| 1 |
<?php |
| 2 |
/** |
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* MCP pairing lifecycle — mint / rotate / revoke the per-site connection token. |
| 4 |
* |
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* The primary way an AI assistant connects to ThinkRank: an admin clicks |
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* Connect, the plugin mints a 32-byte secret, and the user pastes either the |
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* single connect URL (token embedded in the path) or the endpoint + Bearer |
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* token into their AI client. The token is validated directly by Mcp_Server — |
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* no hosted infrastructure is involved. |
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* |
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* State is stored in the `thinkrank_mcp_pairing` option: |
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* { |
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* site_token: string (the secret the client presents), |
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* connected: bool, |
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* connected_at: int (unix ts), |
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* scopes: string[] (e.g. ['read','write']), |
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* user_id: int (admin who minted the token; MCP calls run as them) |
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* } |
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* |
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* @package ThinkRank\Mcp |
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*/ |
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|
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declare(strict_types=1); |
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|
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namespace ThinkRank\Mcp; |
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|
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use ThinkRank\Core\Secret_At_Rest; |
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|
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if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { |
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exit; // Exit if accessed directly. |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Connection-token lifecycle for the ThinkRank MCP server. |
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*/ |
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final class Mcp_Pairing { |
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|
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/** |
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* Option key holding all MCP pairing state. |
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*/ |
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public const OPTION = 'thinkrank_mcp_pairing'; |
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|
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/** |
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* Path segment of the pretty per-site endpoint. |
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*/ |
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public const SITE_ENDPOINT_PATH = 'thinkrank/mcp'; |
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|
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/** |
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* Default scopes granted on connect. |
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*/ |
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private const DEFAULT_SCOPES = [ 'read', 'write' ]; |
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|
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/** |
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* Throttle window (seconds) for last-used writes — one option write per |
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* minute at most, so a busy client can't hammer the option on every call. |
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*/ |
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private const LAST_USED_THROTTLE = 60; |
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|
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/** |
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* The PRIMARY endpoint the user pastes into their AI client — this |
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* site's own MCP URL. |
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* |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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public static function site_endpoint(): string { |
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return home_url( '/' . self::SITE_ENDPOINT_PATH ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Always-on fallback endpoint via the REST namespace, for hosts where |
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* the pretty rewrite can't be served (e.g. plain permalinks). |
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* |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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public static function site_endpoint_fallback(): string { |
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return rest_url( 'thinkrank/v1/mcp' ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* The SINGLE URL the user pastes into their AI client — the pretty |
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* endpoint with the connection token embedded as a path segment. |
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* Empty string when not connected. |
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* |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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public static function connect_url(): string { |
