| @@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ | ||
| 2 | 2 | /** |
| 3 | 3 | * IP matching utilities |
| 4 | 4 | * |
| 5 | 5 | * Shared IP/pattern matching for the firewall and login modules. Supports |
| 6 | - * exact addresses, CIDR ranges and wildcards, for both IPv4 and IPv6. | |
| 6 | + * exact addresses, CIDR ranges and wildcards, for both IPv4 and IPv6. It is | |
| 7 | + * also where the plugin reads what the client sends about the request: the | |
| 8 | + * client address (get_client_ip()) and the request target (request_uri()). | |
| 7 | 9 | * |
| 8 | 10 | * @package Vigilante |
| 9 | 11 | */ |
| 10 | 12 | |
| @@ -39,10 +41,11 @@ | ||
| 39 | 41 | if ( '' === $ip || '' === $pattern ) { |
| 40 | 42 | return false; |
| 41 | 43 | } |
| 42 | 44 | |
| 43 | - // Exact match (also covers fully-written IPv6). | |
| 44 | - if ( $ip === $pattern ) { | |
| 45 | + // Exact match, comparing what the addresses ARE and not how they are | |
| 46 | + // written (see same_address()). | |
| 47 | + if ( self::same_address( $ip, $pattern ) ) { | |
| 45 | 48 | return true; |
| 46 | 49 | } |
| 47 | 50 | |
| 48 | 51 | // CIDR notation. |
| @@ -79,8 +82,65 @@ | ||
| 79 | 82 | return false; |
| 80 | 83 | } |
| 81 | 84 | |
| 82 | 85 | /** |
| 86 | + * Whether an address is in a list, matching exact addresses and CIDR only. | |
| 87 | + * | |
| 88 | + * The strict cousin of in_list(), for deciding identity rather than | |
| 89 | + * filtering traffic. A wildcard entry (1.2.* or a bare *) is never honoured | |
| 90 | + * here: a proxy the site delegates its client IP to is a specific machine | |
| 91 | + * or a specific range, and a wildcard in that role is the trust-everyone | |
| 92 | + * footgun that would reopen the forwarded-header spoofing (6.1) this release | |
| 93 | + * closes, since matches() turns a bare * into /^.*$/ and trusts every peer. | |
| 94 | + * Kept apart from in_list() on purpose, so the firewall whitelist keeps its | |
| 95 | + * wildcards while the proxy-trust decision cannot grow one. | |
| 96 | + * | |
| 97 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 98 | + * | |
| 99 | + * @param string $ip Address to test. | |
| 100 | + * @param array $list List of exact addresses or CIDR ranges. | |
| 101 | + * @return bool | |
| 102 | + */ | |
| 103 | + public static function in_list_ip_or_cidr( $ip, $list ) { | |
| 104 | + if ( empty( $list ) || ! is_array( $list ) ) { | |
| 105 | + return false; | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + | |
| 108 | + $ip = trim( (string) $ip ); | |
| 109 | + if ( '' === $ip ) { | |
| 110 | + return false; | |
| 111 | + } | |
| 112 | + | |
| 113 | + foreach ( $list as $pattern ) { | |
| 114 | + $pattern = trim( (string) $pattern ); | |
| 115 | + | |
| 116 | + if ( '' === $pattern || false !== strpos( $pattern, '*' ) ) { | |
| 117 | + continue; | |
| 118 | + } | |
| 119 | + | |
| 120 | + if ( self::same_address( $ip, $pattern ) ) { | |
| 121 | + return true; | |
| 122 | + } | |
| 123 | + | |
| 124 | + if ( false !== strpos( $pattern, '/' ) ) { | |
| 125 | + // A range too wide to name anything is ignored here as well as | |
| 126 | + // rejected on the way in: an entry can arrive by import or from | |
| 127 | + // an older version, and it must not turn every peer into a | |
| 128 | + // trusted proxy. See proxy_prefix_is_sane(). | |
| 129 | + if ( ! self::proxy_prefix_is_sane( $pattern ) ) { | |
| 130 | + continue; | |
| 131 | + } | |
| 132 | + | |
| 133 | + if ( self::cidr_match( $ip, $pattern ) ) { | |
| 134 | + return true; | |
| 135 | + } | |
| 136 | + } | |
| 137 | + } | |
| 138 | + | |
| 139 | + return false; | |
| 140 | + } | |
| 141 | + | |
| 142 | + /** | |
| 83 | 143 | * Whether a string is a pattern this class can actually match. |
| 84 | 144 | * |
