dologin / src / data.upgrade.func.php

data.upgrade.func.php in DoLogin Security trunk, at src/data.upgrade.func.php

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1	<?php
2	defined( 'WPINC' ) \|\| exit;
3
4
5	function dologin_update_1_4_1() {
6	global $wpdb;
7	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery -- one-time schema migration on the plugin's own custom table; table name is a hardcoded internal identifier.
8	$wpdb->query( 'ALTER TABLE `' . $wpdb->prefix . "dologin_pswdless` ADD COLUMN `src` varchar(255) NOT NULL DEFAULT '' AFTER `hash`" );
9	}
10
11	function dologin_update_4_0_0() {
12	\dologin\Data::cls()->tb_create( 'site' );
13	}
14
15	function dologin_update_4_5_0() {
16	global $wpdb;
17
18	// SMS login is legacy and no longer participates in DoLogin authentication.
19	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery, WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.NotPrepared -- one-time schema migration on the plugin's own legacy table.
20	$wpdb->query( 'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `' . $wpdb->prefix . 'dologin_sms`' );
21
22	delete_option( 'dologin.sms' );
23	delete_option( 'dologin.sms_force' );
24	}
25
26	function dologin_update_4_6_0() {
27	delete_option( 'dologin.kl_sso_app_tag' );
28	delete_option( 'dologin.kl_sso_app_hash' );
29	delete_option( 'dologin.kl_sso_api_base' );
30	delete_option( 'dologin.kl_sso_ws_url' );
31	}
32
33	/**
34	* Protect legacy bearer tokens and recoverable authentication secrets at rest.
35	*/
36	function dologin_update_4_7_4() {
37	$data = \dologin\Data::cls();
38	$data->tables_create();
39
40	dologin_migrate_token_hashes( $data->tb( 'pswdless' ), 'passwordless-login' );
41	dologin_migrate_token_hashes( $data->tb( 'site' ), 'site-connection' );
42	dologin_migrate_twofa_secrets();
43
44	$site_sk = (string) \dologin\Conf::val( '_sk' );
45	if ( $site_sk && ! \dologin\Secret::is_sealed( $site_sk ) ) {
46	$sealed = \dologin\Secret::seal( 'site-easy-login-signing-key', $site_sk );
47	if ( $sealed ) {
48	\dologin\Conf::update( '_sk', $sealed );
49	}
50	}
51	}
52
53	/**
54	* Remove the obsolete force-mode activation-owner marker.
55	*/
56	function dologin_update_4_7_5() {
57	\dologin\Conf::delete( '_kl_sso_force_uid' );
58	}
59
60	/**
61	* Replace raw token values with purpose-bound HMAC verifiers.
62	*/
63	function dologin_migrate_token_hashes( $table, $purpose ) {
64	global $wpdb;
65
66	$last_id = 0;
67	do {
68	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.InterpolatedNotPrepared, PluginCheck.Security.DirectDB.UnescapedDBParameter, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery -- one-time migration of a hardcoded internal table; the cursor is prepared.
69	$rows = $wpdb->get_results( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT id, hash FROM `$table` WHERE id > %d AND hash <> '' ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT 500", $last_id ) );
70	if ( ! is_array( $rows ) ) {
71	return false;
72	}
73	foreach ( $rows as $row ) {
74	$last_id = (int) $row->id;
75	$stored = (string) $row->hash;
76	if ( \dologin\Secret::is_token_hash( $stored ) ) {
77	continue;
78	}
79	$hash = \dologin\Secret::token_hash( $purpose, $stored );
80	if ( ! $hash ) {
81	continue;
82	}
83	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.InterpolatedNotPrepared, PluginCheck.Security.DirectDB.UnescapedDBParameter, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery -- one-time migration of a hardcoded internal table; all values are prepared and the old value is compared atomically.
84	$wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "UPDATE `$table` SET hash = %s WHERE id = %d AND hash = %s", $hash, $last_id, $stored ) );
85	}
86	} while ( 500 === count( $rows ) );
87
88	return true;
89	}
90
91	/**
92	* Encrypt existing TOTP shared secrets in bounded batches.
93	*/
94	function dologin_migrate_twofa_secrets() {
95	global $wpdb;
96
97	$last_id = 0;
98	do {
99	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.InterpolatedNotPrepared, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery -- one-time migration of WordPress user metadata; the key and cursor are prepared.
100	$rows = $wpdb->get_results( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT umeta_id, meta_value FROM `$wpdb->usermeta` WHERE umeta_id > %d AND meta_key = %s ORDER BY umeta_id ASC LIMIT 500", $last_id, '2fa' ) );
101	if ( ! is_array( $rows ) ) {
102	return false;
103	}
104	foreach ( $rows as $row ) {
105	$last_id = (int) $row->umeta_id;
106	$stored = (string) $row->meta_value;
107	if ( ! $stored \|\| \dologin\Secret::is_sealed( $stored ) ) {
108	continue;
109	}
110	$sealed = \dologin\Secret::seal( 'totp-user-secret', $stored );
111	if ( ! $sealed ) {
112	continue;
113	}
114	// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.PreparedSQL.InterpolatedNotPrepared, WordPress.DB.DirectDatabaseQuery -- one-time usermeta migration; all values are prepared and the old value is compared atomically.
115	$wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "UPDATE `$wpdb->usermeta` SET meta_value = %s WHERE umeta_id = %d AND meta_value = %s", $sealed, $last_id, $stored ) );
116	}
117	} while ( 500 === count( $rows ) );
118
119	return true;
120	}
121