MobileAppQRLogin.php
| 1 | <?php |
| 2 | /** |
| 3 | * REST API Mobile App QR Login controller. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Handles requests to generate and exchange QR login tokens for direct mobile |
| 6 | * app authentication via Application Passwords. Token generation is gated on |
| 7 | * the `manage_woocommerce` capability (administrators and shop managers by |
| 8 | * default). |
| 9 | */ |
| 10 | |
| 11 | declare( strict_types=1 ); |
| 12 | |
| 13 | namespace Automattic\WooCommerce\Admin\API; |
| 14 | |
| 15 | use Automattic\WooCommerce\Admin\API\RateLimits\QRLoginRateLimits; |
| 16 | |
| 17 | defined( 'ABSPATH' ) || exit; |
| 18 | |
| 19 | /** |
| 20 | * Mobile App QR Login controller. |
| 21 | * |
| 22 | * @internal |
| 23 | */ |
| 24 | class MobileAppQRLogin extends \WC_REST_Data_Controller { |
| 25 | |
| 26 | /** |
| 27 | * Endpoint namespace. |
| 28 | * |
| 29 | * @var string |
| 30 | */ |
| 31 | protected $namespace = 'wc-admin'; |
| 32 | |
| 33 | /** |
| 34 | * Route base. |
| 35 | * |
| 36 | * @var string |
| 37 | */ |
| 38 | protected $rest_base = 'mobile-app'; |
| 39 | |
| 40 | /** |
| 41 | * Token TTL in seconds (5 minutes). |
| 42 | */ |
| 43 | const TOKEN_TTL = 300; |
| 44 | |
| 45 | /** |
| 46 | * Transient prefix for QR login tokens. |
| 47 | */ |
| 48 | const TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_token_'; |
| 49 | |
| 50 | /** |
| 51 | * Max tokens per user per 15-minute window. |
| 52 | */ |
| 53 | const MAX_TOKENS_PER_WINDOW = 5; |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /** |
| 56 | * Max exchange attempts per valid token per 15-minute window. |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | const MAX_EXCHANGE_ATTEMPTS = 10; |
| 59 | |
| 60 | /** |
| 61 | * Max invalid-token exchange attempts per IP per 15-minute window. |
| 62 | */ |
| 63 | const MAX_INVALID_EXCHANGE_ATTEMPTS = 100; |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /** |
| 66 | * Max invalid-token scan attempts per IP per 15-minute window. |
| 67 | */ |
| 68 | const MAX_INVALID_SCAN_ATTEMPTS = 100; |
| 69 | |
| 70 | /** |
| 71 | * Broad anonymous exchange abuse guard per IP per 15-minute window. |
| 72 | */ |
| 73 | const MAX_EXCHANGE_IP_ATTEMPTS = 1000; |
| 74 | |
| 75 | /** |
| 76 | * Option prefix for database-backed atomic token claims. |
| 77 | */ |
| 78 | const CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_claim_'; |
| 79 | |
| 80 | /** |
| 81 | * Scan-claim option prefix. Independent from `CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX` so the |
| 82 | * scan and exchange mutexes can't deadlock each other; they protect |
| 83 | * different write windows on the same token record. |
| 84 | */ |
| 85 | const SCAN_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_scan_claim_'; |
| 86 | |
| 87 | /** |
| 88 | * Approval-claim option prefix. Prevents concurrent number choices from |
| 89 | * racing the one-strike scanned -> approved/rejected transition. |
| 90 | */ |
| 91 | const APPROVE_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_approve_claim_'; |
| 92 | |
| 93 | /** |
| 94 | * Stable Application Passwords `app_id` for credentials issued by this |
| 95 | * flow. Lets administrators identify QR-issued credentials in the |
| 96 | * Application Passwords screen and revoke them in bulk. |
| 97 | */ |
| 98 | const APP_ID = '0b540e2f-86b7-4b8a-8e0c-f61e9bfbde59'; |
| 99 | |
| 100 | /** |
| 101 | * Transient prefix for the "token consumed" record written after a successful |
| 102 | * exchange. The wc-admin UI polls a status endpoint that reads this so it can |
| 103 | * transition to a confirmation panel and surface the device that signed in. |
| 104 | */ |
| 105 | const CONSUMED_TRANSIENT_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_consumed_'; |
| 106 | |
| 107 | /** |
| 108 | * Max status checks per user per 15-minute window. The polling client hits |
| 109 | * this every ~2.5s while a QR is on screen; 600/15min ≈ 40/min, comfortably |
| 110 | * above the polling rate but tight enough to short-circuit a misbehaving |
| 111 | * client or a credential-stuffing scan. |
| 112 | */ |
| 113 | const MAX_STATUS_CHECKS_PER_WINDOW = 600; |
| 114 | |
| 115 | /** |
| 116 | * Max revoke attempts per user per 15-minute window. |
| 117 | */ |
| 118 | const MAX_REVOKE_ATTEMPTS = 10; |
| 119 | |
| 120 | /** |
| 121 | * Whitelisted keys for the `device` payload sent by the mobile app on the |
| 122 | * scan call. Anything outside this set is dropped before storage. |
| 123 | * |
| 124 | * `brand` is Android-only (`Build.BRAND`, e.g. "google", "samsung"); iOS |
| 125 | * doesn't have a direct analogue and clients that don't have the field |
| 126 | * just leave it absent. |
| 127 | * |
| 128 | * @var string[] |
| 129 | */ |
| 130 | const DEVICE_PAYLOAD_KEYS = array( 'os', 'os_version', 'model', 'brand', 'app_version' ); |
| 131 | |
| 132 | /** |
| 133 | * Maximum length (chars) for any individual sanitized device-payload field. |
| 134 | * Defends against accidental or hostile bloat ending up in transients and |
| 135 | * the Application Password name. |
| 136 | */ |
| 137 | const DEVICE_FIELD_MAX_LENGTH = 64; |
| 138 | |
| 139 | /** |
| 140 | * State machine values for the per-token record. Transitions are gated |
| 141 | * by an explicit `current_state` check at the top of each handler |
| 142 | * (scan/approve/exchange) so the only writers are the handlers themselves. |
| 143 | */ |
| 144 | const STATE_PENDING = 'pending'; |
| 145 | const STATE_SCANNED = 'scanned'; |
| 146 | const STATE_APPROVED = 'approved'; |
| 147 | const STATE_REJECTED = 'rejected'; |
| 148 | const STATE_EXPIRED = 'expired'; |
| 149 | const STATE_CONSUMED = 'consumed'; |
| 150 | |
| 151 | /** |
| 152 | * Pick window after the app scans a QR (seconds). The merchant has this |
| 153 | * long to tap the matching number on wc-admin before the session |
| 154 | * auto-rejects. Short enough to limit replay; long enough for a confused |
| 155 | * user to read the phone, find their browser, and click. |
| 156 | */ |
| 157 | const CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 90; |
| 158 | |
| 159 | /** |
| 160 | * Length (bytes pre-bin2hex) of the exchange-grant nonce minted on |
| 161 | * approval. The grant gates the final `/qr-login-exchange` call so an |
| 162 | * attacker who learned the token can't race the legit app to exchange |
| 163 | * after approval. 32 bytes = 64 hex chars = 256 bits of entropy. |
| 164 | */ |
| 165 | const EXCHANGE_GRANT_BYTES = 32; |
| 166 | |
| 167 | /** |