| 85 | 145 | * The counterpart of matches(): everything this returns true for is |
| 86 | 146 | * something the matcher understands, and everything else is noise that |
| @@ -176,8 +236,171 @@ | ||
| 176 | 236 | ); |
| 177 | 237 | } |
| 178 | 238 | |
| 179 | 239 | /** |
| 240 | + * Whether a string is a proxy address this class trusts to set a header. | |
| 241 | + * | |
| 242 | + * A valid pattern that is not a wildcard: an exact address or a CIDR range. | |
| 243 | + * The counterpart of in_list_ip_or_cidr() for the save path, so a wildcard | |
| 244 | + * typed into the trusted proxies field is rejected with feedback instead of | |
| 245 | + * sitting there matching nothing (or, before the strict matcher, everything). | |
| 246 | + * | |
| 247 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 248 | + * | |
| 249 | + * @param string $pattern Candidate pattern. | |
| 250 | + * @return bool | |
| 251 | + */ | |
| 252 | + public static function is_valid_proxy( $pattern ) { | |
| 253 | + $pattern = trim( (string) $pattern ); | |
| 254 | + | |
| 255 | + if ( false !== strpos( $pattern, '*' ) || ! self::is_valid_pattern( $pattern ) ) { | |
| 256 | + return false; | |
| 257 | + } | |
| 258 | + | |
| 259 | + return self::proxy_prefix_is_sane( $pattern ); | |
| 260 | + } | |
| 261 | + | |
| 262 | + /** | |
| 263 | + * Whether a CIDR entry is narrow enough to name a proxy | |
| 264 | + * | |
| 265 | + * A prefix length of zero matches every address, so 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 say | |
| 266 | + * exactly what the rejected '*' says, written as a CIDR. Rejecting the | |
| 267 | + * wildcard and accepting those was the same footgun with another spelling: | |
| 268 | + * with either one in the list every peer counts as a trusted proxy and any | |
| 269 | + * visitor picks the address the firewall sees, which is the forwarded-header | |
| 270 | + * spoofing (6.1) this list exists to prevent. Found by the file-by-file | |
| 271 | + * review of 2.11.10. | |
| 272 | + * | |
| 273 | + * Stopping at zero was not enough, and that is the second cross review of | |
| 274 | + * 2.11.10: 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1 are two accepted entries that between | |
| 275 | + * them cover the whole internet, with the same effect and no warning. So the | |
| 276 | + * question is not "is it zero" but "can this range name a proxy". The floors | |
| 277 | + * are 8 for IPv4, the widest range that still names something real (the | |
| 278 | + * classic private network is 10.0.0.0/8), and 7 for IPv6, because fc00::/7 is | |
| 279 | + * how the whole IPv6 private space is written and this very class treats it | |
| 280 | + * as the own network in is_own_network(). A first version put the IPv6 floor | |
| 281 | + * at 16 and refused fc00::/7, fd00::/8 (what Docker hands out) and fe80::/10, | |
| 282 | + * so a list that already held one of them stopped honouring the header | |
| 283 | + * altogether and every visitor came out with the proxy's address: the tool | |
| 284 | + * contradicting itself about what a private network is. Found by the third | |
| 285 | + * cross review of 2.11.10. With 7, ::/0 and 2000::/3, which is all of the | |
| 286 | + * routable internet, are still refused. | |
| 287 | + * | |
| 288 | + * Measured against what the CDNs publish, and all of them pass: Cloudflare | |
| 289 | + * (/13, /15, /29), Fastly (/16, /32), Akamai (/10, /11, /13, /24), Sucuri | |
| 290 | + * (/22, /23), Bunny (/32), CloudFront (/15) and Google (/16, /22). | |
| 291 | + * | |
| 292 | + * Kept deliberately as a floor and not as a warning: an entry this wide is | |
| 293 | + * indistinguishable from the wildcard that is already refused, and the cost | |
| 294 | + * of being wrong is that any visitor chooses their own address. | |
| 295 | + * | |
