| @@ -93,8 +93,14 @@ | ||
| 93 | 93 | // Proxy / CDN: forwarded header to trust for the visitor IP. |
| 94 | 94 | // Empty = trust only REMOTE_ADDR (the real connection, unspoofable). |
| 95 | 95 | 'trusted_proxy_header' => '', |
| 96 | 96 | |
| 97 | + // Proxy / CDN: IPs or CIDR ranges the forwarded header is accepted | |
| 98 | + // from. Empty = accept it only from your own network, and, for | |
| 99 | + // CF-Connecting-IP, Cloudflare's own ranges. Since 2.11.9, so a | |
| 100 | + // header cannot be forged by a visitor reaching the origin directly. | |
| 101 | + 'trusted_proxies' => array(), | |
| 102 | + | |
| 97 | 103 | // User-Agent management |
| 98 | 104 | 'ua_whitelist' => array(), |
| 99 | 105 | 'ua_blacklist' => array(), |
| 100 | 106 | |
| @@ -431,11 +437,14 @@ | ||
| 431 | 437 | 'auto_scan' => true, |
| 432 | 438 | 'scan_frequency' => 'daily', |
| 433 | 439 | 'notify_level' => 'suspicious_only', |
| 434 | 440 | 'instant_alert' => false, |
| 435 | - 'excluded_paths' => array( | |
| 436 | - 'wp-content/cache', | |
| 437 | - ), | |
| 441 | + // Empty for a new installation. It used to start with | |
| 442 | + // wp-content/cache, from when nothing in the scan looked in | |
| 443 | + // that folder anyway; the scan now searches it for hidden | |
| 444 | + // code. A site that has the entry saved keeps it: what is in | |
| 445 | + // this list is the site's own, and an update does not edit it. | |
| 446 | + 'excluded_paths' => array(), | |
| 438 | 447 | 'excluded_extensions' => array( |
| 439 | 448 | // Translations (regenerated per-locale, never in checksums). |
| 440 | 449 | '.po', '.mo', '.pot', |
| 441 | 450 | // Binary images (cosmetic, not executable; often rewritten by image-optimizer plugins). |
| @@ -552,8 +561,34 @@ | ||
| 552 | 561 | |
| 553 | 562 | /** |
| 554 | 563 | * Deep merge arrays |
| 555 | 564 | * |
| 565 | + * Associative arrays are merged key by key, because that is what lets a | |
| 566 | + * saved option keep working when a release adds a setting. Lists are | |
| 567 | + * replaced whole, and that part is not cosmetic: merging a list key by key | |
| 568 | + * means index by index, so a stored list shorter than the default came back | |
| 569 | + * with the default's tail glued to it. Saving "administrator" alone into | |
| 570 | + * enforced_roles (default administrator, editor) was read back as | |
| 571 | + * administrator, editor, and unchecking every role was read back as the two | |
| 572 | + * defaults, so three role pickers could not be narrowed at all. It is the | |
| 573 | + * same bug merge_preset() was given its own merge for in 2.9.8; the fix | |
| 574 | + * never reached this one or the one in the admin save. | |
| 575 | + * | |
| 576 | + * An empty saved list therefore means empty, not "fall back to the default". | |
| 577 | + * That is the honest reading of what was saved, and the save path is what | |
| 578 | + * makes sure a list only becomes empty when somebody emptied it: a list the | |
| 579 | + * form did not carry is left alone rather than blanked. | |
| 580 | + * | |
| 581 | + * Which of the two happens is decided by the DEFAULT, never by what was | |
| 582 | + * saved. Deciding by what was saved looks equivalent and is not: an empty | |
| 583 | + * array is a list by any definition, so a section stored as array() would | |
| 584 | + * have replaced a whole group of settings instead of merging into it, and | |
| 585 | + * every key of that group would have come back missing. Found by the third | |
| 586 | + * cross review of this release, measured on rest_api_security (7 keys to 0) | |
| 587 | + * and on registration_approval (4 to 0, including its enabled flag). | |
| 588 | + * | |
| 589 | + * @since 3.0.1 Lists replace instead of merging index by index. | |
| 590 | + * | |
| 556 | 591 | * @param array $defaults Default values. |
| 557 | 592 | * @param array $saved Saved values. |
| 558 | 593 | * @return array Merged array. |
| 559 | 594 | */ |
| @@ -558,17 +593,17 @@ | ||
| 558 | 593 | * @return array Merged array. |
| 559 | 594 | */ |
| 560 | 595 | private function array_merge_deep( $defaults, $saved ) { |
| 561 | 596 | $result = $defaults; |
| 562 | - | |
| 597 | + | |
| 563 | 598 | foreach ( $saved as $key => $value ) { |
| 564 | - if ( is_array( $value ) && isset( $result[ $key ] ) && is_array( $result[ $key ] ) ) { | |
| 599 | + if ( is_array( $value ) && isset( $result[ $key ] ) && is_array( $result[ $key ] ) && ! self::is_list( $result[ $key ] ) ) { | |
| 565 | 600 | $result[ $key ] = $this->array_merge_deep( $result[ $key ], $value ); |
| 566 | 601 | } else { |
| 567 | 602 | $result[ $key ] = $value; |
| 568 | 603 | } |
| 569 | 604 | } |
| 570 | - | |
| 605 | + | |
| 571 | 606 | return $result; |
| 572 | 607 | } |
| 573 | 608 | |
| 574 | 609 | /** |
| @@ -700,9 +735,12 @@ | ||
| 700 | 735 | * @since 2.10.1 |
| 701 | 736 | * @return bool |
| 702 | 737 | */ |
| 703 | 738 | public static function owns_shared_files() { |
| 704 | - return ! is_multisite() || is_main_site(); | |
| 739 | + // One wp-config.php and one root .htaccess per installation, even with | |
| 740 | + // several networks in it: is_main_site() alone is true on the main site | |
| 741 | + // of every network. Since 2.11.8, found by the audit of the network. | |
| 742 | + return ! is_multisite() || ( is_main_site() && is_main_network() ); | |
| 705 | 743 | } |
| 706 | 744 | |
| 707 | 745 | public static function can_write_shared_files() { |
| 708 | 746 | if ( ! is_multisite() ) { |
| @@ -708,9 +746,11 @@ | ||
| 708 | 746 | if ( ! is_multisite() ) { |
| 709 | 747 | return true; |
| 710 | 748 | } |
| 711 | 749 | |
| 712 | - if ( ! is_main_site() ) { | |
| 750 | + // See owns_shared_files(): the main site of a secondary network, and | |
| 751 | + // its network administrator, do not own the installation's files. | |
| 752 | + if ( ! is_main_site() || ! is_main_network() ) { | |
| 713 | 753 | return false; |
| 714 | 754 | } |
| 715 | 755 | |
| 716 | 756 | // WP-CLI with nobody logged in: there is no user to ask, and the site is |
| @@ -779,8 +819,15 @@ | ||
| 779 | 819 | * addresses that receive the alerts is another, and nobody presses a button |