| 168 | * Invalid exchange grants allowed before the token is terminally rejected. |
| 169 | */ |
| 170 | const MAX_INVALID_GRANT_ATTEMPTS = 3; |
| 171 | |
| 172 | /** |
| 173 | * Transient prefix mapping `session_id` → `token_hash` so the mobile-side |
| 174 | * `/qr-login-session-status` poll can resolve a session id back to the |
| 175 | * underlying token record without exposing the original token to the |
| 176 | * polling channel. |
| 177 | */ |
| 178 | const SESSION_TRANSIENT_PREFIX = '_wc_qr_login_session_'; |
| 179 | |
| 180 | /** |
| 181 | * Rate limit for /qr-login-scan (per IP per 15 min). |
| 182 | */ |
| 183 | const MAX_SCAN_PER_WINDOW = 10; |
| 184 | |
| 185 | /** |
| 186 | * Rate limit for /qr-login-approve (per user per 15 min). |
| 187 | */ |
| 188 | const MAX_APPROVE_PER_WINDOW = 20; |
| 189 | |
| 190 | /** |
| 191 | * Rate limit for /qr-login-session-status (per session id per 15 min). |
| 192 | * |
| 193 | * Accounts for ~2-s polling over a 90-s challenge window plus headroom. |
| 194 | */ |
| 195 | const MAX_SESSION_STATUS_PER_WINDOW = 60; |
| 196 | |
| 197 | /** |
| 198 | * Register routes. |
| 199 | * |
| 200 | * @return void |
| 201 | */ |
| 202 | public function register_routes() { |
| 203 | // Generate a QR login token (requires authentication and `manage_woocommerce` capability). |
| 204 | register_rest_route( |
| 205 | $this->namespace, |
| 206 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-token', |
| 207 | array( |
| 208 | array( |
| 209 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::CREATABLE, |
| 210 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'generate_token' ), |
| 211 | 'permission_callback' => array( $this, 'get_items_permissions_check' ), |
| 212 | ), |
| 213 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 214 | ) |
| 215 | ); |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // Exchange a QR login token for Application Password (no authentication required). |
| 218 | // The device payload is captured at /qr-login-scan time and sourced from the |
| 219 | // approved record — the exchange call only needs the token + grant nonce. |
| 220 | register_rest_route( |
| 221 | $this->namespace, |
| 222 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-exchange', |
| 223 | array( |
| 224 | array( |
| 225 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::CREATABLE, |
| 226 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'exchange_token' ), |
| 227 | 'permission_callback' => '__return_true', |
| 228 | 'args' => array( |
| 229 | 'token' => array( |
| 230 | 'required' => true, |
| 231 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 232 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 233 | ), |
| 234 | // Soft-required: the handler enforces presence + validity |
| 235 | // via constant-time comparison and returns a clear |
| 236 | // `invalid_exchange_grant` 412 if missing. We don't make |
| 237 | // it `required: true` at the schema layer because that |
| 238 | // would short-circuit earlier checks (HTTPS, invalid |
| 239 | // token, rate limit) with a generic WP validation 400 |
| 240 | // before our diagnostic responses can fire. |
| 241 | 'exchange_grant' => array( |
| 242 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 243 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 244 | ), |
| 245 | ), |
| 246 | ), |
| 247 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 248 | ) |
| 249 | ); |
| 250 | |
| 251 | // Poll for token status (consumed yet?). Used by wc-admin to transition |
| 252 | // the modal from "QR shown" to "Signed in successfully on {device}". |
| 253 | register_rest_route( |
| 254 | $this->namespace, |
| 255 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-status', |
| 256 | array( |
| 257 | array( |
| 258 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::CREATABLE, |
| 259 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'get_status' ), |
| 260 | 'permission_callback' => array( $this, 'get_items_permissions_check' ), |
| 261 | 'args' => array( |
| 262 | 'token' => array( |
| 263 | 'required' => true, |
| 264 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 265 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 266 | ), |
| 267 | ), |
| 268 | ), |
| 269 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 270 | ) |
| 271 | ); |
| 272 | |
| 273 | // Revoke (delete) the Application Password issued by an exchange. The |
| 274 | // user must own the AP — verified inside the callback via the WP API. |
| 275 | register_rest_route( |
| 276 | $this->namespace, |
| 277 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-revoke', |
| 278 | array( |
| 279 | array( |
| 280 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::DELETABLE, |
| 281 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'revoke_password' ), |
| 282 | 'permission_callback' => array( $this, 'get_items_permissions_check' ), |
| 283 | 'args' => array( |
| 284 | 'uuid' => array( |
| 285 | 'required' => true, |
| 286 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 287 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 288 | ), |
| 289 | ), |
| 290 | ), |
| 291 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 292 | ) |
| 293 | ); |
| 294 | |
| 295 | // Mobile app reports the QR was scanned. Server generates the |
| 296 | // number-match challenge and returns the *real* number to the app |
| 297 | // only. Public — token + capability flag are the auth. |
| 298 | register_rest_route( |
| 299 | $this->namespace, |
| 300 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-scan', |
| 301 | array( |
| 302 | array( |
| 303 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::CREATABLE, |
| 304 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'scan_token' ), |
| 305 | 'permission_callback' => '__return_true', |
| 306 | 'args' => array( |
| 307 | 'token' => array( |
| 308 | 'required' => true, |
| 309 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 310 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 311 | ), |
| 312 | // The device payload is required: it shows up in the |
| 313 | // merchant's "match this number" device card, in the |
| 314 | // Application Password name, and in the sign-in |
| 315 | // notification email. Mobile clients always have these |
| 316 | // fields available from the platform SDK (Build.MODEL, |
| 317 | // UIDevice.current.model, etc.), so requiring the |
| 318 | // payload at the protocol level keeps every downstream |
| 319 | // surface honest. |
| 320 | 'device' => array( |
| 321 | 'required' => true, |
| 322 | 'type' => 'object', |
| 323 | 'properties' => array( |
