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<?php |
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/** |
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* Core-route POS audit-meta guard. |
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* |
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* WCPOS Bearer tokens authenticate every REST request (Init hooks |
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* determine_current_user globally, without requiring the X-WCPOS marker), so a |
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* cashier whose capabilities allow order writes could bypass the |
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* server-authoritative `_pos_*` audit enforcement on the wcpos namespaces by |
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* writing the same keys through core routes such as `wc/v3/orders` or its |
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* batch endpoint. This guard rejects those writes. |
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* |
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* It MUST be registered unconditionally from Init (alongside |
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* determine_current_user_early), never from the X-WCPOS-gated API class — an |
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* attacker controls whether that marker is sent. |
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* |
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* Cookie- and application-password-authenticated requests are intentionally |
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* not guarded: a user whose capabilities allow editing order meta through |
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* wp-admin or core REST keeps that power. The guard only closes the gap where |
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* a POS token grants more than the POS surface would allow. |
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* |
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* @package WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Services |
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*/ |
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|
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namespace WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Services; |
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|
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use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\Sync\Meta_Entry; |
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use WP_Error; |
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use WP_REST_Request; |
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use WCPOS\WooCommercePOS\API; |
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|
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/** |
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* Core_Order_Audit_Guard service. |
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*/ |
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final class Core_Order_Audit_Guard { |
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/** |
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* User authenticated before WCPOS's priority-20 JWT filter. |
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* |
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* @var int |
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*/ |
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private $pre_wcpos_user_id = 0; |
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|
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/** |
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* Register the guard on the REST dispatch pipeline. |
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*/ |
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public function register_hooks(): void { |
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add_filter( 'determine_current_user', array( $this, 'record_prior_authentication' ), 20 ); |
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add_filter( 'rest_pre_dispatch', array( $this, 'rest_pre_dispatch' ), 10, 3 ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Record authentication completed before WCPOS's priority-20 JWT filter. |
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* |
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* @param false|int|WP_Error $user_id User ID if already authenticated, false or error otherwise. |
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* |
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* @return false|int|WP_Error |
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*/ |
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public function record_prior_authentication( $user_id ) { |
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$this->pre_wcpos_user_id = \is_numeric( $user_id ) ? absint( $user_id ) : 0; |
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|
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return $user_id; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Reject non-wcpos REST writes of POS audit meta by WCPOS-JWT-authenticated requests. |
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* |
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* @param mixed $result Response to replace the requested version with. |
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* @param \WP_REST_Server $server Server instance. |
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* @param WP_REST_Request $request Request used to generate the response. |
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* |
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* @return mixed |
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*/ |
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public function rest_pre_dispatch( $result, $server, $request ) { |
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$error = $this->guard( $request ); |
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$this->pre_wcpos_user_id = 0; |
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|
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return is_wp_error( $error ) ? $error : $result; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Evaluate one request. Cheap checks run first: no token cryptography and no |
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* order loads unless the payload actually carries suspicious meta entries. |
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* |
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* @param WP_REST_Request $request REST request. |
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* |
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* @return null|WP_Error WP_Error to short-circuit the dispatch, null to pass through. |
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*/ |
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private function guard( WP_REST_Request $request ) { |
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if ( ! \in_array( $request->get_method(), array( 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH' ), true ) ) { |
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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// WordPress matches REST routes case-insensitively, so every route |
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// comparison below must be case-insensitive too. |
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$route = $request->get_route(); |
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if ( $this->is_wcpos_route( $route ) ) { |
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// The wcpos controllers enforce server-authoritative audit meta themselves. |
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return null; |
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} |
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if ( ! preg_match( '#/orders(?:/\d+|/batch)?/?$#i', $route ) ) { |
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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$is_order_batch = (bool) preg_match( '#/orders/batch/?$#i', $route ); |
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|
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// An order batch beyond WooCommerce's own limit is rejected by |
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// check_batch_limit() with a 413 before any item is written, so skip |
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// scanning it rather than doing unbounded work here. |
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if ( $is_order_batch && $this->batch_over_limit( $request ) ) { |
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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// Candidate meta_data sets: top-level, plus per-item for batch requests. |
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// Each candidate is array{ 0: mixed meta_data, 1: int order_id }. |
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$single_order_id = 0; |
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if ( preg_match( '#/orders/(\d+)/?$#i', $route, $matches ) ) { |
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$single_order_id = (int) $matches[1]; |
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} |
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|
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$candidates = array( array( $request->get_param( 'meta_data' ), $single_order_id ) ); |
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foreach ( array( 'create', 'update' ) as $operation ) { |
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foreach ( (array) $request->get_param( $operation ) as $item ) { |
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$item = (array) $item; |
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$order_id = ( $is_order_batch && 'update' === $operation ) ? (int) ( $item['id'] ?? 0 ) : 0; |
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if ( isset( $item['meta_data'] ) ) { |
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$candidates[] = array( $item['meta_data'], $order_id ); |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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|
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// Pass 1 — audit keys by name. No auth or order lookup needed to detect, |
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// and only a request that is actually suspicious pays for token validation. |
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$audit_keys = Pos_Order_Audit::audit_meta_keys(); |
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$has_audit_key = false; |
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foreach ( $candidates as $candidate ) { |
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foreach ( $this->meta_entries( $candidate[0] ) as $entry ) { |
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if ( \in_array( Meta_Entry::key( $entry ), $audit_keys, true ) ) { |
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$has_audit_key = true; |
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break 2; |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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|
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if ( $has_audit_key ) { |
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return $this->is_wcpos_jwt_authenticated() ? $this->forbidden() : null; |
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} |
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|
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// Pass 2 — id-addressed entries. WooCommerce resolves a meta_data entry by |