| 780 | 820 | * called "restore defaults" expecting that. Both the Standard preset and the |
| 781 | 821 | * two reset buttons leave these alone. |
| 782 | 822 | * |
| 823 | + * Read from outside the plugin: the third-party network plugin Vigilante | |
| 824 | + * Network Sync calls this from its 2.0.3 to decide what NOT to copy between | |
| 825 | + * the sites of a network, so a key it does not know about is preserved per | |
| 826 | + * site instead of overwritten. Adding keys here is safe and helps it; | |
| 827 | + * renaming or removing the method, or changing the shape of what it returns, | |
| 828 | + * silently changes what that plugin replicates across a whole network. | |
| 829 | + * | |
| 783 | 830 | * @since 2.9.8 |
| 784 | 831 | * |
| 785 | 832 | * @return array<string,string[]> |
| 786 | 833 | */ |
| @@ -785,9 +832,9 @@ | ||
| 785 | 832 | * @return array<string,string[]> |
| 786 | 833 | */ |
| 787 | 834 | public static function get_user_data_keys() { |
| 788 | 835 | return array( |
| 789 | - 'firewall' => array( 'ip_whitelist', 'ip_blacklist', 'ua_whitelist', 'ua_blacklist', 'trusted_proxy_header' ), | |
| 836 | + 'firewall' => array( 'ip_whitelist', 'ip_blacklist', 'ua_whitelist', 'ua_blacklist', 'trusted_proxy_header', 'trusted_proxies' ), | |
| 790 | 837 | 'login_security' => array( 'ip_whitelist', 'custom_login_url', 'two_factor' ), |
| 791 | 838 | 'user_security' => array( 'insecure_usernames' ), |
| 792 | 839 | 'file_integrity' => array( 'excluded_paths', 'excluded_extensions' ), |
| 793 | 840 | 'email' => array( 'additional_recipients' ), |
| @@ -831,12 +878,28 @@ | ||
| 831 | 878 | * get_shared_file_settings() lists what does nothing but end up in a shared |
| 832 | 879 | * file. These do both: blocking bad bots and bad query strings, the visitor |
| 833 | 880 | * IP detection and the two whitelists run in PHP for the site that stores |
| 834 | 881 | * them, and on the main site of a network they are also what the .htaccess |
| 835 | - * rules of every site are generated from; the three module switches decide | |
| 836 | - * whether the .htaccess blocks and the wp-config.php constants exist at all. | |
| 837 | - * On a subsite they only act on that site, so they stay editable there. | |
| 882 | + * rules of every site are generated from; the three writing module switches | |
| 883 | + * (firewall, security_headers, wp_hardening) decide whether the .htaccess | |
| 884 | + * blocks and the wp-config.php constants exist at all. | |
| 838 | 885 | * |
| 886 | + * Since 2.11.8 it also locks what decides whether the shared files are | |
| 887 | + * WATCHED, not built: the File Integrity module and its scan_critical_config | |
| 888 | + * switch. On the main site the critical-file scan is the network's canary | |
| 889 | + * for a change to wp-config.php or the root .htaccess, which only a network | |
| 890 | + * administrator can approve, so a main-site administrator without network | |
| 891 | + * rights must not be able to silence it by turning either one off. Closing | |
| 892 | + * the ignore list and the clear-results button in 2.11.8 left these two as | |
| 893 | + * the remaining routes; found by the audit of the admin surface. | |
| 894 | + * | |
| 895 | + * Since 3.0.0 the self-check has no setting at all, so there is nothing to lock: Vigilant's own | |
| 896 | + * files are shared by every site, and on the main site the self-check is | |
| 897 | + * the one that reports a change to them for the whole network. | |
| 898 | + * | |
| 899 | + * On a subsite all of them only act on that site, so they stay editable | |
| 900 | + * there (get_locked_file_settings() adds this set only when owns_shared_files()). | |
| 901 | + * | |
| 839 | 902 | * Until 2.11.6 an administrator of the main site without network rights |
| 840 | 903 | * could change any of them, and the file-only ones too: the write to the |
| 841 | 904 | * file was refused at that moment, but the value stayed stored, and the |
| 842 | 905 | * refresh after the next update, or the next save by a network |
| @@ -842,15 +905,283 @@ | ||
| 842 | 905 | * refresh after the next update, or the next save by a network |
| 843 | 906 | * administrator, published it to the whole network. |
| 844 | 907 | * |
| 845 | 908 | * @since 2.11.6 |
| 909 | + * @since 2.11.8 The file_integrity module and scan_critical_config. | |
| 846 | 910 | * |
| 847 | 911 | * @return array<string,string[]> |
| 848 | 912 | */ |
| 913 | + /** | |
| 914 | + * The two factor policy that governs this installation | |
| 915 | + * | |
| 916 | + * On a network the answer must not depend on which site the login happens to | |
| 917 | + * arrive at, because the cookie WordPress issues does not: COOKIEHASH comes | |
| 918 | + * from the network siteurl (wp-includes/default-constants.php) and | |
| 919 | + * COOKIE_DOMAIN covers every host of the network | |
| 920 | + * (wp-includes/ms-default-constants.php). Until 2.11.10 the settings, the | |
| 921 | + * enforced roles and the TOTP table were all read per site, so somebody | |
| 922 | + * holding the password of an administrator protected by 2FA on the main site | |
| 923 | + * posted the login to a subsite where that account has no role, was never | |
| 924 | + * asked for a code, and came out with a session valid across the network. | |
| 925 | + * Measured on the Multisite install on 12 sep 2026 (user_requires_2fa true on | |
| 926 | + * the main site, false on demo2 for the same account) and found by the | |
| 927 | + * file-by-file review of 2.11.10. | |
| 928 | + * | |
| 929 | + * So the policy of the main site governs the whole network. On a single site | |
| 930 | + * this is the site's own configuration and nothing changes. | |
| 931 | + * | |
| 932 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 933 | + * | |
| 934 | + * @return array The two_factor section that applies. | |
| 935 | + */ | |
| 936 | + public static function two_factor_policy() { | |
| 937 | + $options = is_multisite() | |
| 938 | + ? get_blog_option( get_main_site_id(), self::OPTION_NAME, array() ) | |
| 939 | + : get_option( self::OPTION_NAME, array() ); | |
| 940 | + | |
| 941 | + if ( ! is_array( $options ) ) { | |
| 942 | + return array(); | |
