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Vigilant – 100% Free Security Suite: Firewall, 2FA, Login, Headers, Scanner… / 2.11.8
Vigilant – 100% Free Security Suite: Firewall, 2FA, Login, Headers, Scanner… v2.11.8
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← All changes | includes/class-database.php +145 -22 2.10.52.11.8 View file →
@@ -29,8 +29,18 @@
29 29 */
30 30 const DB_VERSION_OPTION = 'vigilante_db_version';
31 31
32 32 /**
33 + * Records that the destructive part of the 2.11.0 migration already ran.
34 + *
35 + * A marker of its own, not a point on the version chain, because what it
36 + * governs deletes rows. See purge_for_2_11_0().
37 + *
38 + * @since 2.11.4
39 + */
40 + const PURGE_2_11_0_OPTION = 'vigilante_purge_2_11_0_done';
41 +
42 + /**
33 43 * Activity log table name (without prefix)
34 44 *
35 45 * @var string
36 46 */
@@ -103,18 +113,8 @@
103 113 return $this->wpdb->prefix . $table;
104 114 }
105 115
106 116 /**
107 - * Get escaped table name for use in SQL queries
108 - *
109 - * @param string $table Full table name.
110 - * @return string Escaped table name with backticks.
111 - */
112 - private function esc_table( $table ) {
113 - return '`' . esc_sql( $table ) . '`';
114 - }
115 -
116 - /**
117 117 * Get activity log table name
118 118 *
119 119 * @return string
120 120 */
@@ -262,9 +262,9 @@
262 262 // 2FA Codes table
263 263 $two_factor_codes_sql = "CREATE TABLE {$this->get_2fa_codes_table()} (
264 264 id bigint(20) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,
265 265 user_id bigint(20) unsigned NOT NULL,
266 - code varchar(6) NOT NULL,
266 + code varchar(64) NOT NULL,
267 267 created_at datetime NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
268 268 expires_at datetime NOT NULL,
269 269 attempts int(11) unsigned DEFAULT 0,
270 270 used tinyint(1) DEFAULT 0,
@@ -317,15 +317,49 @@
317 317 ) $charset_collate;";
318 318
319 319 dbDelta( $two_factor_totp_sql );
320 320
321 - // Store database version
322 - update_option( self::DB_VERSION_OPTION, self::DB_VERSION );
321 + $this->store_schema_version();
323 322
324 323 return $result;
325 324 }
326 325
327 326 /**
327 + * Write the schema version, but never walk the stored value backwards
328 + *
329 + * vigilante_db_version is written on two different scales into the same
330 + * option: this class counts in schema versions, currently 1.4.0, and
331 + * Vigilante_Admin::run_migrations() counts in plugin versions, currently
332 + * 2.11.0. For version_compare, 1.4.0 is LOWER than 1.14.0, so a site whose
333 + * option was last written here reads as being behind almost every step of
334 + * that chain and runs them all again.
335 + *
336 + * That was not a corner case. create_tables() is called unconditionally by
337 + * the activator, so deactivating and reactivating the plugin on a perfectly
338 + * up-to-date site sent it back to 1.4.0 and replayed eleven migrations,
339 + * among them the one that empties the trusted devices and the pending
340 + * second-factor codes. Every user of that site had to pass the second
341 + * factor again, for no reason, every single time somebody toggled the
342 + * plugin. Reported by @calzbert, who worked it out from the code after the
343 + * 1.4.0 reading turned up on a site here.
344 + *
345 + * Refusing to go backwards fixes that without touching the two scales,
346 + * which is a separate job. A brand new site still starts here, with no
347 + * option at all, and that is correct: it has never run the chain.
348 + *
349 + * @since 2.11.4
350 + *
351 + * @return void
352 + */
353 + private function store_schema_version() {
354 + $stored = get_option( self::DB_VERSION_OPTION, '0' );
355 +
356 + if ( version_compare( $stored, self::DB_VERSION, '<' ) ) {
357 + update_option( self::DB_VERSION_OPTION, self::DB_VERSION );
358 + }
359 + }
360 +
361 + /**
328 362 * Check if tables need to be updated
329 363 *
330 364 * @return bool True if update needed.
331 365 */
@@ -375,13 +409,75 @@
375 409 }
376 410 }
377 411 // phpcs:enable WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching, WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
378 412
379 - // Update stored version
380 - update_option( self::DB_VERSION_OPTION, self::DB_VERSION );
413 + $this->store_schema_version();
381 414 }
382 415
383 416 /**
417 + * Schema changes and purges of the 2.11.0 security release
418 + *
419 + * Called from the 2.11.0 block of Vigilante_Admin::run_migrations(), not
420 + * from needs_update(): the vigilante_db_version option is shared with that
421 + * chain and on any updated site it already holds a plugin version (2.9.9 or
422 + * later), so a bump of DB_VERSION would never fire. create_tables() widens
423 + * the code column on its own through dbDelta; this method does what dbDelta
424 + * cannot, which is deleting rows.