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// its numeric `id` BEFORE its `key` and overwrites the row, so an entry |
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// under a harmless key can rename an audit row away. Only order-targeted |
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// candidates can be checked, and each order is loaded at most once, only |
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// for JWT-authenticated requests with an id-addressed entry present. |
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$ids_by_order = array(); |
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foreach ( $candidates as $candidate ) { |
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if ( $candidate[1] <= 0 ) { |
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continue; |
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} |
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foreach ( $this->meta_entries( $candidate[0] ) as $entry ) { |
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if ( is_numeric( $entry['id'] ?? null ) ) { |
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$ids_by_order[ $candidate[1] ][] = (int) $entry['id']; |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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|
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if ( array() === $ids_by_order || ! $this->is_wcpos_jwt_authenticated() ) { |
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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foreach ( $ids_by_order as $order_id => $meta_ids ) { |
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$protected = Pos_Order_Audit::audit_meta_ids( wc_get_order( $order_id ) ); |
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if ( array() !== array_intersect( $meta_ids, $protected ) ) { |
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return $this->forbidden(); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* The rejection response. |
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* |
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* @return WP_Error |
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*/ |
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private function forbidden(): WP_Error { |
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return new WP_Error( |
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'woocommerce_pos_rest_audit_meta_forbidden', |
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__( 'POS audit metadata cannot be modified through this REST route.', 'woocommerce-pos' ), |
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array( 'status' => 403 ) |
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); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Whether the route belongs to a WCPOS REST namespace (case-insensitive, |
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* mirroring WordPress route matching). Same namespace list as |
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* API::get_route_namespaces(), which is not static and lives on the |
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* X-WCPOS-gated API class this guard must not depend on being constructed. |
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* |
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* @param string $route REST route, e.g. `/wc/v3/orders`. |
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* |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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private function is_wcpos_route( string $route ): bool { |
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/** This filter is documented in includes/API.php */ |
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$namespaces = apply_filters( 'woocommerce_pos_rest_namespaces', API::ROUTE_NAMESPACES ); |
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$namespaces = array_unique( array_merge( API::ROUTE_NAMESPACES, (array) $namespaces ) ); |
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|
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foreach ( $namespaces as $namespace ) { |
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if ( \is_string( $namespace ) && '' !== $namespace && 0 === stripos( trailingslashit( $route ), '/' . trailingslashit( $namespace ) ) ) { |
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return true; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Whether an order batch exceeds WooCommerce's own batch limit. |
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* |
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* Mirrors WC_REST_Controller::check_batch_limit(), which rejects the whole |
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* request with a 413 before processing any item. |
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* |
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* @param WP_REST_Request $request REST request. |
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* |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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private function batch_over_limit( WP_REST_Request $request ): bool { |
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$total = 0; |
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foreach ( array( 'create', 'update', 'delete' ) as $operation ) { |
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$items = $request->get_param( $operation ); |
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$total += \is_array( $items ) ? \count( $items ) : 0; |
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} |
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|
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/** This filter is documented in WooCommerce's WC_REST_Controller::check_batch_limit() */ |
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$limit = (int) apply_filters( 'woocommerce_rest_batch_items_limit', 100, 'orders' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- WooCommerce core hook. |
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|
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return $total > $limit; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Normalize a request meta_data value into an array of entry arrays. |
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* |
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* @param mixed $meta_data Raw meta_data parameter (array of arrays/objects, or anything else). |
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* |
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* @return array<int, array> |
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*/ |
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private function meta_entries( $meta_data ): array { |
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if ( ! \is_array( $meta_data ) ) { |
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return array(); |
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} |
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|
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return array_map( |
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static function ( $entry ) { |
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return (array) $entry; |
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}, |
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$meta_data |
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); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Whether the current request was authenticated by a WCPOS token. |
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* |
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* Authentication filters before WCPOS's priority-20 filter retain provenance |
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* for cookie and other credentials. If determine_current_user was skipped |
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* because the user was already loaded, that also represents prior auth. |
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* Otherwise, re-validate the token and require it to resolve to the |
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* current user. |
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* |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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private function is_wcpos_jwt_authenticated(): bool { |
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$user_id = get_current_user_id(); |
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if ( $user_id <= 0 ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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if ( $this->pre_wcpos_user_id > 0 ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$auth_header = $this->get_auth_header(); |
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if ( ! \is_string( $auth_header ) || '' === $auth_header ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$auth_service = Auth::instance(); |
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$token = $auth_service->extract_token( $auth_header ); |
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if ( null === $token ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$decoded = $auth_service->validate_token( $token ); |
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if ( is_wp_error( $decoded ) ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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return absint( $decoded->data->user->id ) === $user_id; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Extract the Authorization credential from the request environment. |
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* |
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* Same three sources as Init::get_auth_header_early() (private there); |
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* candidates for consolidation into the Auth service. |
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* |
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* @return false|string |
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*/ |
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private function get_auth_header() { |
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if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['HTTP_AUTHORIZATION'] ) ) { |
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return sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_AUTHORIZATION'] ) ); |
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} |
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|
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if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['REDIRECT_HTTP_AUTHORIZATION'] ) ) { |
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return sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REDIRECT_HTTP_AUTHORIZATION'] ) ); |
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} |
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|
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if ( ! empty( $_GET['authorization'] ) ) { // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended |
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return sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['authorization'] ) ); |
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} |
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|
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return false; |
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} |
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} |
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|