| 943 | + } | |
| 944 | + | |
| 945 | + $login = isset( $options['login_security'] ) && is_array( $options['login_security'] ) | |
| 946 | + ? $options['login_security'] | |
| 947 | + : array(); | |
| 948 | + | |
| 949 | + return ( isset( $login['two_factor'] ) && is_array( $login['two_factor'] ) ) ? $login['two_factor'] : array(); | |
| 950 | + } | |
| 951 | + | |
| 952 | + /** | |
| 953 | + * Whether two factor is required for this account, anywhere in the network | |
| 954 | + * | |
| 955 | + * Union, and deliberately so. Reading the policy only from the main site, | |
| 956 | + * which is what this release did at first, would have switched two factor off | |
| 957 | + * for every network that has it configured per subsite, which until now was | |
| 958 | + * the only way it could be configured at all: a silent downgrade of the very | |
| 959 | + * protection being fixed. Found by the cross review of 2.11.10. So the | |
| 960 | + * question is asked of every site the account belongs to, plus the main site, | |
| 961 | + * each with its own enforced roles and exclusions, and one yes is enough. | |
| 962 | + * | |
| 963 | + * That also closes the bypass: the settings, the roles and the enrolment used | |
| 964 | + * to be read from whichever site the login arrived at, while the cookie | |
| 965 | + * WordPress issues is valid across the whole network (COOKIEHASH comes from | |
| 966 | + * the network siteurl and COOKIE_DOMAIN covers every host of it), so an | |
| 967 | + * account protected on one site could log in through another and come out | |
| 968 | + * with a session valid everywhere. | |
| 969 | + * | |
| 970 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 971 | + * | |
| 972 | + * @param WP_User $user User being authenticated. | |
| 973 | + * @return bool | |
| 974 | + */ | |
| 975 | + public static function two_factor_required_for( $user ) { | |
| 976 | + return array() !== self::two_factor_demands_for( $user ); | |
| 977 | + } | |
| 978 | + | |
| 979 | + /** | |
| 980 | + * Which second factor methods this account is asked for, across the network | |
| 981 | + * | |
| 982 | + * Empty when nothing asks. On a network there can be more than one, because | |
| 983 | + * each site keeps its own settings and the requirement is the union of them. | |
| 984 | + * | |
| 985 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 986 | + * | |
| 987 | + * @param WP_User $user User being authenticated. | |
| 988 | + * @return string[] Methods asked for, without repeats. | |
| 989 | + */ | |
| 990 | + public static function two_factor_methods_for( $user ) { | |
| 991 | + $methods = array(); | |
| 992 | + | |
| 993 | + foreach ( self::two_factor_demands_for( $user ) as $settings ) { | |
| 994 | + $method = isset( $settings['method'] ) ? (string) $settings['method'] : 'email'; | |
| 995 | + | |
| 996 | + // A method this version does not know is read as the default rather | |
| 997 | + // than left to fall through. Registering nothing at all is how the | |
| 998 | + // second factor of a whole network went quiet in silence: a saved | |
| 999 | + // value of '' (which validate_section() lets through on an import, | |
| 1000 | + // since only the tab has an allowlist) matched neither class, so no | |
| 1001 | + // filter was registered anywhere while every screen still said two | |
| 1002 | + // factor was on. Found by the third cross review of 2.11.10. | |
| 1003 | + $methods[] = in_array( $method, array( 'email', 'totp' ), true ) ? $method : 'email'; | |
| 1004 | + } | |
| 1005 | + | |
| 1006 | + return array_values( array_unique( $methods ) ); | |
| 1007 | + } | |
| 1008 | + | |
| 1009 | + /** | |
| 1010 | + * Which of the two second factor classes handles this login | |
| 1011 | + * | |
| 1012 | + * The method cannot be read from one site's settings, and reading it from the | |
| 1013 | + * main site was the hole the third cross review of 2.11.10 found: with the | |
| 1014 | + * main site on totp and a subsite asking for a code by email, the class that | |
| 1015 | + * registered was TOTP, the account had no enrolment, and the "not set up yet" | |
| 1016 | + * branch let the login through. In 2.11.9 that same login was asked for its | |
| 1017 | + * emailed code. So the question is asked per account, not per site. | |
| 1018 | + * | |
| 1019 | + * The order is what keeps it closed at both ends: | |
| 1020 | + * | |
| 1021 | + * 1. An enrolment already made wins while some site asking for a second | |
| 1022 | + * factor asks for an authenticator app. It is the strongest factor the | |
| 1023 | + * account has and it is ready to use, wherever in the network it was set | |
| 1024 | + * up. | |
| 1025 | + * 2. Otherwise, if any site asking for a second factor asks for email, email | |
| 1026 | + * handles it. Email needs no enrolment, so it can never fall into the | |
| 1027 | + * branch that lets a login through for lack of one. | |
| 1028 | + * 3. Only when every site asking wants an authenticator app does TOTP handle | |
| 1029 | + * it, which is the case the grace period was written for. | |
| 1030 | + * | |
| 1031 | + * The condition on the first step came in 2.11.11. Without it an enrolment | |
| 1032 | + * left from a time when the site asked for an app outranked the method the | |
| 1033 | + * site asks for now: a single site set to email asked those accounts for an | |
| 1034 | + * authenticator code, which 2.11.9 never did and which locks out whoever | |
| 1035 | + * removed the app after the switch. Dropping that enrolment opens nothing, | |
| 1036 | + * because the account then goes to email, which needs no enrolment. | |
| 1037 | + * | |
| 1038 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 1039 | + * @since 2.11.11 An enrolment only wins while an authenticator app is asked for. | |
| 1040 | + * | |
| 1041 | + * @param WP_User $user User being authenticated. | |
| 1042 | + * @param bool $enrolled Whether the account has a TOTP enrolment anywhere. | |
| 1043 | + * @return string 'email', 'totp', or '' when nothing asks. | |
| 1044 | + */ | |
| 1045 | + public static function two_factor_handler_for( $user, $enrolled ) { | |
| 1046 | + $methods = self::two_factor_methods_for( $user ); | |