425 + *
426 + * - Trusted devices identified a browser by its User-Agent (S1). If the old
427 + * rows survived, the bypass would survive with them.
428 + * - Email codes were stored in clear (S11). They are compared against a
429 + * hash from now on, so any pending code would fail; they expire in
430 + * minutes and a new one is a click away.
431 + *
432 + * @since 2.11.0
433 + *
434 + * @return bool True when it ran, false when it had already run.
435 + */
436 + public function purge_for_2_11_0() {
437 + /*
438 + * Its own one-off marker, and not a point on the version chain.
439 + *
440 + * This deletes rows, and it hung off a version comparison that could
441 + * walk backwards, so every reactivation replayed it. store_schema_version()
442 + * closes that particular door, but the lesson is more general than the
443 + * door: a migration that deletes rows should not depend on a version
444 + * number staying where it was put.
445 + *
446 + * Both the marker and the tables are per site (get_table_name() builds
447 + * on $wpdb->prefix), so the pair travels together and there is no case
448 + * where one site's marker stops another site's purge. A subsite created
449 + * after a network-wide activation is NOT covered by this marker, and
450 + * does not need to be: it has no marker, so it purges, and what it
451 + * purges are its own tables, created empty moments earlier.
452 + *
453 + * Marked AFTER the deletes, unlike the network sweep of the baselines,
454 + * and the asymmetry is deliberate. There, repeating the walk is
455 + * expensive and not finishing it costs only time. Here, repeating the
456 + * deletes costs one more prompt for the second factor, while not doing
457 + * them at all would leave the trusted devices that were identified by
458 + * User-Agent in place, which is the bypass this purge exists to close.
459 + * When in doubt, repeat the harmless one. Marker added in 2.11.4.
460 + */
461 + if ( get_option( self::PURGE_2_11_0_OPTION ) ) {
462 + return false;
463 + }
464 +
465 + // phpcs:disable WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching, WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared -- %i placeholder requires WP 6.2+, and the sniff reports inside prepare(). Plugin tables, no cache to invalidate.
466 + $this->wpdb->query(
467 + $this->wpdb->prepare( 'DELETE FROM %i', $this->get_2fa_devices_table() )
468 + );
469 + $this->wpdb->query(
470 + $this->wpdb->prepare( 'DELETE FROM %i', $this->get_2fa_codes_table() )
471 + );
472 + // phpcs:enable WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching, WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
473 +
474 + update_option( self::PURGE_2_11_0_OPTION, '1', false );
475 +
476 + return true;
477 + }
478 +
479 + /**
384 480 * Drop all plugin tables
385 481 *
386 482 * @return bool
387 483 */
@@ -402,8 +498,9 @@
402 498 }
403 499 // phpcs:enable WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.SchemaChange
404 500
405 501 delete_option( self::DB_VERSION_OPTION );
502 + delete_option( self::PURGE_2_11_0_OPTION );
406 503
407 504 return true;
408 505 }
409 506
@@ -633,18 +730,35 @@
633 730 $ip_address = sanitize_text_field( $ip_address );
634 731 $username = sanitize_user( $username );
635 732 $status = sanitize_key( $status );
636 733 $user_agent = isset( $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] ) ) : '';
637 - $now = current_time( 'mysql' );
638 734
735 + /*
736 + * UTC, like every other timestamp this table is compared against.
737 + * Until 2.11.0 last_attempt was written in the site's local time while
738 + * get_failed_attempt_count() compared it against a UTC window and
739 + * set_lockout() wrote lockout_until in UTC, so the login lockout only
740 + * worked on sites whose timezone is UTC: with a positive offset the
741 + * lockout was never seen as active, with a negative one the attempts
742 + * were never counted (S18, found on 5 Sep 2026 while testing S8).
743 + */
744 + $now = current_time( 'mysql', true );
745 +
639 746 // Check if record exists for this IP + username
640 747 // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
641 748 $existing = $this->wpdb->get_row( $this->wpdb->prepare( 'SELECT * FROM %i WHERE ip_address = %s AND username = %s', $table, $ip_address, $username ), ARRAY_A );
642 749
643 750 if ( $existing ) {
751 + // An active lockout keeps its status: recording a failure on top
752 + // of it used to flip the row back to 'failed', so the lockout
753 + // vanished from is_locked_out() the moment anyone tried again (S8).
