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WCPOS – Point of Sale (POS) plugin for WooCommerce / 1.10.18
WCPOS – Point of Sale (POS) plugin for WooCommerce v1.10.18
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← All changes | includes/API/V2/Write_Controller.php +7 -102 1.10.141.10.18 View file →
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
7 7
8 8 namespace WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\API\V2;
9 9
10 10 use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\API\V2\Writers\Collection_Writer_Resolver;
11 -use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Services\Customer_Account_Guard;
11 +use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Services\Permission_Rules;
12 12 use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Services\Tax_Id_Types;
13 13 use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Sync\Api;
14 14 use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Sync\Collections;
15 15 use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Sync\Endpoint_Permissions;
@@ -44,14 +44,8 @@
44 44 * live in an injected mutation store, so the apply logic is unit-testable with a
45 45 * fake store + a stubbed `rest_do_request`.
46 46 */
47 47 class Write_Controller extends WP_REST_Controller {
48 - /**
49 - * True while wc_rest_check_user_permissions() is re-run for a cleared target.
50 - *
51 - * @var bool
52 - */
53 - private $rejudging_user_target = false;
54 48
55 49 // Our gate (capability + F13 health); forwarded writes scope the client-tier grant below.
56 50 use Endpoint_Permissions;
57 51
@@ -599,13 +593,13 @@
599 593 *
600 594 * @param int $id The order id.
601 595 */
602 596 private function can_forward_delete( int $id ): bool {
603 - add_filter( 'woocommerce_rest_check_permissions', array( $this, 'wcpos_check_permissions' ), 10, 4 );
597 + Permission_Rules::install_wc_filter();
604 598 try {
605 599 return (bool) wc_rest_check_post_permissions( 'shop_order', 'delete', $id );
606 600 } finally {
607 - remove_filter( 'woocommerce_rest_check_permissions', array( $this, 'wcpos_check_permissions' ), 10 );
601 + Permission_Rules::uninstall_wc_filter();
608 602 }
609 603 }
610 604
611 605 private function checkpoint_and_finalize( string $mutation_id, int $remote_id, int $response_status ) {
@@ -751,9 +745,9 @@
751 745 */
752 746 private function dispatch_write( WP_REST_Request $request ) {
753 747 // Stamp here so direct callers (notably deletes) carry the scope too.
754 748 Store_Scope::stamp( $request );
755 - add_filter( 'woocommerce_rest_check_permissions', array( $this, 'wcpos_check_permissions' ), 10, 4 );
749 + Permission_Rules::install_wc_filter();
756 750 try {
757 751 // Marked as OUR traffic for the duration of the forward, so a consumer
758 752 // keyed on store scope can act on a till write without also claiming
759 753 // every stock wc/v3 product write on the site (pro#425 review).
@@ -762,104 +756,15 @@
762 756 return rest_do_request( $request );
763 757 }
764 758 );
765 759 } finally {
766 - remove_filter( 'woocommerce_rest_check_permissions', array( $this, 'wcpos_check_permissions' ), 10 );
760 + Permission_Rules::uninstall_wc_filter();
767 761 }
768 762 }
769 763
770 - /**
771 - * Judge a customer edit or delete the way V1\Customers_Controller does.
772 - *
773 - * The staff guard runs first and is final. A target it has cleared is then
774 - * re-judged by WooCommerce with the target's own roles allowed through the
775 - * shop_manager role-name restriction, so a shop manager can edit a subscriber
776 - * from a current app exactly as from the legacy route. WooCommerce's
777 - * credential fence is untouched: it runs in the controller, not here.
778 - *
779 - * @param bool $permission WooCommerce's verdict so far.
780 - * @param string $context 'edit' or 'delete'.
781 - * @param int $target_id Target user ID.