| 1047 | + | |
| 1048 | + if ( ! $methods ) { | |
| 1049 | + return ''; | |
| 1050 | + } | |
| 1051 | + | |
| 1052 | + if ( $enrolled && in_array( 'totp', $methods, true ) ) { | |
| 1053 | + return 'totp'; | |
| 1054 | + } | |
| 1055 | + | |
| 1056 | + return in_array( 'email', $methods, true ) ? 'email' : 'totp'; | |
| 1057 | + } | |
| 1058 | + | |
| 1059 | + /** | |
| 1060 | + * The two factor settings of every site that asks this account for one | |
| 1061 | + * | |
| 1062 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 1063 | + * | |
| 1064 | + * @param WP_User $user User being authenticated. | |
| 1065 | + * @return array[] The two_factor section of each site that asks. | |
| 1066 | + */ | |
| 1067 | + private static function two_factor_demands_for( $user ) { | |
| 1068 | + if ( empty( $user->ID ) ) { | |
| 1069 | + return array(); | |
| 1070 | + } | |
| 1071 | + | |
| 1072 | + if ( ! is_multisite() ) { | |
| 1073 | + $roles = ( isset( $user->roles ) && is_array( $user->roles ) ) ? $user->roles : array(); | |
| 1074 | + $policy = self::two_factor_policy(); | |
| 1075 | + | |
| 1076 | + return self::two_factor_site_requires( $policy, $user, $roles ) ? array( $policy ) : array(); | |
| 1077 | + } | |
| 1078 | + | |
| 1079 | + $demands = array(); | |
| 1080 | + $blog_ids = array( (int) get_main_site_id() ); | |
| 1081 | + | |
| 1082 | + /* | |
| 1083 | + * A super administrator is a member of almost no site (measured on the | |
| 1084 | + * Multisite install: of three sites, the network owner belongs to one), | |
| 1085 | + * yet can log in through any of them and the cookie is valid everywhere. | |
| 1086 | + * Asking only the sites they belong to left the account with the most | |
| 1087 | + * power in the network outside the policy, which is the bypass upside | |
| 1088 | + * down. So for them every site of the network is consulted. There are | |
| 1089 | + * few super administrators. It does not only run at login, though, which | |
| 1090 | + * this note claimed until 2.11.11: the dashboard hooks of the TOTP class | |
| 1091 | + * ask it on every admin screen of every site of a network, at least once | |
| 1092 | + * per hook. | |
| 1093 | + */ | |
| 1094 | + if ( is_super_admin( $user->ID ) ) { | |
| 1095 | + $blog_ids = array_merge( $blog_ids, get_sites( array( 'fields' => 'ids', 'number' => 200 ) ) ); | |
| 1096 | + } | |
| 1097 | + | |
| 1098 | + foreach ( get_blogs_of_user( $user->ID ) as $blog ) { | |
| 1099 | + if ( ! empty( $blog->userblog_id ) ) { | |
| 1100 | + $blog_ids[] = (int) $blog->userblog_id; | |
| 1101 | + } | |
| 1102 | + } | |
| 1103 | + | |
| 1104 | + foreach ( array_unique( $blog_ids ) as $blog_id ) { | |
| 1105 | + $options = get_blog_option( $blog_id, self::OPTION_NAME, array() ); | |
| 1106 | + | |
| 1107 | + if ( ! is_array( $options ) || empty( $options['login_security']['two_factor'] ) ) { | |
| 1108 | + continue; | |
| 1109 | + } | |
| 1110 | + | |
| 1111 | + /* | |
| 1112 | + * A site whose Login Security module is off asks for nothing, and | |
| 1113 | + * reading only the sub-setting made it ask anyway: a subsite that had | |
| 1114 | + * switched the whole module off, leaving an orphan two_factor.enabled | |
| 1115 | + * behind, imposed a second factor on every account of the network, | |
| 1116 | + * with no screen anywhere explaining why. It is the two-level toggle | |
| 1117 | + * trap of this plugin read upside down. Found by the third cross | |
| 1118 | + * review of 2.11.10. | |
| 1119 | + */ | |
| 1120 | + if ( empty( $options['modules']['login_security'] ) ) { | |
| 1121 | + continue; | |
| 1122 | + } | |
| 1123 | + | |
| 1124 | + $elsewhere = new WP_User( $user->ID ); | |
| 1125 | + $elsewhere->for_site( $blog_id ); | |
| 1126 | + | |
| 1127 | + // A super administrator can hold no role row anywhere, and is judged | |
| 1128 | + // as an administrator so the strictest policy of the network reaches | |
| 1129 | + // the account with the most power in it. | |
| 1130 | + $roles = ( isset( $elsewhere->roles ) && is_array( $elsewhere->roles ) && $elsewhere->roles ) | |
| 1131 | + ? $elsewhere->roles | |
| 1132 | + : ( is_super_admin( $user->ID ) ? array( 'administrator' ) : array() ); | |
| 1133 | + | |
| 1134 | + if ( self::two_factor_site_requires( $options['login_security']['two_factor'], $user, $roles ) ) { | |
| 1135 | + $demands[] = $options['login_security']['two_factor']; | |
| 1136 | + } | |
| 1137 | + } | |
| 1138 | + | |
| 1139 | + return $demands; | |
| 1140 | + } | |
| 1141 | + | |
| 1142 | + /** | |
| 1143 | + * Whether one site's two factor settings cover this account | |
| 1144 | + * | |
| 1145 | + * @since 2.11.10 | |
| 1146 | + * | |
| 1147 | + * @param array $settings The two_factor section of one site. | |
| 1148 | + * @param WP_User $user User being authenticated. | |
| 1149 | + * @param string[] $roles Roles the account holds on that site. | |
| 1150 | + * @return bool | |
| 1151 | + */ | |
| 1152 | + private static function two_factor_site_requires( $settings, $user, $roles ) { | |
| 1153 | + if ( ! is_array( $settings ) || empty( $settings['enabled'] ) ) { | |
| 1154 | + return false; | |
| 1155 | + } | |
| 1156 | + | |
| 1157 | + $excluded = isset( $settings['excluded_users'] ) ? array_map( 'absint', (array) $settings['excluded_users'] ) : array(); | |
| 1158 | + | |
| 1159 | + if ( in_array( (int) $user->ID, $excluded, true ) ) { | |
| 1160 | + return false; | |
| 1161 | + } | |
| 1162 | + | |
| 1163 | + $enforced = isset( $settings['enforced_roles'] ) ? (array) $settings['enforced_roles'] : array( 'administrator', 'editor' ); | |
| 1164 | + | |
| 1165 | + return (bool) array_intersect( (array) $roles, $enforced ); | |
| 1166 | + } | |
| 1167 | + | |
| 1168 | + /** | |
| 1169 | + * Settings that only a network administrator may change on the main site | |
| 1170 | + * | |
| 1171 | + * @return array<string,string[]> | |
| 1172 | + */ | |
| 849 | 1173 | public static function get_main_site_file_settings() { |
| 850 | 1174 | return array( |
| 851 | - 'modules' => array( 'firewall', 'security_headers', 'wp_hardening' ), | |
| 852 | - 'firewall' => array( 'block_bad_bots', 'block_bad_query_strings', 'trusted_proxy_header', 'ip_whitelist', 'ua_whitelist' ), | |