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$token = self::site_token(); |
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if ( '' === $token ) { |
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return ''; |
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} |
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return self::site_endpoint() . '/' . $token; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Current pairing state, defaults merged. |
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* |
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* @return array{site_token:string,token_hash:string,token_sealed:bool,connected:bool,connected_at:int,scopes:string[],user_id:int,last_used:int} |
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*/ |
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public static function state(): array { |
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$stored = get_option( self::OPTION, [] ); |
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if ( ! is_array( $stored ) ) { |
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$stored = []; |
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} |
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$raw = isset( $stored['site_token'] ) ? (string) $stored['site_token'] : ''; |
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$plain = '' === $raw ? '' : Secret_At_Rest::decrypt( $raw ); |
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|
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// Sealed: something IS stored, but this site can no longer open it — |
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// the auth salt rotated, or sodium went away under us (decrypt() hands |
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// the envelope back unchanged in that case). Either way there is no |
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// displayable credential, and the envelope must never be passed off as |
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// one: it would be copied into a client and 401 forever. |
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$sealed = '' !== $raw && ( '' === $plain || Secret_At_Rest::is_encrypted( $plain ) ); |
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|
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return [ |
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// Decrypted for display and for the self-test's own probe. Stored |
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// encrypted (#396) — a database read on its own no longer yields a |
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// usable admin-equivalent credential. |
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'site_token' => $sealed ? '' : $plain, |
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// Whether a stored token exists that cannot be shown here. Callers |
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// use this to tell "never connected" apart from "connected, but |
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// this site cannot display the token any more". |
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'token_sealed' => $sealed, |
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// What authorize() compares against. Held separately so a token |
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// whose ciphertext can no longer be opened — the auth salt was |
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// rotated, the site was migrated without wp-config — keeps |
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// authenticating the clients already configured with it, instead of |
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// silently locking them out. |
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'token_hash' => isset( $stored['token_hash'] ) ? (string) $stored['token_hash'] : '', |
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'connected' => ! empty( $stored['connected'] ), |
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'connected_at' => isset( $stored['connected_at'] ) ? (int) $stored['connected_at'] : 0, |
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'scopes' => isset( $stored['scopes'] ) && is_array( $stored['scopes'] ) |
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? array_values( array_map( 'strval', $stored['scopes'] ) ) |
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: [], |
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'user_id' => isset( $stored['user_id'] ) ? (int) $stored['user_id'] : 0, |
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'last_used' => isset( $stored['last_used'] ) ? (int) $stored['last_used'] : 0, |
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]; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Record that the static token was just used to authenticate an MCP call. |
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* Throttled to at most one option write per minute so a busy client can't |
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* turn every request into a database write. No-op when not connected. |
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* |
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* @return void |
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*/ |
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public static function touch_last_used(): void { |
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$stored = get_option( self::OPTION, [] ); |
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if ( ! is_array( $stored ) || empty( $stored['site_token'] ) ) { |
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return; |
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} |
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$now = time(); |