| 296 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 297 | + * | |
| 298 | + * @param string $pattern Address or CIDR range. | |
| 299 | + * @return bool True when it is an exact address or a narrow enough range. | |
| 300 | + */ | |
| 301 | + public static function proxy_prefix_is_sane( $pattern ) { | |
| 302 | + $pattern = trim( (string) $pattern ); | |
| 303 | + | |
| 304 | + if ( false === strpos( $pattern, '/' ) ) { | |
| 305 | + return true; | |
| 306 | + } | |
| 307 | + | |
| 308 | + $parts = explode( '/', $pattern, 2 ); | |
| 309 | + | |
| 310 | + if ( 2 !== count( $parts ) ) { | |
| 311 | + return false; | |
| 312 | + } | |
| 313 | + | |
| 314 | + $subnet = trim( $parts[0] ); | |
| 315 | + $bits = (int) trim( $parts[1] ); | |
| 316 | + $packed = inet_pton( $subnet ); | |
| 317 | + | |
| 318 | + if ( false === $packed ) { | |
| 319 | + return false; | |
| 320 | + } | |
| 321 | + | |
| 322 | + $minimo = ( 4 === strlen( $packed ) ) ? 8 : 7; | |
| 323 | + | |
| 324 | + return ( $bits >= $minimo ); | |
| 325 | + } | |
| 326 | + | |
| 327 | + /** | |
| 328 | + * Whether two written addresses are the same address | |
| 329 | + * | |
| 330 | + * Comparing the strings was enough for IPv4 and wrong for IPv6, where the | |
| 331 | + * same address has many spellings: 2001:DB8::1, 2001:db8::1 and | |
| 332 | + * 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 are one address written three | |
| 333 | + * ways, and only the last two compared equal to each other. It mattered | |
| 334 | + * because the .htaccess side normalises with inet_pton()/inet_ntop() before | |
| 335 | + * writing its rule, so Apache exempted a peer that PHP did not recognise, | |
| 336 | + * which is the direction that opens something: measured against a real | |
| 337 | + * Apache by the second cross review of 2.11.10. | |
| 338 | + * | |
| 339 | + * Falls back to the string comparison when either side is not an address, so | |
| 340 | + * nothing that used to match stops matching. | |
| 341 | + * | |
| 342 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 343 | + * | |
| 344 | + * @param string $a First address. | |
| 345 | + * @param string $b Second address. | |
| 346 | + * @return bool | |
| 347 | + */ | |
| 348 | + public static function same_address( $a, $b ) { | |
| 349 | + if ( $a === $b ) { | |
| 350 | + return true; | |
| 351 | + } | |
| 352 | + | |
| 353 | + $pa = inet_pton( $a ); | |
| 354 | + $pb = inet_pton( $b ); | |
| 355 | + | |
| 356 | + if ( false === $pa || false === $pb ) { | |
| 357 | + return false; | |
| 358 | + } | |
| 359 | + | |
| 360 | + return ( $pa === $pb ); | |
| 361 | + } | |
| 362 | + | |
| 363 | + /** | |
| 364 | + * Split a list into the proxy addresses that are valid and the ones that are not. | |
| 365 | + * | |
| 366 | + * Like split_list(), but rejecting wildcards: the trusted proxies list feeds | |
| 367 | + * an identity decision, and only exact addresses and CIDR ranges belong there. | |
| 368 | + * | |
| 369 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 370 | + * | |
| 371 | + * @param array|string $list List of patterns, or a newline separated string. | |
| 372 | + * @return array{valid: string[], rejected: string[]} | |
| 373 | + */ | |
| 374 | + public static function split_list_ip_or_cidr( $list ) { | |
| 375 | + if ( is_string( $list ) ) { | |
| 376 | + $list = preg_split( '/[\r\n]+/', $list ); | |
| 377 | + } | |
| 378 | + | |
| 379 | + $valid = array(); | |
| 380 | + $rejected = array(); | |
| 381 | + | |
| 382 | + foreach ( (array) $list as $entry ) { | |
| 383 | + $entry = trim( (string) $entry ); | |
| 384 | + | |
| 385 | + if ( '' === $entry ) { | |
| 386 | + continue; | |
| 387 | + } | |
| 388 | + | |
| 389 | + if ( self::is_valid_proxy( $entry ) ) { | |
| 390 | + $valid[] = $entry; | |
| 391 | + } else { | |