| 1175 | + 'modules' => array( 'firewall', 'security_headers', 'wp_hardening', 'file_integrity' ), | |
| 1176 | + // trusted_proxies goes with trusted_proxy_header, and leaving it out | |
| 1177 | + // was a hole: the header decides which address the firewall of the | |
| 1178 | + // whole installation acts on, and this list decides which peers may | |
| 1179 | + // set that header. An administrator of the main site without network | |
| 1180 | + // rights who could edit only this half turned every visitor into a | |
| 1181 | + // trusted proxy. Found by the file-by-file review of 2.11.10. | |
| 1182 | + 'firewall' => array( 'block_bad_bots', 'block_bad_query_strings', 'trusted_proxy_header', 'trusted_proxies', 'ip_whitelist', 'ua_whitelist' ), | |
| 1183 | + 'file_integrity' => array( 'scan_critical_config' ), | |
| 853 | 1184 | ); |
| 854 | 1185 | } |
| 855 | 1186 | |
| 856 | 1187 | /** |
| @@ -900,13 +1231,29 @@ | ||
| 900 | 1231 | */ |
| 901 | 1232 | public static function keep_locked_file_settings( $options, $stored ) { |
| 902 | 1233 | $options = is_array( $options ) ? $options : array(); |
| 903 | 1234 | $stored = is_array( $stored ) ? $stored : array(); |
| 1235 | + $locked = self::get_locked_file_settings(); | |
| 904 | 1236 | |
| 905 | - foreach ( self::get_locked_file_settings() as $section => $keys ) { | |
| 1237 | + if ( ! $locked ) { | |
| 1238 | + return $options; | |
| 1239 | + } | |
| 1240 | + | |
| 1241 | + /* | |
| 1242 | + * A key that was never stored takes its default, which is what it was | |
| 1243 | + * worth before. Until 2.11.8 it was dropped instead, and the sanitize | |
| 1244 | + * callback of the option filled it in again, but validate_options() | |
| 1245 | + * fills a missing module switch with false, not with its default. | |
| 1246 | + */ | |
| 1247 | + $instance = new self(); | |
| 1248 | + $defaults = $instance->get_default_options(); | |
| 1249 | + | |
| 1250 | + foreach ( $locked as $section => $keys ) { | |
| 906 | 1251 | if ( true === $keys ) { |
| 907 | 1252 | if ( array_key_exists( $section, $stored ) ) { |
| 908 | 1253 | $options[ $section ] = $stored[ $section ]; |
| 1254 | + } elseif ( isset( $defaults[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 1255 | + $options[ $section ] = $defaults[ $section ]; | |
| 909 | 1256 | } else { |
| 910 | 1257 | unset( $options[ $section ] ); |
| 911 | 1258 | } |
| 912 | 1259 | continue; |
| @@ -911,19 +1258,27 @@ | ||
| 911 | 1258 | } |
| 912 | 1259 | continue; |
| 913 | 1260 | } |
| 914 | 1261 | |
| 915 | - $stored_section = ( isset( $stored[ $section ] ) && is_array( $stored[ $section ] ) ) ? $stored[ $section ] : array(); | |
| 1262 | + $stored_section = ( isset( $stored[ $section ] ) && is_array( $stored[ $section ] ) ) ? $stored[ $section ] : array(); | |
| 1263 | + $default_section = ( isset( $defaults[ $section ] ) && is_array( $defaults[ $section ] ) ) ? $defaults[ $section ] : array(); | |
| 916 | 1264 | |
| 917 | 1265 | foreach ( $keys as $key ) { |
| 918 | 1266 | if ( array_key_exists( $key, $stored_section ) ) { |
| 919 | - if ( ! isset( $options[ $section ] ) || ! is_array( $options[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 920 | - $options[ $section ] = array(); | |
| 1267 | + $value = $stored_section[ $key ]; | |
| 1268 | + } elseif ( array_key_exists( $key, $default_section ) ) { | |
| 1269 | + $value = $default_section[ $key ]; | |
| 1270 | + } else { | |
| 1271 | + if ( isset( $options[ $section ] ) && is_array( $options[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 1272 | + unset( $options[ $section ][ $key ] ); | |
| 921 | 1273 | } |
| 922 | - $options[ $section ][ $key ] = $stored_section[ $key ]; | |
| 923 | - } elseif ( isset( $options[ $section ] ) && is_array( $options[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 924 | - unset( $options[ $section ][ $key ] ); | |
| 1274 | + continue; | |
| 925 | 1275 | } |
| 1276 | + | |
| 1277 | + if ( ! isset( $options[ $section ] ) || ! is_array( $options[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 1278 | + $options[ $section ] = array(); | |
| 1279 | + } | |
| 1280 | + $options[ $section ][ $key ] = $value; | |
| 926 | 1281 | } |
| 927 | 1282 | } |
| 928 | 1283 | |
| 929 | 1284 | return $options; |
| @@ -929,8 +1284,65 @@ | ||
| 929 | 1284 | return $options; |
| 930 | 1285 | } |
| 931 | 1286 | |
| 932 | 1287 | /** |
| 1288 | + * Take a lock kept as a row of the options table, or report that another request holds it | |
| 1289 | + * | |
| 1290 | + * add_option() cannot be a lock: it runs INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE | |
| 1291 | + * (wp-includes/option.php:1142 in WP 7.1), so two requests that both find | |
| 1292 | + * the option missing both "create" it and both believe they hold it. INSERT | |
| 1293 | + * IGNORE creates the row for exactly one of them, which is what core does in | |
| 1294 | + * WP_Upgrader::create_lock() (wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php:1065). | |
| 1295 | + * A lock older than the timeout counts as abandoned, by a fatal error between | |
| 1296 | + * taking and releasing it, and only one request takes it over. | |
| 1297 | + * | |
| 1298 | + * @since 2.11.8 | |
| 1299 | + * | |
| 1300 | + * @param string $name Option name of the lock, in the current site's table. | |
| 1301 | + * @param int $timeout Seconds after which a held lock counts as abandoned. | |
| 1302 | + * @return bool True if this request now holds the lock. | |
| 1303 | + */ | |
| 1304 | + public static function acquire_option_lock( $name, $timeout ) { | |
| 1305 | + global $wpdb; | |
| 1306 | + | |
| 1307 | + // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery,WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching -- an atomic lock needs INSERT IGNORE, which the options API does not offer; same query as WP_Upgrader::create_lock(). | |
| 1308 | + if ( $wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "INSERT IGNORE INTO {$wpdb->options} ( option_name, option_value, autoload ) VALUES ( %s, %s, 'no' )", $name, (string) time() ) ) ) { | |
| 1309 | + wp_cache_delete( $name, 'options' ); | |