| 324 | 'os' => array( 'type' => 'string' ), |
| 325 | 'os_version' => array( 'type' => 'string' ), |
| 326 | 'model' => array( 'type' => 'string' ), |
| 327 | 'brand' => array( 'type' => 'string' ), |
| 328 | 'app_version' => array( 'type' => 'string' ), |
| 329 | ), |
| 330 | ), |
| 331 | // Capability flag the mobile app sets to advertise that |
| 332 | // it implements the number-matching protocol. Reserved |
| 333 | // for future protocol bumps that might gate behavior on |
| 334 | // further capability bits. |
| 335 | 'supports_number_matching' => array( |
| 336 | 'required' => true, |
| 337 | 'type' => 'boolean', |
| 338 | ), |
| 339 | ), |
| 340 | ), |
| 341 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 342 | ) |
| 343 | ); |
| 344 | |
| 345 | // Merchant taps a number on wc-admin. Server validates against the |
| 346 | // stored real number with hash_equals; correct → approved, wrong → |
| 347 | // rejected (terminal, no retry). |
| 348 | register_rest_route( |
| 349 | $this->namespace, |
| 350 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-approve', |
| 351 | array( |
| 352 | array( |
| 353 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::CREATABLE, |
| 354 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'approve_token' ), |
| 355 | 'permission_callback' => array( $this, 'get_items_permissions_check' ), |
| 356 | 'args' => array( |
| 357 | 'token' => array( |
| 358 | 'required' => true, |
| 359 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 360 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 361 | ), |
| 362 | 'choice' => array( |
| 363 | 'required' => true, |
| 364 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 365 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 366 | ), |
| 367 | ), |
| 368 | ), |
| 369 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 370 | ) |
| 371 | ); |
| 372 | |
| 373 | // Mobile app polls this with the session id returned from /scan. |
| 374 | // While in `scanned` we say so; on `approved` we hand over the |
| 375 | // short-lived `exchange_grant` nonce required by the final |
| 376 | // /qr-login-exchange call. |
| 377 | register_rest_route( |
| 378 | $this->namespace, |
| 379 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-session-status', |
| 380 | array( |
| 381 | array( |
| 382 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::READABLE, |
| 383 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'get_session_status' ), |
| 384 | 'permission_callback' => '__return_true', |
| 385 | 'args' => array( |
| 386 | 'session_id' => array( |
| 387 | 'required' => true, |
| 388 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 389 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 390 | ), |
| 391 | 'token_hash' => array( |
| 392 | 'type' => 'string', |
| 393 | 'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_text_field', |
| 394 | ), |
| 395 | ), |
| 396 | ), |
| 397 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 398 | ) |
| 399 | ); |
| 400 | |
| 401 | // Cheap up-front capability check so wc-admin can render a permanently |
| 402 | // disabled QR card (rather than spin up a token request that will fail) |
| 403 | // when application passwords are unavailable on this site. Same gate as |
| 404 | // the token endpoint so a subscriber cannot probe site configuration. |
| 405 | register_rest_route( |
| 406 | $this->namespace, |
| 407 | '/' . $this->rest_base . '/qr-login-availability', |
| 408 | array( |
| 409 | array( |
| 410 | 'methods' => \WP_REST_Server::READABLE, |
| 411 | 'callback' => array( $this, 'get_availability' ), |
| 412 | 'permission_callback' => array( $this, 'get_items_permissions_check' ), |
| 413 | ), |
| 414 | 'schema' => array( $this, 'get_public_item_schema' ), |
| 415 | ) |
| 416 | ); |
| 417 | |
| 418 | parent::register_routes(); |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | |
| 421 | /** |
| 422 | * Check whether the current user can generate a QR login token. |
| 423 | * |
| 424 | * Requires the `manage_woocommerce` capability, which covers administrators and |
| 425 | * shop managers out of the box. The check is deliberately explicit (not routed |
| 426 | * through `wc_rest_check_manager_permissions()`) so it cannot be loosened by the |
| 427 | * `woocommerce_rest_check_permissions` filter that other Admin API endpoints share. |
| 428 | * |
| 429 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request The REST request (unused). |
| 430 | * @return \WP_Error|bool True if the user has the required capability, WP_Error otherwise. |
| 431 | */ |
| 432 | public function get_items_permissions_check( $request ) { |
| 433 | unset( $request ); |
| 434 | // Parameter required by WP REST contract but unused here. |
| 435 | |
| 436 | if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_woocommerce' ) ) { |
| 437 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 438 | 'woocommerce_rest_cannot_view', |
| 439 | __( 'Sorry, you are not allowed to generate a mobile app QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 440 | array( 'status' => rest_authorization_required_code() ) |
| 441 | ); |
| 442 | } |
| 443 | |
| 444 | return true; |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | |
| 447 | /** |
| 448 | * Check if Application Passwords are available. |
| 449 | * |
| 450 | * @return bool |
| 451 | */ |
| 452 | private function are_application_passwords_available() { |
| 453 | return function_exists( 'wp_is_application_passwords_available' ) |
| 454 | && wp_is_application_passwords_available(); |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | |
| 457 | /** |
| 458 | * Return a REST response carrying WordPress' no-cache headers. |
| 459 | * |
| 460 | * @param array<string, mixed> $data Response payload. |
| 461 | * @return \WP_REST_Response |
| 462 | */ |
| 463 | private function rest_ensure_nocache_response( array $data ): \WP_REST_Response { |
| 464 | $response = rest_ensure_response( $data ); |
| 465 | |
| 466 | foreach ( wp_get_nocache_headers() as $header_name => $header_value ) { |
| 467 | if ( false === $header_value ) { |
| 468 | continue; |
| 469 | } |
| 470 | |
| 471 | $response->header( $header_name, (string) $header_value ); |
| 472 | } |
| 473 | |
| 474 | return $response; |
| 475 | } |
| 476 | |
| 477 | /** |
| 478 | * Reason codes returned by `/qr-login-availability` so wc-admin can |
| 479 | * tailor the disabled card to the specific cause. |
| 480 | */ |
| 481 | const AVAILABILITY_REASON_HTTPS_REQUIRED = 'https_required'; |
| 482 | const AVAILABILITY_REASON_AP_UNSUPPORTED = 'application_passwords_unsupported'; |
