_token_secret_previous_until'] = 0; $this->save(); } /** * When the secrets were last replaced, if ever. * * @return int A Unix timestamp, or 0. */ public function secretsRotatedAt(): int { return (int) ($this->options['secrets_rotated_at'] ?? 0); } /** * The image secret if there is one, without minting. * * Reading a token never needs one to exist: if there is no secret, no token * was ever made and nothing can decode. Minting on the read path would let * a stranger who calls the image endpoint decide the moment the secret * comes into being -- and two such calls arriving together can each mint * one, after which whichever loses has published image URLs that will never * resolve again. Narrow, but the consequence outlives the request: those * URLs sit in caches. * * To be precise about what this does and does not fix: it takes the timing * away from a stranger. Two ordinary first page views arriving together can * still each mint, with the same consequence -- the same race the link * password has always had. That window closes at the first uncached render; * it is not worth an option row of its own. * * @return string The stored secret, or an empty string. */ public function peekImageTokenSecret(): string { return (string) ($this->options['image_token_secret'] ?? ''); } }