| 1310 | + return true; | |
| 1311 | + } | |
| 1312 | + | |
| 1313 | + // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery,WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching -- the lock row as stored right now, not a cached copy. | |
| 1314 | + $held = $wpdb->get_var( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT option_value FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name = %s", $name ) ); | |
| 1315 | + | |
| 1316 | + if ( null === $held || ( time() - (int) $held ) < $timeout ) { | |
| 1317 | + return false; | |
| 1318 | + } | |
| 1319 | + | |
| 1320 | + // Abandoned: the delete only matches the value that was read, and only one | |
| 1321 | + // request wins the insert that follows. | |
| 1322 | + // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery,WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching -- removes an abandoned lock row. | |
| 1323 | + $wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name = %s AND option_value = %s", $name, $held ) ); | |
| 1324 | + | |
| 1325 | + // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery,WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching -- same atomic insert as above. | |
| 1326 | + return (bool) $wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "INSERT IGNORE INTO {$wpdb->options} ( option_name, option_value, autoload ) VALUES ( %s, %s, 'no' )", $name, (string) time() ) ); | |
| 1327 | + } | |
| 1328 | + | |
| 1329 | + /** | |
| 1330 | + * Release a lock taken with acquire_option_lock() | |
| 1331 | + * | |
| 1332 | + * @since 2.11.8 | |
| 1333 | + * | |
| 1334 | + * @param string $name Option name of the lock. | |
| 1335 | + */ | |
| 1336 | + public static function release_option_lock( $name ) { | |
| 1337 | + global $wpdb; | |
| 1338 | + | |
| 1339 | + // phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.DirectQuery,WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery.NoCaching -- removes the row acquire_option_lock() inserted. | |
| 1340 | + $wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name = %s", $name ) ); | |
| 1341 | + wp_cache_delete( $name, 'options' ); | |
| 1342 | + } | |
| 1343 | + | |
| 1344 | + /** | |
| 933 | 1345 | * Put a configuration back to the defaults without deleting what the owner typed |
| 934 | 1346 | * |
| 935 | 1347 | * @since 2.9.8 |
| 936 | 1348 | * |
| @@ -1024,8 +1436,55 @@ | ||
| 1024 | 1436 | return $base; |
| 1025 | 1437 | } |
| 1026 | 1438 | |
| 1027 | 1439 | /** |
| 1440 | + * A stored list, or the shipped one when it arrives empty | |
| 1441 | + * | |
| 1442 | + * For the four lists that have NO field on any screen: the allowed HTTP | |
| 1443 | + * methods, the insecure usernames, the public REST endpoints and the roles | |
| 1444 | + * of registration approval. Nobody can empty those from the interface, so | |
| 1445 | + * an empty one is a leftover, and every version up to 3.0.0 produced them: | |
| 1446 | + * saving any tab wrote array() over every list of that section whose key the | |
| 1447 | + * form did not carry, which for these four was always. Reading the settings | |
| 1448 | + * hid it by merging the shipped values on top, and 3.0.1 stops doing that, | |
| 1449 | + * because a stored empty list is what makes unticking every role work. | |
| 1450 | + * | |
| 1451 | + * The migration in vigilante.php removes those keys once. This is the line | |
| 1452 | + * of defence for every other route, including Under Attack, which | |
| 1453 | + * photographs the raw option when it is switched on and puts it back whole | |
| 1454 | + * when it expires, after the migration has already marked itself done. | |
| 1455 | + * | |
| 1456 | + * It goes through every reader of those four lists, the ones that enforce | |
| 1457 | + * and the ones that only report, because a screen that says "no insecure | |
| 1458 | + * user" while the check is blocking them is its own kind of wrong. The | |
| 1459 | + * shipped value is read from get_default_options() rather than written out | |
| 1460 | + * again here: a second copy of a list drifts from the first. | |
| 1461 | + * | |
| 1462 | + * @since 3.0.1 | |
| 1463 | + * | |
| 1464 | + * @param mixed $value Stored value, as the caller already has it. | |
| 1465 | + * @param string[] $path Path of the setting in the options array. | |
| 1466 | + * @return array | |
| 1467 | + */ | |
| 1468 | + public static function list_or_shipped( $value, $path ) { | |
| 1469 | + if ( is_array( $value ) && array() !== $value ) { | |
| 1470 | + return $value; | |
| 1471 | + } | |
| 1472 | + | |
| 1473 | + $instance = new self(); | |
| 1474 | + $shipped = $instance->get_default_options(); | |
| 1475 | + | |
| 1476 | + foreach ( (array) $path as $key ) { | |
| 1477 | + if ( ! is_array( $shipped ) || ! array_key_exists( $key, $shipped ) ) { | |
| 1478 | + return array(); | |
| 1479 | + } | |
| 1480 | + $shipped = $shipped[ $key ]; | |
| 1481 | + } | |
| 1482 | + | |
| 1483 | + return is_array( $shipped ) ? $shipped : array(); | |
| 1484 | + } | |
| 1485 | + | |
| 1486 | + /** | |
| 1028 | 1487 | * Whether an array is a plain list (0..n-1 keys) |
| 1029 | 1488 | * |
| 1030 | 1489 | * array_is_list() is PHP 8.1 and this plugin supports 7.4. |
| 1031 | 1490 | * |
| @@ -1030,12 +1489,16 @@ | ||
| 1030 | 1489 | * array_is_list() is PHP 8.1 and this plugin supports 7.4. |
| 1031 | 1490 | * |
| 1032 | 1491 | * @since 2.9.8 |
| 1033 | 1492 | * |
| 1493 | + * Public since 3.0.1 because the admin save path needs the same answer: the | |
| 1494 | + * two places that used to merge lists index by index have to agree on what | |
| 1495 | + * a list is, or they disagree on a different subset of the settings. | |
| 1496 | + * | |
| 1034 | 1497 | * @param array $value Array to inspect. |
| 1035 | 1498 | * @return bool |
| 1036 | 1499 | */ |
| 1037 | - private static function is_list( $value ) { | |
| 1500 | + public static function is_list( $value ) { | |
| 1038 | 1501 | if ( array() === $value ) { |
| 1039 | 1502 | return true; |
| 1040 | 1503 | } |
| 1041 | 1504 | |
| @@ -1251,8 +1714,171 @@ | ||
| 1251 | 1714 | ); |
| 1252 | 1715 | } |
| 1253 | 1716 | |
| 1254 | 1717 | /** |
| 1718 | + * The settings that hold a list of file paths, by section | |