| 483 | const AVAILABILITY_REASON_AP_DISABLED_BY_FILTER = 'application_passwords_disabled_by_filter'; |
| 484 | |
| 485 | /** |
| 486 | * Report whether QR login is currently available on this site. |
| 487 | * |
| 488 | * Lets wc-admin render a permanently-disabled QR card with the right |
| 489 | * explanation up-front, instead of mounting `<QRDirectLoginCode />`, |
| 490 | * spinning, calling `/qr-login-token`, and only then showing a generic |
| 491 | * error. The reason code is the heuristic best we can do without each |
| 492 | * security plugin self-identifying: |
| 493 | * |
| 494 | * - `https_required` — `is_ssl()` is false or the raw/final `siteurl` is |
| 495 | * `http://`. The most common cause is a local dev environment; |
| 496 | * production sites without HTTPS can't use QR login at all. |
| 497 | * - `application_passwords_unsupported` — WordPress core's own support |
| 498 | * gate (`wp_is_application_passwords_supported()`) returns false. |
| 499 | * Ships true on every modern WP host that has SSL or is local; false |
| 500 | * here typically means the site is non-local + non-SSL. |
| 501 | * - `application_passwords_disabled_by_filter` — the WP support gate |
| 502 | * passes, but the `wp_is_application_passwords_available` filter |
| 503 | * returns false. This is the case where a security plugin (Wordfence, |
| 504 | * Solid Security, etc.) or a custom code snippet has explicitly |
| 505 | * disabled application passwords. We can't name the exact source from |
| 506 | * the filter alone; the docs link in the merchant-facing UI covers it. |
| 507 | * |
| 508 | * `nocache_headers()` so an upstream cache cannot pin a stale |
| 509 | * "unavailable" response for a site that just installed an HTTPS cert. |
| 510 | * |
| 511 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request The REST request (unused). |
| 512 | * @return \WP_REST_Response |
| 513 | */ |
| 514 | public function get_availability( $request ): \WP_REST_Response { |
| 515 | unset( $request ); |
| 516 | |
| 517 | nocache_headers(); |
| 518 | |
| 519 | $site_url = $this->get_secure_site_url(); |
| 520 | $https_ok = ! is_wp_error( $site_url ); |
| 521 | $ap_supported = function_exists( 'wp_is_application_passwords_supported' ) |
| 522 | && wp_is_application_passwords_supported(); |
| 523 | $ap_available = $this->are_application_passwords_available(); |
| 524 | |
| 525 | $https_ok = is_ssl() && $https_ok; |
| 526 | $available = $https_ok && $ap_available; |
| 527 | $reason = null; |
| 528 | |
| 529 | if ( ! $available ) { |
| 530 | if ( ! $https_ok ) { |
| 531 | $reason = self::AVAILABILITY_REASON_HTTPS_REQUIRED; |
| 532 | } elseif ( ! $ap_supported ) { |
| 533 | $reason = self::AVAILABILITY_REASON_AP_UNSUPPORTED; |
| 534 | } else { |
| 535 | $reason = self::AVAILABILITY_REASON_AP_DISABLED_BY_FILTER; |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | |
| 539 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( |
| 540 | array( |
| 541 | 'available' => $available, |
| 542 | 'reason' => $reason, |
| 543 | ) |
| 544 | ); |
| 545 | } |
| 546 | |
| 547 | /** |
| 548 | * Check rate limit for token generation. |
| 549 | * |
| 550 | * @param int $user_id The user ID. |
| 551 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 552 | */ |
| 553 | private function check_generation_rate_limit( $user_id ) { |
| 554 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_GENERATION, (string) $user_id ); |
| 555 | } |
| 556 | |
| 557 | /** |
| 558 | * Broad anonymous abuse guard for token exchange. |
| 559 | * |
| 560 | * This intentionally has a high ceiling. It is only meant to slow obvious |
| 561 | * unauthenticated floods; valid-token and invalid-token traffic use separate |
| 562 | * lower buckets so a few random requests from a shared proxy IP cannot block |
| 563 | * legitimate QR login exchanges. |
| 564 | * |
| 565 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 566 | */ |
| 567 | private function check_exchange_ip_rate_limit() { |
| 568 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_EXCHANGE_IP, $this->get_client_ip() ); |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | /** |
| 572 | * Check rate limit for random/nonexistent exchange tokens. |
| 573 | * |
| 574 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 575 | */ |
| 576 | private function check_invalid_exchange_rate_limit() { |
| 577 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_INVALID_EXCHANGE, $this->get_client_ip() ); |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | |
| 580 | /** |
| 581 | * Check rate limit for random/nonexistent scan tokens. |
| 582 | * |
| 583 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 584 | */ |
| 585 | private function check_invalid_scan_rate_limit() { |
| 586 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_INVALID_SCAN, $this->get_client_ip() ); |
| 587 | } |
| 588 | |
| 589 | /** |
| 590 | * Check rate limit for exchange attempts against a valid token. |
| 591 | * |
| 592 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 593 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 594 | */ |
| 595 | private function check_valid_exchange_rate_limit( $token_hash ) { |
| 596 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_VALID_EXCHANGE, $token_hash ); |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | |
| 599 | /** |
| 600 | * Get the client IP address used as the per-IP rate-limit key. |
| 601 | * |
| 602 | * Uses `REMOTE_ADDR` exclusively. We intentionally do not honor |
| 603 | * `HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR` here: the exchange endpoint is unauthenticated, and |
| 604 | * without a project-wide trusted-proxy list we cannot tell a legitimate |
| 605 | * proxy header from an attacker-supplied one. Trusting the first XFF value |
| 606 | * would let any client choose a fresh rate-limit bucket per request and |
| 607 | * bypass per-IP caps. On sites behind a CDN/load balancer that all clients |
| 608 | * share, REMOTE_ADDR is the proxy IP, so exchange uses broad IP throttling |
| 609 | * only as an abuse guard and relies on token-scoped buckets for security. |
| 610 | * |
| 611 | * @return string |
| 612 | */ |
| 613 | private function get_client_ip() { |
| 614 | if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) { |
| 615 | return sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ); |
| 616 | } |
| 617 | return ''; |
| 618 | } |
| 619 | |
| 620 | /** |
| 621 | * Build the option name used for a token exchange claim. |
| 622 | * |
| 623 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 624 | * @return string |