| 392 | + $rejected[] = $entry; | |
| 393 | + } | |
| 394 | + } | |
| 395 | + | |
| 396 | + return array( | |
| 397 | + 'valid' => array_values( array_unique( $valid ) ), | |
| 398 | + 'rejected' => array_values( array_unique( $rejected ) ), | |
| 399 | + ); | |
| 400 | + } | |
| 401 | + | |
| 402 | + /** | |
| 180 | 403 | * Whether a wildcard pattern is plausible for one address family. |
| 181 | 404 | * |
| 182 | 405 | * A bare '*' is rejected on purpose: as a whitelist it would let everyone |
| 183 | 406 | * in and as a blacklist it would lock everyone out, and nobody types that |
| @@ -356,42 +579,127 @@ | ||
| 356 | 579 | return ''; |
| 357 | 580 | } |
| 358 | 581 | |
| 359 | 582 | /** |
| 583 | + * The proxy IPs/CIDRs the admin declared their forwarded header comes from. | |
| 584 | + * | |
| 585 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 586 | + * | |
| 587 | + * @return string[] | |
| 588 | + */ | |
| 589 | + public static function trusted_proxies() { | |
| 590 | + $options = get_option( 'vigilante_options' ); | |
| 591 | + $list = ( is_array( $options ) && isset( $options['firewall']['trusted_proxies'] ) ) ? $options['firewall']['trusted_proxies'] : array(); | |
| 592 | + return is_array( $list ) ? $list : array(); | |
| 593 | + } | |
| 594 | + | |
| 595 | + /** | |
| 596 | + * Cloudflare's published edge ranges, so CF-Connecting-IP verifies itself. | |
| 597 | + * | |
| 598 | + * From https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/ (stable, changes rarely). Bundled so | |
| 599 | + * a site behind Cloudflare does not have to list them by hand; if they ever | |
| 600 | + * change, the admin can add the new ones to the trusted proxies list. | |
| 601 | + * | |
| 602 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 603 | + * | |
| 604 | + * @return string[] | |
| 605 | + */ | |
| 606 | + public static function cloudflare_ranges() { | |
| 607 | + return array( | |
| 608 | + '173.245.48.0/20', '103.21.244.0/22', '103.22.200.0/22', '103.31.4.0/22', | |
| 609 | + '141.101.64.0/18', '108.162.192.0/18', '190.93.240.0/20', '188.114.96.0/20', | |
| 610 | + '197.234.240.0/22', '198.41.128.0/17', '162.158.0.0/15', '104.16.0.0/13', | |
| 611 | + '104.24.0.0/14', '172.64.0.0/13', '131.0.72.0/22', | |
| 612 | + '2400:cb00::/32', '2606:4700::/32', '2803:f800::/32', '2405:b500::/32', | |
| 613 | + '2405:8100::/32', '2a06:98c0::/29', '2c0f:f248::/32', | |
| 614 | + ); | |
| 615 | + } | |
| 616 | + | |
| 617 | + /** | |
| 618 | + * Whether the TCP peer may be trusted to have set the forwarded header | |
| 619 | + * | |
| 620 | + * The reviewer of 2.11.8 was right: honouring CF-Connecting-IP, | |
| 621 | + * X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP without checking who sent them lets any | |
| 622 | + * visitor whose request reaches PHP directly forge the address the firewall, | |
| 623 | + * the whitelist and the rate limiter act on. So the header is honoured only | |
| 624 | + * when the real connection, REMOTE_ADDR, is a proxy we have reason to trust: | |
| 625 | + * | |
| 626 | + * - an exact address or CIDR range in the admin's trusted proxies list | |
| 627 | + * (wins for any header); a wildcard there is ignored, see | |
| 628 | + * in_list_ip_or_cidr(); | |
| 629 | + * - for CF-Connecting-IP, one of Cloudflare's published ranges, since only | |
| 630 | + * Cloudflare sends that header; | |
| 631 | + * - with no list configured, an address of your own network (a reverse proxy | |
| 632 | + * in front of PHP, a load balancer in a private subnet), which a visitor | |
| 633 | + * hitting a public origin directly is not. | |
| 634 | + * | |
| 635 | + * A public load balancer that connects from a public address needs its IPs | |
| 636 | + * in the trusted proxies list; until then its header is not honoured and the | |