| 1719 | + * | |
| 1720 | + * A path is read by what it is. sanitize_text_field() deletes every %XX octet | |
| 1721 | + * and, when it finds one, collapses repeated spaces, so an exclusion written | |
| 1722 | + * for a folder called foto%20x was saved as fotox and excluded nothing: the | |
| 1723 | + * scan compares what is stored with the paths it finds, one by one (measured | |
| 1724 | + * on 1 oct 2026 against 3.0.1). Every other list in the options is a list of | |
| 1725 | + * addresses, names or extensions, where nothing meaningful is lost, and keeps | |
| 1726 | + * its reader. | |
| 1727 | + * | |
| 1728 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1729 | + * | |
| 1730 | + * @return array<string,string[]> | |
| 1731 | + */ | |
| 1732 | + public static function path_list_keys() { | |
| 1733 | + return array( | |
| 1734 | + 'file_integrity' => array( 'excluded_paths' ), | |
| 1735 | + ); | |
| 1736 | + } | |
| 1737 | + | |
| 1738 | + /** | |
| 1739 | + * One path as it was typed: invalid UTF-8 out, the ends trimmed, and nothing | |
| 1740 | + * else touched. Invalid UTF-8 has to go because the option would not be | |
| 1741 | + * written with it. | |
| 1742 | + * | |
| 1743 | + * A line that has tags (or a stray <) is dropped whole, not cut. A path has | |
| 1744 | + * none, and wp_strip_all_tags() would cut it at the < and leave a shorter path | |
| 1745 | + * than the one written, which excludes more than anyone asked: a folder | |
| 1746 | + * called a<b would exclude a. Until 3.0.1 the < was kept as an entity, which | |
| 1747 | + * matched nothing, and dropping the line has the same effect. | |
| 1748 | + * | |
| 1749 | + * A line with a line break inside is dropped too. The textarea is read line by | |
| 1750 | + * line, so only an element of a list can have one (an export edited by hand), | |
| 1751 | + * and the next save of the tab would show it as two lines and store two paths: | |
| 1752 | + * a, a line break and wp-content would end up excluding all of wp-content. | |
| 1753 | + * 3.0.1 turned the break into a space, which matched nothing, and dropping the | |
| 1754 | + * line has the same effect (fourth cross review, 1 oct 2026). | |
| 1755 | + * | |
| 1756 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1757 | + * | |
| 1758 | + * @param mixed $line Entry. | |
| 1759 | + * @return string | |
| 1760 | + */ | |
| 1761 | + public static function sanitize_path_line( $line ) { | |
| 1762 | + if ( ! is_scalar( $line ) ) { | |
| 1763 | + return ''; | |
| 1764 | + } | |
| 1765 | + | |
| 1766 | + $line = trim( wp_check_invalid_utf8( (string) $line, true ) ); | |
| 1767 | + | |
| 1768 | + if ( false !== strpbrk( $line, "\r\n" ) ) { | |
| 1769 | + return ''; | |
| 1770 | + } | |
| 1771 | + | |
| 1772 | + return wp_strip_all_tags( $line ) === $line ? $line : ''; | |
| 1773 | + } | |
| 1774 | + | |
| 1775 | + /** | |
| 1776 | + * The text of a textarea of paths, one per line, each line read as one path. | |
| 1777 | + * | |
| 1778 | + * Line by line, because a stray < in one line would take the lines after it | |
| 1779 | + * with it if the whole text went through wp_strip_all_tags(). | |
| 1780 | + * | |
| 1781 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1782 | + * | |
| 1783 | + * @param mixed $text Text. | |
| 1784 | + * @return string | |
| 1785 | + */ | |
| 1786 | + public static function sanitize_path_text( $text ) { | |
| 1787 | + $lines = preg_split( '/\r\n|\r|\n/', (string) $text ); | |
| 1788 | + | |
| 1789 | + return implode( "\n", array_map( array( __CLASS__, 'sanitize_path_line' ), (array) $lines ) ); | |
| 1790 | + } | |
| 1791 | + | |
| 1792 | + /** | |
| 1793 | + * Take the lists of paths out of a settings tree before the generic sanitizer reads it | |
| 1794 | + * | |
| 1795 | + * Known limits (fourth cross review, 1 oct 2026), none reachable from the | |
| 1796 | + * settings screen and all on the side of watching more: process_section_data() | |
| 1797 | + * reads the entries of a list posted as an array (excluded_paths[]=) with | |
| 1798 | + * sanitize_text_field() and applies sanitize_key() to the keys, so a key | |
| 1799 | + * written with another spelling is not found here, and a form posted as an | |
| 1800 | + * array instead of a string goes through a generic sanitizer. In those three | |
| 1801 | + * the %XX are lost, as they were in 3.0.1. | |
| 1802 | + * | |
| 1803 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1804 | + * | |
| 1805 | + * @param mixed $data Settings tree: section => key => value. | |
| 1806 | + * @return array Only the path lists that are present, in the same shape, each already read as paths. | |
| 1807 | + */ | |
| 1808 | + public static function take_path_lists( $data ) { | |
| 1809 | + $taken = array(); | |
| 1810 | + | |
| 1811 | + if ( ! is_array( $data ) ) { | |
| 1812 | + return $taken; | |
| 1813 | + } | |
| 1814 | + | |
| 1815 | + foreach ( self::path_list_keys() as $section => $keys ) { | |
| 1816 | + if ( ! isset( $data[ $section ] ) || ! is_array( $data[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 1817 | + continue; | |
| 1818 | + } | |
| 1819 | + | |
| 1820 | + foreach ( $keys as $key ) { | |
| 1821 | + if ( ! isset( $data[ $section ][ $key ] ) ) { | |
| 1822 | + continue; | |
| 1823 | + } | |
| 1824 | + | |
| 1825 | + $value = $data[ $section ][ $key ]; | |
| 1826 | + | |
| 1827 | + if ( is_array( $value ) ) { | |
| 1828 | + $taken[ $section ][ $key ] = array_map( array( __CLASS__, 'sanitize_path_line' ), array_values( array_filter( $value, 'is_scalar' ) ) ); | |
| 1829 | + } elseif ( is_scalar( $value ) ) { | |
| 1830 | + $taken[ $section ][ $key ] = self::sanitize_path_text( $value ); | |
| 1831 | + } | |
| 1832 | + } | |
| 1833 | + } | |
| 1834 | + | |
| 1835 | + return $taken; | |
| 1836 | + } | |
| 1837 | + | |
| 1838 | + /** | |
| 1839 | + * Put back the lists of paths take_path_lists() took out, over what the generic sanitizer left | |
| 1840 | + * | |
| 1841 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1842 | + * | |
| 1843 | + * @param mixed $data Sanitized settings tree. | |
| 1844 | + * @param array $taken What take_path_lists() returned for the same tree. | |