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$last = isset( $stored['last_used'] ) ? (int) $stored['last_used'] : 0; |
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if ( $now - $last < self::LAST_USED_THROTTLE ) { |
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return; |
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} |
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$stored['last_used'] = $now; |
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update_option( self::OPTION, $stored, false ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* SHA-256 used to store the pairing token's verifier at rest. |
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* |
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* Mirrors Mcp_OAuth::hash(), which has always stored access and refresh |
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* tokens this way. The pairing token was the one exception (#396). |
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* |
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* @since 2.0.1 |
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* |
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* @param string $value Raw token. |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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private static function hash( string $value ): string { |
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return hash( 'sha256', $value ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Whether a presented token is the pairing token. |
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* |
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* Compared against the stored hash. A row written before this change holds |
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* a plaintext token and no hash, so it is verified against the plaintext |
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* once and then upgraded in place — an existing pairing keeps working and |
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* no one has to re-pair. |
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* |
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* @since 2.0.1 |
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* |
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* @param string $presented Token presented by the client. |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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public static function verify_token( string $presented ): bool { |
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if ( '' === $presented ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$state = self::state(); |
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|
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if ( '' !== $state['token_hash'] ) { |
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return hash_equals( $state['token_hash'], self::hash( $presented ) ); |
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} |
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|
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// Legacy row: plaintext, no hash. |
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if ( '' === $state['site_token'] || ! hash_equals( $state['site_token'], $presented ) ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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self::upgrade_legacy_storage( $presented ); |
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|
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return true; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Re-store a legacy plaintext token encrypted, with its hash. |
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* |
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* @since 2.0.1 |
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* |
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* @param string $token Raw token, already verified. |
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* @return void |
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*/ |
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private static function upgrade_legacy_storage( string $token ): void { |
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$stored = get_option( self::OPTION, [] ); |
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|
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if ( ! is_array( $stored ) ) { |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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$stored['site_token'] = Secret_At_Rest::encrypt( $token ); |
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$stored['token_hash'] = self::hash( $token ); |
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|
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update_option( self::OPTION, $stored, false ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* The stored site token (secret). Empty string when not connected. |
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* |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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public static function site_token(): string { |
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return self::state()['site_token']; |
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} |
| 238 |
|
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/** |
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* The admin user the connection runs as (the token's minter). |
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* |
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* @return int |
| 243 |
*/ |
| 244 |
public static function user_id(): int { |
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return self::state()['user_id']; |
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} |
| 247 |
|