| 625 | */ |
| 626 | private function get_token_claim_key( $token_hash ) { |
| 627 | return self::CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX . $token_hash; |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | |
| 630 | /** |
| 631 | * Atomically claim a token for exchange using the options table. |
| 632 | * |
| 633 | * `add_option()` is backed by a unique option_name constraint, so it works |
| 634 | * across PHP workers even on default installs without a persistent object |
| 635 | * cache. Stale claims are cleaned only if their stored value still matches |
| 636 | * the value this request observed, avoiding deletion of another worker's |
| 637 | * fresh claim. |
| 638 | * |
| 639 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 640 | * @param int $expires_at Unix timestamp when the token expires. |
| 641 | * @return bool True if the claim was acquired. |
| 642 | */ |
| 643 | private function claim_token_for_exchange( $token_hash, $expires_at ) { |
| 644 | return $this->claim_token_with_option_key( |
| 645 | $this->get_token_claim_key( $token_hash ), |
| 646 | $expires_at |
| 647 | ); |
| 648 | } |
| 649 | |
| 650 | /** |
| 651 | * Atomically claim a token using an option key. |
| 652 | * |
| 653 | * @param string $claim_key Option key used as the claim mutex. |
| 654 | * @param int $expires_at Unix timestamp when the token expires. |
| 655 | * @return bool True if the claim was acquired. |
| 656 | */ |
| 657 | private function claim_token_with_option_key( $claim_key, $expires_at ) { |
| 658 | $claim_expires_at = max( time() + 30, (int) $expires_at ); |
| 659 | |
| 660 | if ( add_option( $claim_key, (string) $claim_expires_at, '', false ) ) { |
| 661 | return true; |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | |
| 664 | $existing_expires_at = (int) get_option( $claim_key, 0 ); |
| 665 | if ( $existing_expires_at > 0 && $existing_expires_at <= time() ) { |
| 666 | $this->delete_claim_if_value_matches( $claim_key, (string) $existing_expires_at ); |
| 667 | return add_option( $claim_key, (string) $claim_expires_at, '', false ); |
| 668 | } |
| 669 | |
| 670 | return false; |
| 671 | } |
| 672 | |
| 673 | /** |
| 674 | * Delete a claim option only if it still has the value this request observed. |
| 675 | * |
| 676 | * @param string $claim_key Option key used as the claim mutex. |
| 677 | * @param string $observed_claim_value Claim expiry value previously read from the option. |
| 678 | * @return bool True if the observed stale claim was deleted. |
| 679 | */ |
| 680 | private function delete_claim_if_value_matches( $claim_key, $observed_claim_value ) { |
| 681 | global $wpdb; |
| 682 | |
| 683 | $result = $wpdb->query( |
| 684 | $wpdb->prepare( |
| 685 | "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->options} WHERE option_name = %s AND option_value = %s", |
| 686 | $claim_key, |
| 687 | $observed_claim_value |
| 688 | ) |
| 689 | ); |
| 690 | |
| 691 | if ( false === $result ) { |
| 692 | wc_get_logger()->warning( |
| 693 | sprintf( |
| 694 | 'QR login stale-claim cleanup query failed for %s: %s', |
| 695 | $claim_key, |
| 696 | $wpdb->last_error |
| 697 | ), |
| 698 | array( 'source' => 'mobile-app-qr-login' ) |
| 699 | ); |
| 700 | } |
| 701 | |
| 702 | wp_cache_delete( $claim_key, 'options' ); |
| 703 | |
| 704 | return (int) $result > 0; |
| 705 | } |
| 706 | |
| 707 | /** |
| 708 | * Release a token exchange claim. |
| 709 | * |
| 710 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 711 | * @return void |
| 712 | */ |
| 713 | private function release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ) { |
| 714 | delete_option( $this->get_token_claim_key( $token_hash ) ); |
| 715 | } |
| 716 | |
| 717 | /** |
| 718 | * Atomically claim a token for scan. Mirrors `claim_token_for_exchange()` |
| 719 | * (same `add_option()` unique-constraint mutex, same staleness recovery) |
| 720 | * but uses its own option key so the scan and exchange windows are |
| 721 | * independent. |
| 722 | * |
| 723 | * Without this, two concurrent `/qr-login-scan` requests both pass the |
| 724 | * `state === pending` gate, both write a fresh challenge, and the last |
| 725 | * writer wins — leaving the loser's session_id silently orphaned and |
| 726 | * pointing at the wrong challenge. |
| 727 | * |
| 728 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 729 | * @param int $expires_at Unix timestamp when the token expires. |
| 730 | * @return bool True if the claim was acquired. |
| 731 | */ |
| 732 | private function claim_token_for_scan( $token_hash, $expires_at ) { |
| 733 | return $this->claim_token_with_option_key( |
| 734 | self::SCAN_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX . $token_hash, |
| 735 | $expires_at |
| 736 | ); |
| 737 | } |
| 738 | |
| 739 | /** |
| 740 | * Release a token scan claim owned by this request. |
| 741 | * |
| 742 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 743 | * @return void |
| 744 | */ |
| 745 | private function release_token_scan_claim( $token_hash ) { |
| 746 | delete_option( self::SCAN_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX . $token_hash ); |
| 747 | } |
| 748 | |
| 749 | /** |
| 750 | * Atomically claim a token for approval. |
| 751 | * |
| 752 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 753 | * @param int $expires_at Unix timestamp when the claim should expire. |
| 754 | * @return bool True if the claim was acquired. |
| 755 | */ |
| 756 | private function claim_token_for_approval( $token_hash, $expires_at ) { |
| 757 | return $this->claim_token_with_option_key( |
| 758 | self::APPROVE_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX . $token_hash, |
| 759 | $expires_at |
| 760 | ); |
| 761 | } |
| 762 | |
| 763 | /** |
| 764 | * Release a token approval claim owned by this request. |
| 765 | * |
| 766 | * @param string $token_hash SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token. |
| 767 | * @return void |
| 768 | */ |
| 769 | private function release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ) { |
| 770 | delete_option( self::APPROVE_CLAIM_OPTION_PREFIX . $token_hash ); |
| 771 | } |
| 772 | |
| 773 | /** |
| 774 | * Get the remaining storage TTL for a token record. |
| 775 | * |
| 776 | * @param array<string, mixed> $token_data Token record. |
| 777 | * @return int Remaining TTL in seconds. |
| 778 | */ |
| 779 | private function get_token_record_ttl( array $token_data ) { |
| 780 | return max( |
| 781 | 1, |
| 782 | isset( $token_data['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $token_data['expires_at'] - time() : self::TOKEN_TTL |