| 637 | + * connection address is used, which is safe. | |
| 638 | + * | |
| 639 | + * @since 2.11.9 | |
| 640 | + * | |
| 641 | + * @param string $remote Validated REMOTE_ADDR. | |
| 642 | + * @param string $header Trusted header key. | |
| 643 | + * @param string[] $trusted_proxies Configured proxy IPs/CIDRs. | |
| 644 | + * @return bool | |
| 645 | + */ | |
| 646 | + private static function peer_is_trusted_proxy( $remote, $header, $trusted_proxies ) { | |
| 647 | + // A dual-stack proxy connects as ::ffff:10.0.0.5; read it as the IPv4 it | |
| 648 | + // is, so a private reverse proxy is recognised as own network and a peer | |
| 649 | + // listed by its IPv4 matches. client_from_chain() already unmaps, this | |
| 650 | + // keeps the two sides symmetric (found by the cross review of 2.11.9). | |
| 651 | + $remote = self::unmap_ipv4( $remote ); | |
| 652 | + | |
| 653 | + if ( ! empty( $trusted_proxies ) && self::in_list_ip_or_cidr( $remote, $trusted_proxies ) ) { | |
| 654 | + return true; | |
| 655 | + } | |
| 656 | + | |
| 657 | + if ( 'cf-connecting-ip' === $header && self::in_list_ip_or_cidr( $remote, self::cloudflare_ranges() ) ) { | |
| 658 | + return true; | |
| 659 | + } | |
| 660 | + | |
| 661 | + return empty( $trusted_proxies ) && self::is_own_network( $remote ); | |
| 662 | + } | |
| 663 | + | |
| 664 | + /** | |
| 360 | 665 | * Resolve the client IP from a $_SERVER-like array. |
| 361 | 666 | * |
| 362 | 667 | * Only the real TCP peer (REMOTE_ADDR) is trusted by default, because it |
| 363 | - * cannot be spoofed. A forwarded-for / connecting-ip header is honoured | |
| 364 | - * ONLY when the admin has explicitly declared their site sits behind that | |
| 365 | - * proxy; otherwise any visitor could forge the header and impersonate any | |
| 366 | - * IP (bypassing the whitelist, evading the blacklist, poisoning the rate | |
| 367 | - * limiter, etc.). | |
| 668 | + * cannot be spoofed. A forwarded-for / connecting-ip header is honoured only | |
| 669 | + * when the admin has declared their site sits behind that proxy AND the | |
| 670 | + * connection actually comes from a proxy we trust (see | |
| 671 | + * peer_is_trusted_proxy()); otherwise any visitor could forge the header and | |
| 672 | + * impersonate any IP, bypassing the whitelist, evading the blacklist and | |
| 673 | + * poisoning the rate limiter. Reported by the wp.org review of 2.11.8. | |
| 368 | 674 | * |
| 369 | - * @param array $server A $_SERVER-like array. | |
| 370 | - * @param string $trusted_header One of the keys in trusted_header_map(), or '' for none. | |
| 675 | + * @param array $server A $_SERVER-like array. | |
| 676 | + * @param string $trusted_header One of the keys in trusted_header_map(), or '' for none. | |
| 677 | + * @param string[] $trusted_proxies Configured proxy IPs/CIDRs. | |
| 371 | 678 | * @return string Validated IP, or '0.0.0.0' when none could be determined. |
| 372 | 679 | */ |
| 373 | - public static function resolve_client_ip( $server, $trusted_header = '' ) { | |
| 374 | - $map = self::trusted_header_map(); | |
| 680 | + public static function resolve_client_ip( $server, $trusted_header = '', $trusted_proxies = array() ) { | |
| 681 | + $map = self::trusted_header_map(); | |
| 682 | + $remote = ''; | |
| 375 | 683 | |
| 376 | - if ( '' !== $trusted_header && isset( $map[ $trusted_header ] ) ) { | |
| 377 | - $key = $map[ $trusted_header ]; | |
| 378 | - if ( ! empty( $server[ $key ] ) ) { | |
| 379 | - $value = self::client_from_chain( (string) $server[ $key ] ); | |
| 380 | - if ( '' !== $value ) { | |
| 381 | - return $value; | |
| 382 | - } | |
| 684 | + if ( ! empty( $server['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) { | |
| 685 | + $candidate = trim( (string) $server['REMOTE_ADDR'] ); | |