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/** |
| 249 |
* Whether an MCP connection token is currently active for this site. |
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* |
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* Deliberately reads the hash, not the decrypted token. Those are not the |
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* same question: after an auth salt rotation the ciphertext will not open, |
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* so `site_token` is '' — but `token_hash` still verifies the credential |
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* every configured client is holding, and verify_token() still accepts it. |
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* Answering "not connected" there made ensure_connected() mint a fresh |
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* token over the hash, which was the only surviving copy of the live one. |
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* |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
| 260 |
public static function is_connected(): bool { |
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$state = self::state(); |
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return $state['connected'] && ( '' !== $state['token_hash'] || '' !== $state['site_token'] ); |
| 263 |
} |
| 264 |
|
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/** |
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* Whether the active connection is limited to read-only tools. |
| 267 |
* |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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public static function is_read_only(): bool { |
| 271 |
$scopes = self::state()['scopes']; |
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return ! in_array( 'write', $scopes, true ); |
| 273 |
} |
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|
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/** |
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* Sanitized snapshot for the MCP admin page. |
| 277 |
* |
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* @return array<string,mixed> |
| 279 |
*/ |
| 280 |
public static function public_status(): array { |
| 281 |
$state = self::state(); |
| 282 |
return [ |
| 283 |
'connected' => self::is_connected(), |
| 284 |
'connection_token' => $state['site_token'], |
| 285 |
// Connected, but the token cannot be displayed on this site any |
| 286 |
// more. The screen offers a rotate instead of a blank recipe. |
| 287 |
'token_sealed' => $state['token_sealed'], |
| 288 |
'connect_url' => self::connect_url(), |
| 289 |
'mcp_endpoint' => self::site_endpoint(), |
| 290 |
'mcp_endpoint_rest' => self::site_endpoint_fallback(), |
| 291 |
'connected_at' => $state['connected_at'], |
| 292 |
'last_used' => $state['last_used'], |
| 293 |
'scopes' => $state['scopes'], |
| 294 |
'read_only' => self::is_read_only(), |
| 295 |
// Ready-to-paste connection recipes (header-based — token stays out |
| 296 |
// of the URL, so it can't leak into server/proxy logs). |
| 297 |
'config' => self::config_snippets(), |
| 298 |
// A drop-in instruction the user can paste into their AI client so |
| 299 |
// it sets the connection up itself. |
| 300 |
'ai_prompt' => self::ai_prompt(), |
| 301 |
]; |
| 302 |
} |
| 303 |
|
| 304 |
/** |
| 305 |
* Ready-to-paste connection recipes for the dashboard. All header-based |
| 306 |
* (Authorization: Bearer) so the secret stays out of URLs and logs. |
| 307 |
* Empty strings when not connected. |
| 308 |
* |
| 309 |
* @return array{cli:string,json:string} |
| 310 |
*/ |
| 311 |
public static function config_snippets(): array { |
| 312 |
$token = self::site_token(); |
| 313 |
if ( '' === $token ) { |
| 314 |
return [ |
| 315 |
'cli' => '', |
| 316 |
'json' => '', |
| 317 |
]; |
| 318 |
} |
| 319 |
$endpoint = self::site_endpoint(); |
| 320 |
|
| 321 |
// Claude Code one-liner. The CLI requires the positional NAME and URL |
| 322 |
// BEFORE any flags (`claude mcp add <name> <url> --flags`). |
| 323 |
$cli = sprintf( |
| 324 |
'claude mcp add thinkrank %s --transport http --header "Authorization: Bearer %s"', |
| 325 |
$endpoint, |
| 326 |
$token |
| 327 |
); |
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
// Portable mcpServers JSON block (Claude Desktop / other clients). |
| 330 |
$json = wp_json_encode( |
| 331 |
[ |
| 332 |
'mcpServers' => [ |
| 333 |
'thinkrank' => [ |
| 334 |
'url' => $endpoint, |
| 335 |
'headers' => [ |
| 336 |
'Authorization' => 'Bearer ' . $token, |
| 337 |
], |
| 338 |
], |
| 339 |
], |
| 340 |
], |
| 341 |
JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES |
| 342 |
); |
| 343 |
|
| 344 |
return [ |
| 345 |
'cli' => $cli, |
| 346 |
'json' => is_string( $json ) ? $json : '', |
| 347 |
]; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
/** |
| 351 |
* A copy-paste instruction the user hands to their AI assistant so IT |
| 352 |
* sets up the ThinkRank MCP connection for them. Empty when not connected. |
| 353 |
* |
| 354 |
* @return string |
| 355 |
*/ |
| 356 |
public static function ai_prompt(): string { |
| 357 |
if ( ! self::is_connected() ) { |
| 358 |
return ''; |
| 359 |
} |
| 360 |
$token = self::site_token(); |
| 361 |
$endpoint = self::site_endpoint(); |
| 362 |
$access = self::is_read_only() |
| 363 |
? 'read-only (inspect SEO data and settings only)' |
| 364 |
: 'read-write (can update SEO metadata and settings)'; |
| 365 |
|
| 366 |
$lines = [ |
| 367 |
'Add the following remote MCP server to your connections so you can manage SEO on my WordPress site, then use it.', |
| 368 |
'', |
| 369 |
'Server name: ThinkRank', |
| 370 |
'Server URL: ' . $endpoint, |
| 371 |
'Transport: streamable HTTP', |
| 372 |
'Authentication: Bearer token (in the Authorization header)', |
| 373 |
'API key: ' . $token, |
| 374 |
'Access level: ' . $access, |
| 375 |
'', |
| 376 |