| 783 | ); |
| 784 | } |
| 785 | |
| 786 | /** |
| 787 | * Delete the session-id to token-hash mapping for a token record. |
| 788 | * |
| 789 | * @param array<string, mixed> $token_data Token record. |
| 790 | * @return void |
| 791 | */ |
| 792 | private function delete_session_mapping_for_record( array $token_data ) { |
| 793 | if ( empty( $token_data['challenge']['session_id'] ) ) { |
| 794 | return; |
| 795 | } |
| 796 | |
| 797 | delete_transient( |
| 798 | self::SESSION_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . hash( 'sha256', (string) $token_data['challenge']['session_id'] ) |
| 799 | ); |
| 800 | } |
| 801 | |
| 802 | /** |
| 803 | * Validate that the configured site URL is HTTPS and return it. |
| 804 | * |
| 805 | * `is_ssl()` only tells us the current REQUEST is HTTPS — it says nothing about |
| 806 | * the canonical site URL WordPress is configured to advertise. `get_site_url()` |
| 807 | * itself is also insufficient because it passes its result through |
| 808 | * `set_url_scheme()`, which rewrites the scheme to match `is_ssl()` — so |
| 809 | * `get_site_url()` will return `https://…` whenever the request happens to be |
| 810 | * HTTPS, masking a stale `http://` `siteurl` option underneath. We therefore |
| 811 | * check the RAW stored option, which is what reflects admin configuration |
| 812 | * and what shows up in reset-password emails, webhooks, canonical redirects, |
| 813 | * etc. If that is `http://`, a misconfigured proxy that terminated TLS before |
| 814 | * reaching PHP could still cause this endpoint to hand the mobile app a cleartext |
| 815 | * site URL for the token-exchange POST. |
| 816 | * |
| 817 | * We deliberately reject (rather than silently normalizing to `https://`) |
| 818 | * because: |
| 819 | * 1. The misconfig usually affects other things (reset-password emails, |
| 820 | * webhooks, canonical redirects). Failing loudly surfaces it. |
| 821 | * 2. Normalizing assumes the site actually serves HTTPS on the same host, |
| 822 | * which we cannot verify from within a single request. |
| 823 | * 3. A 500 is strictly safer than a leaky success. |
| 824 | * |
| 825 | * @return string|\WP_Error The HTTPS site URL, or a WP_Error if it is not HTTPS. |
| 826 | */ |
| 827 | private function get_secure_site_url() { |
| 828 | // Raw option: what the admin actually configured, before `set_url_scheme()` |
| 829 | // inside `get_site_url()` normalizes it based on the current request's scheme. |
| 830 | $raw_site_url = get_option( 'siteurl' ); |
| 831 | $raw_scheme = is_string( $raw_site_url ) ? wp_parse_url( $raw_site_url, PHP_URL_SCHEME ) : null; |
| 832 | |
| 833 | if ( 'https' !== $raw_scheme ) { |
| 834 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 835 | 'insecure_site_url', |
| 836 | __( 'QR login cannot be used because the site URL is not configured for HTTPS. Please update the WordPress Address (URL) in Settings → General to use https://.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 837 | array( 'status' => 500 ) |
| 838 | ); |
| 839 | } |
| 840 | |
| 841 | // Use get_site_url() for the returned value so any scheme normalization |
| 842 | // or filtering that WordPress applies downstream is preserved, then |
| 843 | // validate the final value too. A plugin can still filter `site_url` |
| 844 | // after the raw option check above; never hand the mobile app an |
| 845 | // HTTP exchange target. |
| 846 | $site_url = get_site_url(); |
| 847 | $final_scheme = wp_parse_url( $site_url, PHP_URL_SCHEME ); |
| 848 | |
| 849 | if ( 'https' !== $final_scheme ) { |
| 850 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 851 | 'insecure_site_url', |
| 852 | __( 'QR login cannot be used because the site URL is not configured for HTTPS. Please update the WordPress Address (URL) in Settings → General to use https://.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 853 | array( 'status' => 500 ) |
| 854 | ); |
| 855 | } |
| 856 | |
| 857 | return $site_url; |
| 858 | } |
| 859 | |
| 860 | /** |
| 861 | * Generate a QR login token. |
| 862 | * |
| 863 | * Creates a short-lived one-time token that can be exchanged for an Application |
| 864 | * Password by the mobile app. The caller is assumed to have already passed the |
| 865 | * `manage_woocommerce` capability check in `get_items_permissions_check()`. |
| 866 | * |
| 867 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 868 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 869 | */ |
| 870 | public function generate_token( $request ) { |
| 871 | unset( $request ); |
| 872 | // Parameter required by WP REST contract but unused here. |
| 873 | |
| 874 | // Check HTTPS. |
| 875 | if ( ! is_ssl() ) { |
| 876 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 877 | 'ssl_required', |
| 878 | __( 'QR login requires an HTTPS connection.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 879 | array( 'status' => 403 ) |
| 880 | ); |
| 881 | } |
| 882 | |
| 883 | // Verify the canonical site URL is HTTPS — is_ssl() alone is not enough |
| 884 | // when WordPress is behind a misconfigured proxy. |
| 885 | $site_url = $this->get_secure_site_url(); |
| 886 | if ( is_wp_error( $site_url ) ) { |
| 887 | return $site_url; |
| 888 | } |
| 889 | |
| 890 | // Check Application Passwords are available. |
| 891 | if ( ! $this->are_application_passwords_available() ) { |
| 892 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 893 | 'application_passwords_unavailable', |
| 894 | __( 'Application Passwords are not available on this site.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 895 | array( 'status' => 501 ) |
| 896 | ); |
| 897 | } |
| 898 | |
| 899 | // Check rate limit. |
| 900 | if ( ! $this->check_generation_rate_limit( get_current_user_id() ) ) { |
| 901 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 902 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 903 | __( 'Too many QR login requests. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 904 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 905 | ); |
| 906 | } |
| 907 | |
| 908 | // Generate a cryptographically secure token. |
| 909 | $token = wp_generate_password( 64, false ); |
| 910 | $token_hash = hash( 'sha256', $token ); |
| 911 | $now = time(); |
| 912 | $expires_at = $now + self::TOKEN_TTL; |
| 913 | |
| 914 | // Structured state-machine record. Subsequent transitions |
| 915 | // (scan/approve/exchange) gate themselves on the current state at the |
| 916 | // top of each handler. |
| 917 | $token_data = array( |