754 + $locked = 'lockout' === $existing['status']
755 + && ! empty( $existing['lockout_until'] )
756 + && $existing['lockout_until'] > $now;
757 +
644 758 // Update existing record
645 759 $data = array(
646 - 'status' => $status,
760 + 'status' => $locked ? 'lockout' : $status,
647 761 'attempt_count' => $existing['attempt_count'] + 1,
648 762 'last_attempt' => $now,
649 763 'user_agent' => $user_agent,
650 764 );
@@ -739,9 +853,10 @@
739 853 * @return array|false Lockout data or false if not locked.
740 854 */
741 855 public function is_locked_out( $ip_address ) {
742 856 $table = $this->get_login_attempts_table();
743 - $now = current_time( 'mysql' );
857 + // UTC: lockout_until is written with gmdate(). See record_login_attempt() (S18).
858 + $now = current_time( 'mysql', true );
744 859
745 860 // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
746 861 $lockout = $this->wpdb->get_row( $this->wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM %i WHERE ip_address = %s AND lockout_until > %s AND status = 'lockout' ORDER BY lockout_until DESC LIMIT 1", $table, $ip_address, $now ), ARRAY_A );
747 862
@@ -767,9 +882,10 @@
767 882 * @return array List of locked IPs with their data.
768 883 */
769 884 public function get_active_lockouts() {
770 885 $table = $this->get_login_attempts_table();
771 - $now = current_time( 'mysql' );
886 + // UTC: lockout_until is written with gmdate(). See record_login_attempt() (S18).
887 + $now = current_time( 'mysql', true );
772 888
773 889 // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
774 890 $lockouts = $this->wpdb->get_results( $this->wpdb->prepare( "SELECT ip_address, username, attempt_count as attempts, lockout_until as locked_until, last_attempt FROM %i WHERE lockout_until > %s AND status = 'lockout' ORDER BY lockout_until DESC", $table, $now ) );
775 891
@@ -814,10 +930,11 @@
814 930 public function cleanup_old_login_attempts( $hours = 24 ) {
815 931 $table = $this->get_login_attempts_table();
816 932 $date = gmdate( 'Y-m-d H:i:s', strtotime( "-{$hours} hours" ) );
817 933
934 + // UTC on both sides, like the rest of this table since 2.11.0 (S18).
818 935 // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
819 - $deleted = $this->wpdb->query( $this->wpdb->prepare( 'DELETE FROM %i WHERE last_attempt < %s AND (lockout_until IS NULL OR lockout_until < %s)', $table, $date, current_time( 'mysql' ) ) );
936 + $deleted = $this->wpdb->query( $this->wpdb->prepare( 'DELETE FROM %i WHERE last_attempt < %s AND (lockout_until IS NULL OR lockout_until < %s)', $table, $date, current_time( 'mysql', true ) ) );
820 937
821 938 return $deleted ? $deleted : 0;
822 939 }
823 940
@@ -827,9 +944,10 @@
827 944 * @return array
828 945 */
829 946 public function get_locked_out_ips() {
830 947 $table = $this->get_login_attempts_table();
831 - $now = current_time( 'mysql' );
948 + // UTC: lockout_until is written with gmdate(). See record_login_attempt() (S18).
949 + $now = current_time( 'mysql', true );
832 950
833 951 // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared
834 952 $results = $this->wpdb->get_results( $this->wpdb->prepare( "SELECT DISTINCT ip_address, lockout_until, attempt_count, last_attempt FROM %i WHERE lockout_until > %s AND status = 'lockout' ORDER BY lockout_until DESC", $table, $now ), ARRAY_A );
835 953
@@ -1058,10 +1176,15 @@
1058 1176 'code' => $code,
1059 1177 'expires_at' => $expires_at,
1060 1178 'attempts' => 0,
1061 1179 'used' => 0,
1180 + // In UTC, like expires_at. Left to the column default it was the
1181 + // MySQL server's local time, and the resend limit compares it with
1182 + // time(): on servers behind UTC it never held, and ahead of UTC it
1183 + // refused a legitimate resend for hours (rule 19, 2.11.8).
1184 + 'created_at' => current_time( 'mysql', true ),
1062 1185 ),
1063 - array( '%d', '%s', '%s', '%d', '%d' )
1186 + array( '%d', '%s', '%s', '%d', '%d', '%s' )
1064 1187 );
1065 1188
1066 1189 return $result ? $this->wpdb->insert_id : false;
1067 1190 }