← All changes | includes/classes/utils/Options.php +18 -60 trunk → 2.2.0 View file →

		@@ -3,13 +3,10 @@
3	3	exit;
4	4	}
5	5
6	6	class TCMP_Options {
	7	+ public function __construct() {
7	8
8		- private $request_data;
9		-
10		- public function __construct() {
11		- $this->request_data = array();
12	9	}
13	10
14	11	//Cache
15	12	private function getCacheName( $array ) {
		@@ -97,42 +94,24 @@
97	94	$key = $this->get_key( $key );
98	95	$wp_session[ $key ] = $value;
99	96	}
100	97
101		- // Request-scoped state.
102		- //
103		- // These values are the plugin's own per-request scratch space: the post being
104		- // rendered, the ids of snippets already written, the pending admin notices.
105		- // Every one of them is produced by this plugin during the request and read
106		- // back by it later in the same request. None is ever legitimately supplied by
107		- // the client.
108		- //
109		- // getRequest() used to fall back to $_POST['TCM_' . $key] whenever a key was
110		- // absent from the in-memory store, which turned all of that internal state
111		- // into an unauthenticated input surface. That is CVE-2026-15180: a POST of
112		- // TCM_ErrorMessages[0] landed in the admin notice box on the next page render.
113		- // The fallback was already vestigial — nothing in the plugin has written to
114		- // $_POST['TCM_*'] since 2.5.0 (RDU-1630) — so it is removed outright rather
115		- // than gated behind a nonce, which would have kept an attacker-influenced
116		- // path alive for no caller's benefit.
117		- //
118		- // Consequence for removeRequest(): unsetting the POST field is no longer a
119		- // way to clear a key, so it now clears the in-memory entry. That also fixes
120		- // the clean-up it was always meant to perform — writeMessages( clean: true )
121		- // previously only ever removed a POST field that the plugin itself never set,
122		- // so an internally queued notice survived its own render and could be emitted
123		- // a second time by the next writeMessages() call in the same request
124		- // (includes/admin/editor.php does exactly that).
	98	+ //$_REQUEST
	99	+ //However WP enforces its own logic - during load process wp_magic_quotes() processes variables to emulate magic quotes setting and enforces $_REQUEST to contain combination of $_GET and $_POST, no matter what PHP configuration says.
125	100	private function removeRequest( $key ) {
126		- unset( $this->request_data[ $key ] );
	101	+ $key = $this->get_key( $key );
	102	+ if ( isset( $_POST[ $key ] ) ) {
	103	+ unset( $_POST[ $key ] );
	104	+ }
127	105	}
128	106	private function getRequest( $key, $default = false ) {
	107	+ $key = $this->get_key( $key );
129	108	$result = $default;
130		- if ( isset( $this->request_data[ $key ] ) ) {
131		- if ( is_object( $this->request_data[ $key ] ) ) {
132		- $result = clone $this->request_data[ $key ];
	109	+ if ( isset( $_POST[ $key ] ) ) {
	110	+ if ( is_object( $_POST[ $key ] ) ) {
	111	+ $result = clone $_POST[ $key ];
133	112	} else {
134		- $result = $this->request_data[ $key ];
	113	+ $result = $_POST[ $key ];
135	114	}
136	115	$result = $this->recursive_wp_kses( $result );
137	116	}
138	117	return $result;
		@@ -137,25 +116,8 @@
137	116	}
138	117	return $result;
139	118	}
140	119
141		- // Sanitize a request-scoped value tree.
142		- //
143		- // The permissive whitelist in tcmp_free_wp_kses_tags_attrs.php exists for
144		- // exactly one kind of value: a snippet body. Those are admin-authored
145		- // tracking snippets and legitimately contain <script>, <iframe> and onload —
146		- // that is the plugin's purpose. Applying the same whitelist to every other
147		- // string, as this method used to, extended "may contain executable markup" to
148		- // values that are never tracking code: notice text, names, ids.
149		- //
150		- // So the 'code' field keeps the permissive pass (still opt-out-able via Skip
151		- // Code Sanitization, since a snippet may need markup the whitelist omits) and
152		- // everything else gets wp_kses_post(), which keeps the formatting notices
153		- // legitimately embed — <a href>, <strong>, <span style> — while dropping
154		- // script/iframe/style and every on* handler.
155		- //
156		- // This mirrors the split TCMP_Utils::sanitize_post_or_get() already applies on
157		- // the save path (F-06): permissive for 'code', plain text for the rest.
158	120	public function recursive_wp_kses( $array ) {
159	121	global $tcmp_allowed_html_tags;
160	122	foreach ( $array as $key => &$value ) {
161	123	if ( is_array( $value ) ) {
		@@ -164,9 +126,9 @@
164	126	if ( ! $this->getSkipCodeSanitization() ) {
165	127	$value = wp_kses( $value, $tcmp_allowed_html_tags );
166	128	}
167	129	} elseif ( is_string( $value ) ) {
168		- $value = wp_kses_post( $value );
	130	+ $value = wp_kses( $value, $tcmp_allowed_html_tags );
169	131	} else {
170	132	// do nothing ... could be a video or graphics object
171	133	}
172	134	}
		@@ -173,9 +135,10 @@
173	135	return $array;
174	136	}
175	137
176	138	private function setRequest( $key, $value ) {
177		- $this->request_data[ $key ] = $value;
	139	+ $key = $this->get_key( $key );
	140	+ $_POST[ $key ] = $value;
178	141	}
179	142
180	143	public function isPluginFirstInstall() {
181	144	return $this->getOption( 'PluginFirstInstall', false );
		@@ -388,19 +351,14 @@
388	351	private function writeGenericMessages( $type, $clean = true ) {
389	352	$type = sanitize_text_field( $type );
390	353	$result = false;
391	354	$array = $this->getRequest( $type . 'Messages', array() );
	355	+ // These messages are built by the plugin and have been already sanitized.
	356	+ // Trying to sanitize them again will break plugin functionality since some of the messages contain html.
392	357	if ( is_array( $array ) && count( $array ) > 0 ) {
393	358	$result = true;
394		- // Escape at the sink so safety no longer depends on every caller
395		- // pre-escaping its message arguments (see F-04). wp_kses_post keeps
396		- // the intentional markup (links, styled spans) some notices embed
397		- // while neutralising anything dangerous. It now wraps the wpautop()
398		- // result rather than each message, so the escaping is applied to
399		- // everything that is actually echoed.
400		- $html = wpautop( implode( "\n", $array ) );
401	359	?>
402		- <div class="tcmp-box-<?php echo esc_attr( strtolower( $type ) ); ?>"><?php echo wp_kses_post( $html ); ?></div>
	360	+ <div class="tcmp-box-<?php echo strtolower( $type ); ?>"><?php echo wpautop( implode( "\n", $array ) ); ?></div>
403	361	<?php
404	362	}
405	363	if ( $clean ) {
406	364	$this->removeRequest( $type . 'Messages' );