| 918 | 'state' => self::STATE_PENDING, |
| 919 | 'created_at' => $now, |
| 920 | 'state_at' => $now, |
| 921 | 'user_id' => get_current_user_id(), |
| 922 | 'site_url' => $site_url, |
| 923 | 'expires_at' => $expires_at, |
| 924 | ); |
| 925 | |
| 926 | set_transient( self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash, $token_data, self::TOKEN_TTL ); |
| 927 | |
| 928 | // Build the QR URL (deep link for the mobile app). |
| 929 | $qr_url = sprintf( |
| 930 | 'woocommerce://qr-login?token=%s&siteUrl=%s', |
| 931 | rawurlencode( $token ), |
| 932 | rawurlencode( $site_url ) |
| 933 | ); |
| 934 | |
| 935 | return rest_ensure_response( |
| 936 | array( |
| 937 | 'qr_url' => $qr_url, |
| 938 | 'expires_at' => $expires_at, |
| 939 | 'ttl' => self::TOKEN_TTL, |
| 940 | ) |
| 941 | ); |
| 942 | } |
| 943 | |
| 944 | /** |
| 945 | * Exchange a QR login token for an Application Password. |
| 946 | * |
| 947 | * This endpoint does not require authentication — the token serves |
| 948 | * as the authentication mechanism. |
| 949 | * |
| 950 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 951 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 952 | */ |
| 953 | public function exchange_token( $request ) { |
| 954 | // Refuse to return credentials over a non-HTTPS request. |
| 955 | if ( ! is_ssl() ) { |
| 956 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 957 | 'ssl_required', |
| 958 | __( 'QR login requires an HTTPS connection.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 959 | array( 'status' => 403 ) |
| 960 | ); |
| 961 | } |
| 962 | |
| 963 | // Refuse to return credentials bound to a non-HTTPS site URL — see |
| 964 | // get_secure_site_url() for rationale. A token that was minted while the |
| 965 | // siteurl was still https:// but has since been changed to http:// should |
| 966 | // also be refused here. |
| 967 | $site_url = $this->get_secure_site_url(); |
| 968 | if ( is_wp_error( $site_url ) ) { |
| 969 | return $site_url; |
| 970 | } |
| 971 | |
| 972 | // Defensive sanitize even though the REST `sanitize_callback` already |
| 973 | // did so — guards against future refactors that bypass the callback. |
| 974 | $token = sanitize_text_field( (string) $request->get_param( 'token' ) ); |
| 975 | $token_hash = hash( 'sha256', $token ); |
| 976 | $key = self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash; |
| 977 | |
| 978 | $token_data = get_transient( $key ); |
| 979 | if ( ! is_array( $token_data ) ) { |
| 980 | if ( ! $this->check_invalid_exchange_rate_limit() ) { |
| 981 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 982 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 983 | __( 'Too many exchange attempts. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 984 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 985 | ); |
| 986 | } |
| 987 | |
| 988 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 989 | 'invalid_token', |
| 990 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 991 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 992 | ); |
| 993 | } |
| 994 | |
| 995 | // Broad anonymous abuse guard applies only after token lookup. Random |
| 996 | // invalid requests use the invalid-token bucket above so they cannot |
| 997 | // exhaust this shared-IP guard for later valid exchanges behind the same |
| 998 | // proxy/CDN IP. |
| 999 | if ( ! $this->check_exchange_ip_rate_limit() ) { |
| 1000 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1001 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1002 | __( 'Too many exchange attempts. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1003 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1004 | ); |
| 1005 | } |
| 1006 | |
| 1007 | if ( ! $this->check_valid_exchange_rate_limit( $token_hash ) ) { |
| 1008 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1009 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1010 | __( 'Too many exchange attempts. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1011 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1012 | ); |
| 1013 | } |
| 1014 | |
| 1015 | if ( ! $this->claim_token_for_exchange( $token_hash, isset( $token_data['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $token_data['expires_at'] : time() + self::TOKEN_TTL ) ) { |
| 1016 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1017 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1018 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1019 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1020 | ); |
| 1021 | } |
| 1022 | |
| 1023 | // Re-read after acquiring the database claim in case another process |
| 1024 | // consumed or expired the token while this request was waiting. |
| 1025 | $token_data = get_transient( $key ); |
| 1026 | if ( ! is_array( $token_data ) ) { |
| 1027 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1028 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1029 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1030 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1031 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1032 | ); |
| 1033 | } |
| 1034 | |
| 1035 | // Validate token hasn't expired (belt and suspenders with transient TTL). |
| 1036 | if ( ! empty( $token_data['expires_at'] ) && time() >= (int) $token_data['expires_at'] ) { |
| 1037 | delete_transient( $key ); |
| 1038 | $this->delete_session_mapping_for_record( $token_data ); |
| 1039 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1040 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1041 | 'token_expired', |
| 1042 | __( 'QR login token has expired.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1043 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1044 | ); |
| 1045 | } |
| 1046 | |
| 1047 | // Number-matching enforcement: exchange must be preceded by /scan + |
| 1048 | // /approve. Anything other than `approved` (including `pending` — |
| 1049 | // scan was skipped — and `scanned` — scan completed but merchant |
| 1050 | // didn't tap a number yet) is a hard 412. |
| 1051 | $current_state = isset( $token_data['state'] ) ? (string) $token_data['state'] : self::STATE_PENDING; |
| 1052 | |
| 1053 | if ( self::STATE_APPROVED !== $current_state ) { |
| 1054 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1055 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1056 | 'qr_login_not_approved', |
| 1057 | __( 'This QR login session has not been approved.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1058 | array( 'status' => 412 ) |
| 1059 | ); |
| 1060 | } |