'If you use the Claude Code CLI, this is the exact command (name and URL come BEFORE the flags):', |
| 377 |
' ' . self::config_snippets()['cli'], |
| 378 |
'', |
| 379 |
'Add it now, confirm it is connected by calling its "list-content-types" tool, and tell me what content types you can see.', |
| 380 |
]; |
| 381 |
$prompt = implode( "\n", $lines ); |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
/** |
| 384 |
* Filter the copy-paste AI setup prompt shown in the MCP page. |
| 385 |
* |
| 386 |
* @param string $prompt The default prompt text. |
| 387 |
* @param bool $read_only Whether the connection is read-only. |
| 388 |
*/ |
| 389 |
return (string) apply_filters( 'thinkrank_mcp_ai_prompt', $prompt, self::is_read_only() ); |
| 390 |
} |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
/** |
| 393 |
* Connect — mint a connection token for this site's MCP endpoint. |
| 394 |
* |
| 395 |
* Idempotent: re-connecting keeps the existing token (and its scopes) so |
| 396 |
* a paired client isn't silently broken. Use rotate() to change either. |
| 397 |
* |
| 398 |
* @param bool $read_only Grant only the `read` scope on a NEW token. |
| 399 |
* @return array<string,mixed> Public status. |
| 400 |
*/ |
| 401 |
public static function connect( bool $read_only = false ): array { |
| 402 |
$state = self::state(); |
| 403 |
// The hash is what decides "is there a pairing", not the decrypted |
| 404 |
// token: after an auth salt rotation the ciphertext will not open, but |
| 405 |
// the credential every configured client holds still authenticates |
| 406 |
// against the hash. |
| 407 |
$existing = '' !== $state['token_hash'] || '' !== $state['site_token']; |
| 408 |
$scopes = $existing && ! empty( $state['scopes'] ) |
| 409 |
? $state['scopes'] |
| 410 |
: self::scopes_for( $read_only ); |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
if ( $existing && $state['token_sealed'] ) { |
| 413 |
// Keeping a pairing this site can no longer read. Falling through |
| 414 |
// would re-encrypt $state['site_token'] — which is '' here — and |
| 415 |
// write hash('') over token_hash, destroying the last copy of a |
| 416 |
// live credential and silently resetting its scopes and owner. |
| 417 |
// Touch only the metadata; rotate() is the deliberate re-mint. |
| 418 |
$stored = get_option( self::OPTION, [] ); |
| 419 |
$stored = is_array( $stored ) ? $stored : []; |
| 420 |
$stored['connected'] = true; |
| 421 |
$stored['scopes'] = $scopes; |
| 422 |
if ( empty( $stored['user_id'] ) ) { |
| 423 |
$stored['user_id'] = get_current_user_id(); |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
update_option( self::OPTION, $stored, false ); |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
return self::public_status(); |
| 429 |
} |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
$token = $existing ? $state['site_token'] : self::mint_token(); |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
update_option( |
| 434 |
self::OPTION, |
| 435 |
[ |
| 436 |
'site_token' => Secret_At_Rest::encrypt( $token ), |
| 437 |
'token_hash' => self::hash( $token ), |
| 438 |
'connected' => true, |
| 439 |
'connected_at' => $existing ? $state['connected_at'] : time(), |
| 440 |
'scopes' => $scopes, |
| 441 |
'user_id' => $existing && $state['user_id'] ? $state['user_id'] : get_current_user_id(), |
| 442 |
], |
| 443 |
false |
| 444 |
); |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
return self::public_status(); |
| 447 |
} |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
/** |
| 450 |
* Rotate — mint a BRAND-NEW token, invalidating the previous one |
| 451 |
* immediately. The leaked-token remedy. Optionally flips read-only. |
| 452 |
* |
| 453 |
* @param bool|null $read_only null = keep current scopes; true/false = set. |
| 454 |
* @return array<string,mixed> Public status with the fresh token. |
| 455 |
*/ |
| 456 |
public static function rotate( ?bool $read_only = null ): array { |
| 457 |
$state = self::state(); |
| 458 |
$scopes = null === $read_only |
| 459 |
? ( ! empty( $state['scopes'] ) ? $state['scopes'] : self::DEFAULT_SCOPES ) |
| 460 |
: self::scopes_for( $read_only ); |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
$token = self::mint_token(); |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
update_option( |
| 465 |
self::OPTION, |
| 466 |
[ |
| 467 |
'site_token' => Secret_At_Rest::encrypt( $token ), |
| 468 |
'token_hash' => self::hash( $token ), |
| 469 |
'connected' => true, |
| 470 |
'connected_at' => time(), |
| 471 |
'scopes' => $scopes, |
| 472 |
'user_id' => get_current_user_id() ? get_current_user_id() : $state['user_id'], |
| 473 |
], |
| 474 |
false |
| 475 |
); |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
return self::public_status(); |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
/** |
| 481 |
* Disconnect — revoke the connection token AND every OAuth grant, so |
| 482 |
* Disconnect is a single kill switch for ALL MCP access. |
| 483 |
* |
| 484 |
* @return array<string,mixed> Public status after disconnect. |
| 485 |
*/ |
| 486 |
public static function disconnect(): array { |
| 487 |
delete_option( self::OPTION ); |
| 488 |
Mcp_OAuth::revoke_all(); |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
return self::public_status(); |
| 491 |
} |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
/** |
| 494 |
* Map a read-only flag to the granted scope list. |
| 495 |
* |
| 496 |
* @param bool $read_only Whether to grant read-only access. |
| 497 |
* @return string[] |
| 498 |
*/ |
| 499 |
private static function scopes_for( bool $read_only ): array { |
| 500 |
return $read_only ? [ 'read' ] : self::DEFAULT_SCOPES; |
| 501 |
} |
| 502 |
|
| 503 |
/** |
| 504 |
* Mint a 32-byte random token (64 hex chars). |
| 505 |
* |
| 506 |
* @return string |
| 507 |
*/ |
| 508 |
private static function mint_token(): string { |
| 509 |
return bin2hex( random_bytes( 32 ) ); |
| 510 |
} |
| 511 |
} |
| 512 |
|