782 - */
783 - private function check_user_permission( bool $permission, string $context, int $target_id ): bool {
784 - if ( $this->rejudging_user_target ) {
785 - return $permission;
786 - }
787 - if ( ! Customer_Account_Guard::can_modify( get_current_user_id(), $target_id ) ) {
788 - return false;
789 - }
790 - if ( $permission ) {
791 - return true;
792 - }
793 - $this->rejudging_user_target = true;
794 - $restore = Customer_Account_Guard::allow_target_roles( $target_id );
795 - try {
796 - return (bool) wc_rest_check_user_permissions( $context, $target_id );
797 - } finally {
798 - $restore();
799 - $this->rejudging_user_target = false;
800 - }
801 - }
802 -
803 - /**
804 - * Authorize proxied mutations for POS users while protecting staff accounts.
805 - *
806 - * This filter is attached only while a sync push is forwarded to wc/v3, so
807 - * direct WooCommerce requests keep their normal permission checks.
808 - *
809 - * @param bool $permission The current permission.
810 - * @param string $context The request context.
811 - * @param int $object_id The object ID.
812 - * @param string $post_type The object type passed by WooCommerce.
813 - *
814 - * @return bool
815 - */
764 + /** @deprecated Use Permission_Rules::wc_filter(). */
816 765 public function wcpos_check_permissions( $permission, $context, $object_id, $post_type ) {
817 - // Customer edits/deletes: the staff guard is final, then a cleared target
818 - // is judged by WooCommerce the same way the v1 controller judges it.
819 - if ( 'user' === $post_type && (int) $object_id > 0 && \in_array( $context, array( 'edit', 'delete' ), true ) ) {
820 - return $this->check_user_permission( (bool) $permission, $context, (int) $object_id );
821 - }
822 -
823 - // Catalog and coupon WRITES require the user's real WooCommerce
824 - // capabilities — no POS-tier widening. The cashier role is deliberately
825 - // read-only on catalog (Activator), and a blanket grant here handed
826 - // every POS user product deletion and coupon minting. Product decision
827 - // 2026-08-06: strict wc/v3 parity for catalog mutations; only the
828 - // HPOS placeholder remap below (orders) adjusts anything, and it never
829 - // grants beyond the user's own role caps.
830 -
831 - // Orders: with HPOS enabled (sync off), get_post() yields shop_order_placehold
832 - // (map_meta_cap = false, no capability_type), so WooCommerce's REST check maps
833 - // to the generic edit_post/delete_post caps that cashier-tier roles lack —
834 - // even though they hold the real shop_orders caps. Re-check the capability the
835 - // mapping SHOULD have produced, mirroring V1\Orders_Controller's
836 - // update_item_permissions_check fix. No grant beyond the user's own role caps.
837 - if ( ! $permission && 'shop_order' === $post_type ) {
838 - $order_caps = array(
839 - 'read' => 'read_private_shop_orders',
840 - 'create' => 'publish_shop_orders',
841 - 'delete' => 'delete_shop_orders',
842 - );
843 - $order_cap = $order_caps[ $context ] ?? null;
844 - // edit and delete are ownership-sensitive: the base *_shop_orders cap only
845 - // authorizes acting on the user's OWN orders. Touching another user's order
846 - // additionally requires the *_others_shop_orders cap, mirroring WooCommerce's
847 - // own meta-cap map. Without this, a cashier with delete_shop_orders (but not
848 - // delete_others_shop_orders) could delete/void orders they do not own.
849 - if ( \in_array( $context, array( 'edit', 'delete' ), true ) ) {
850 - $order_post = get_post( $object_id );
851 - if ( $order_post ) {
852 - $owns_order = get_current_user_id() === (int) $order_post->post_author;
853 - $order_cap = $owns_order ? "{$context}_shop_orders" : "{$context}_others_shop_orders";
854 - }
855 - }
856 - if ( $order_cap && current_user_can( $order_cap ) ) {
857 - $permission = true;
858 - }
859 - }
860 -
861 - return $permission;
766 + return Permission_Rules::wc_filter( $permission, $context, $object_id, $post_type, 'writes' );
862 767 }
863 768
864 769 /**
865 770 * Read this collection's document for one record, through its writer.