| 686 | + if ( filter_var( $candidate, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP ) ) { | |
| 687 | + $remote = $candidate; | |
| 383 | 688 | } |
| 384 | 689 | } |
| 385 | 690 | |
| 386 | - if ( ! empty( $server['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) { | |
| 387 | - $remote = trim( (string) $server['REMOTE_ADDR'] ); | |
| 388 | - if ( filter_var( $remote, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP ) ) { | |
| 389 | - return $remote; | |
| 691 | + if ( '' !== $trusted_header && isset( $map[ $trusted_header ] ) && '' !== $remote | |
| 692 | + && ! empty( $server[ $map[ $trusted_header ] ] ) | |
| 693 | + && self::peer_is_trusted_proxy( $remote, $trusted_header, $trusted_proxies ) | |
| 694 | + ) { | |
| 695 | + $value = self::client_from_chain( (string) $server[ $map[ $trusted_header ] ] ); | |
| 696 | + if ( '' !== $value ) { | |
| 697 | + return $value; | |
| 390 | 698 | } |
| 391 | 699 | } |
| 392 | 700 | |
| 393 | - return '0.0.0.0'; | |
| 701 | + return '' !== $remote ? $remote : '0.0.0.0'; | |
| 394 | 702 | } |
| 395 | 703 | |
| 396 | 704 | /** |
| 397 | 705 | * The visitor address in a forwarded header, read from the proxy's end |
| @@ -559,7 +867,43 @@ | ||
| 559 | 867 | $server[ $key ] = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER[ $key ] ) ); |
| 560 | 868 | } |
| 561 | 869 | } |
| 562 | 870 | |
| 563 | - return self::resolve_client_ip( $server, $trusted ); | |
| 871 | + return self::resolve_client_ip( $server, $trusted, self::trusted_proxies() ); | |
| 872 | + } | |
| 873 | + | |
| 874 | + /** | |
| 875 | + * The request target as the client wrote it: path and query, with the | |
| 876 | + * percent-encoding and the UTF-8 bytes intact. | |
| 877 | + * | |
| 878 | + * The one reader of REQUEST_URI for everything that is not the firewall's | |
| 879 | + * pattern haystack. sanitize_text_field() is the wrong tool for it: it | |
| 880 | + * deletes every %XX octet instead of decoding it (_sanitize_text_fields(), | |
| 881 | + * wp-includes/formatting.php), so /categor%C3%ADa/ came out as /categora/ | |
| 882 | + * and a path in Cyrillic as //. The redirects built from that value landed | |
| 883 | + * on a 404, the hidden login address written in a non-Latin script never | |
| 884 | + * matched, and the activity log kept the evidence with the evidence removed | |
| 885 | + * (measured on 1 oct 2026 against 3.0.1). | |
| 886 | + * | |
| 887 | + * esc_url_raw() keeps the %XX octets and the raw UTF-8, writes a space as | |
| 888 | + * %20, drops what a URL cannot carry (< > " { } ^ ` and control characters) | |
| 889 | + * and leaves a target that starts with a slash alone. Its liberties, none of | |
| 890 | + * which matters to the callers: [ ] become %5B %5D, a ;// becomes ://, and a | |
| 891 | + * target that does not start with a slash (OPTIONS *, an absolute-form | |
| 892 | + * request line) comes back with a scheme added or empty, which is why a | |
| 893 | + * caller that needs a path checks for the leading slash itself. | |
| 894 | + * | |
| 895 | + * Not for the firewall's pattern checks, which need the bytes untouched and | |
| 896 | + * read their own raw copy (Vigilante_Firewall::gather_request_data()). | |
| 897 | + * | |
| 898 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 899 | + * | |
| 900 | + * @return string Path and query as sent, or '' when the server gives none. | |
| 901 | + */ | |
| 902 | + public static function request_uri() { | |
| 903 | + if ( ! isset( $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ) || ! is_string( $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ) ) { | |
| 904 | + return ''; | |
| 905 | + } | |
| 906 | + | |
| 907 | + return esc_url_raw( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ) ); | |
| 564 | 908 | } |
| 565 | 909 | } |