| 1845 | + * @return mixed The tree, with the path lists as they were read. | |
| 1846 | + */ | |
| 1847 | + public static function restore_path_lists( $data, $taken ) { | |
| 1848 | + if ( ! is_array( $data ) ) { | |
| 1849 | + return $data; | |
| 1850 | + } | |
| 1851 | + | |
| 1852 | + foreach ( $taken as $section => $values ) { | |
| 1853 | + if ( ! isset( $data[ $section ] ) || ! is_array( $data[ $section ] ) ) { | |
| 1854 | + continue; | |
| 1855 | + } | |
| 1856 | + | |
| 1857 | + foreach ( $values as $key => $value ) { | |
| 1858 | + $data[ $section ][ $key ] = $value; | |
| 1859 | + } | |
| 1860 | + } | |
| 1861 | + | |
| 1862 | + return $data; | |
| 1863 | + } | |
| 1864 | + | |
| 1865 | + /** | |
| 1866 | + * Whether a position in the options, as section.key, is a list of paths | |
| 1867 | + * | |
| 1868 | + * @since 3.0.2 | |
| 1869 | + * | |
| 1870 | + * @param string $trail Section and key joined by a dot. | |
| 1871 | + * @return bool | |
| 1872 | + */ | |
| 1873 | + private static function is_path_list( $trail ) { | |
| 1874 | + $parts = explode( '.', (string) $trail, 2 ); | |
| 1875 | + $paths = self::path_list_keys(); | |
| 1876 | + | |
| 1877 | + return 2 === count( $parts ) && isset( $paths[ $parts[0] ] ) && in_array( $parts[1], $paths[ $parts[0] ], true ); | |
| 1878 | + } | |
| 1879 | + | |
| 1880 | + /** | |
| 1255 | 1881 | * Validate options before saving |
| 1256 | 1882 | * |
| 1257 | 1883 | * @param array $input Raw input to validate. |
| 1258 | 1884 | * @return array Validated options. |
| @@ -1275,9 +1901,9 @@ | ||
| 1275 | 1901 | : false; |
| 1276 | 1902 | } |
| 1277 | 1903 | } elseif ( isset( $defaults[ $section ] ) ) { |
| 1278 | 1904 | // Validate other sections using generic validator |
| 1279 | - $validated[ $section ] = $this->validate_section( $data, $defaults[ $section ] ); | |
| 1905 | + $validated[ $section ] = $this->validate_section( $data, $defaults[ $section ], $section ); | |
| 1280 | 1906 | |
| 1281 | 1907 | // The few keys that live outside get_default_options() on |
| 1282 | 1908 | // purpose (see apply_install_tweaks()) survive with their own |
| 1283 | 1909 | // validation, or an import would silently lose them and the |
| @@ -1294,8 +1920,28 @@ | ||
| 1294 | 1920 | } |
| 1295 | 1921 | } |
| 1296 | 1922 | } |
| 1297 | 1923 | |
| 1924 | + /* | |
| 1925 | + * The lock on the settings the shared files are built from is NOT applied | |
| 1926 | + * here, and that is a decision, not an oversight. The second cross review | |
| 1927 | + * of 2.11.10 raised that register_setting( 'vigilante_options', ... ) | |
| 1928 | + * declares this as its sanitize callback with no lock in it, so anything | |
| 1929 | + * reaching options.php with that option group would write the whole | |
| 1930 | + * option. The chain does not close: the plugin prints no settings_fields() | |
| 1931 | + * for that group anywhere, so the nonce it would need is not obtainable, | |
| 1932 | + * and the five places that do save (saving a tab, importing, a preset, | |
| 1933 | + * restoring the defaults, resetting a section) all apply | |
| 1934 | + * keep_locked_file_settings() themselves. | |
| 1935 | + * | |
| 1936 | + * Putting it here instead would be worse than the door it closes. A | |
| 1937 | + * register_setting() callback runs on EVERY update_option() of this | |
| 1938 | + * option, so it would also lock the writes with no user behind them: the | |
| 1939 | + * expiry of Under Attack restoring what it hardened, WP-CLI and cron. | |
| 1940 | + * Those are already covered by matriz-red-ajustes-compartidos.sh, which | |
| 1941 | + * is where such a change would show up as a row that stopped passing. | |
| 1942 | + */ | |
| 1943 | + | |
| 1298 | 1944 | return apply_filters( 'vigilante_validate_options', $validated, $input ); |
| 1299 | 1945 | } |
| 1300 | 1946 | |
| 1301 | 1947 | /** |
| @@ -1350,13 +1996,14 @@ | ||
| 1350 | 1996 | * could merge any key it liked into vigilante_options (S7 of the 28 Aug |
| 1351 | 1997 | * 2026 audit). Lists are the exception, handled first: their entries are |
| 1352 | 1998 | * data, not keys. |
| 1353 | 1999 | * |
| 1354 | - * @param array $input Input values. | |
| 1355 | - * @param array $defaults Default values. | |
| 2000 | + * @param array $input Input values. | |
| 2001 | + * @param array $defaults Default values. | |
| 2002 | + * @param string $trail Where this is in the options, as section.key, so a list of paths is read as paths. | |
| 1356 | 2003 | * @return array Validated values. |
| 1357 | 2004 | */ |
| 1358 | - private function validate_section( $input, $defaults ) { | |
| 2005 | + private function validate_section( $input, $defaults, $trail = '' ) { | |
| 1359 | 2006 | $validated = array(); |
| 1360 | 2007 | |
| 1361 | 2008 | if ( $this->is_list_default( $defaults ) ) { |
| 1362 | 2009 | if ( ! is_array( $input ) ) { |
| @@ -1362,12 +2009,13 @@ | ||
| 1362 | 2009 | if ( ! is_array( $input ) ) { |
| 1363 | 2010 | return array(); |
| 1364 | 2011 | } |
| 1365 | 2012 | |
| 1366 | - $list = array(); | |
| 2013 | + $is_paths = self::is_path_list( $trail ); | |
| 2014 | + $list = array(); | |
| 1367 | 2015 | foreach ( $input as $value ) { |
| 1368 | 2016 | if ( is_scalar( $value ) ) { |
| 1369 | - $list[] = sanitize_text_field( (string) $value ); | |
| 2017 | + $list[] = $is_paths ? self::sanitize_path_line( $value ) : sanitize_text_field( (string) $value ); | |
| 1370 | 2018 | } elseif ( is_array( $value ) ) { |
| 1371 | 2019 | $list[] = map_deep( $value, 'sanitize_text_field' ); |
| 1372 | 2020 | } |
| 1373 | 2021 | } |
| @@ -1388,9 +2036,9 @@ | ||
| 1388 | 2036 | } elseif ( is_int( $default_value ) ) { |
| 1389 | 2037 | $validated[ $key ] = intval( $value ); |
| 1390 | 2038 | } elseif ( is_array( $default_value ) ) { |
| 1391 | 2039 | if ( is_array( $value ) ) { |
| 1392 | - $validated[ $key ] = $this->validate_section( $value, $default_value ); | |
| 2040 | + $validated[ $key ] = $this->validate_section( $value, $default_value, '' === $trail ? (string) $key : $trail . '.' . $key ); | |
| 1393 | 2041 | } else { |
| 1394 | 2042 | $validated[ $key ] = $default_value; |
| 1395 | 2043 | } |
| 1396 | 2044 | } else { |