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | // Constant-time grant comparison. The grant is bound to this token |
| 1063 | // at /approve time and only handed back to the polling app via |
| 1064 | // /session-status, so an attacker who somehow learned the token |
| 1065 | // can't race the legit app to exchange after approval. |
| 1066 | $submitted_grant = (string) $request->get_param( 'exchange_grant' ); |
| 1067 | $stored_grant = isset( $token_data['exchange_grant'] ) ? (string) $token_data['exchange_grant'] : ''; |
| 1068 | |
| 1069 | if ( '' === $stored_grant || ! hash_equals( $stored_grant, $submitted_grant ) ) { |
| 1070 | $invalid_grant_attempts = isset( $token_data['invalid_grant_attempts'] ) ? (int) $token_data['invalid_grant_attempts'] : 0; |
| 1071 | ++$invalid_grant_attempts; |
| 1072 | |
| 1073 | $token_data['invalid_grant_attempts'] = $invalid_grant_attempts; |
| 1074 | $token_data['invalid_grant_last_attempted_at'] = time(); |
| 1075 | |
| 1076 | if ( $invalid_grant_attempts >= self::MAX_INVALID_GRANT_ATTEMPTS ) { |
| 1077 | $token_data['state'] = self::STATE_REJECTED; |
| 1078 | $token_data['state_at'] = time(); |
| 1079 | |
| 1080 | wc_get_logger()->warning( |
| 1081 | 'QR login rejected after repeated invalid exchange grants', |
| 1082 | array( |
| 1083 | 'source' => 'qr-login-security', |
| 1084 | 'user_id' => isset( $token_data['user_id'] ) ? (int) $token_data['user_id'] : 0, |
| 1085 | 'ip' => $this->get_client_ip(), |
| 1086 | ) |
| 1087 | ); |
| 1088 | } |
| 1089 | |
| 1090 | set_transient( $key, $token_data, $this->get_token_record_ttl( $token_data ) ); |
| 1091 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1092 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1093 | 'invalid_exchange_grant', |
| 1094 | __( 'Invalid exchange grant for this QR login session.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1095 | array( 'status' => 412 ) |
| 1096 | ); |
| 1097 | }//end if |
| 1098 | |
| 1099 | $user_id = $token_data['user_id']; |
| 1100 | $user = get_userdata( $user_id ); |
| 1101 | |
| 1102 | if ( ! $user ) { |
| 1103 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1104 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1105 | 'user_not_found', |
| 1106 | __( 'User associated with this token no longer exists.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1107 | array( 'status' => 404 ) |
| 1108 | ); |
| 1109 | } |
| 1110 | |
| 1111 | // Application Passwords may have been disabled after the token was minted. |
| 1112 | if ( ! $this->are_application_passwords_available() ) { |
| 1113 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1114 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1115 | 'application_passwords_unavailable', |
| 1116 | __( 'Application Passwords are not available on this site.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1117 | array( 'status' => 501 ) |
| 1118 | ); |
| 1119 | } |
| 1120 | |
| 1121 | // Mirror the permission check WP core performs in |
| 1122 | // WP_REST_Application_Passwords_Controller::create_item_permissions_check(). |
| 1123 | // Capability or per-user availability filters could have changed in the |
| 1124 | // window between token generation and exchange. |
| 1125 | if ( ! user_can( $user, 'create_app_password', $user_id ) ) { |
| 1126 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1127 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1128 | 'rest_cannot_create_application_passwords', |
| 1129 | __( 'Application passwords are not available for your account. Please contact the site administrator for assistance.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1130 | array( 'status' => rest_authorization_required_code() ) |
| 1131 | ); |
| 1132 | } |
| 1133 | |
| 1134 | // Source the device payload from the scan record. /qr-login-scan |
| 1135 | // requires a device object, so by the time we reach `approved` it's |
| 1136 | // guaranteed present. Re-sanitize defensively in case the transient |
| 1137 | // was tampered with at the storage layer. |
| 1138 | $device_source = isset( $token_data['challenge']['device'] ) && is_array( $token_data['challenge']['device'] ) |
| 1139 | ? $token_data['challenge']['device'] |
| 1140 | : array(); |
| 1141 | $device = $this->sanitize_device_payload( $device_source ); |
| 1142 | |
| 1143 | // Create an Application Password for the mobile app. The name is |
| 1144 | // descriptive (e.g. "Woo Mobile · iPhone 15 · 2026-04-28") so the user |
| 1145 | // can identify it later in Users → Profile → Application Passwords. |
| 1146 | $app_password_result = \WP_Application_Passwords::create_new_application_password( |
| 1147 | $user_id, |
| 1148 | array( |
| 1149 | 'name' => $this->format_application_password_name( $device ), |
| 1150 | 'app_id' => self::APP_ID, |
| 1151 | ) |
| 1152 | ); |
| 1153 | |
| 1154 | if ( is_wp_error( $app_password_result ) ) { |
| 1155 | wc_get_logger()->error( |
| 1156 | sprintf( |
| 1157 | 'QR login: failed to create Application Password for user %d: %s', |
| 1158 | $user_id, |
| 1159 | $app_password_result->get_error_message() |
| 1160 | ), |
| 1161 | array( 'source' => 'mobile-app-qr-login' ) |
| 1162 | ); |
| 1163 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1164 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1165 | 'application_password_failed', |
| 1166 | __( 'Could not create a mobile-app credential. Please try again, or contact your site administrator.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1167 | array( 'status' => 500 ) |
| 1168 | ); |
| 1169 | } |
| 1170 | |
| 1171 | list( $new_password, $item ) = $app_password_result; |
| 1172 | |
| 1173 | // Write a "consumed" record so wc-admin's polling client can transition |
| 1174 | // from "QR shown" to "Signed in successfully on {device}" and surface |
| 1175 | // a revoke button. Same TTL as the original token transient — there's |
| 1176 | // no value in keeping this record longer than the modal that polls it. |
| 1177 | $consumed_record = array( |
| 1178 | 'consumed_at' => time(), |
| 1179 | 'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 1180 | 'ap_uuid' => $item['uuid'], |
| 1181 | 'ap_name' => $item['name'], |
| 1182 | 'device' => $device, |
| 1183 | ); |
| 1184 | set_transient( |
| 1185 | self::CONSUMED_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash, |
| 1186 | $consumed_record, |
| 1187 | self::TOKEN_TTL |
| 1188 | ); |
| 1189 | |
| 1190 | // One-shot: consume only after the Application Password has been |
| 1191 | // successfully created and the consumed record is visible to wc-admin's |
| 1192 | // polling client. |
| 1193 | delete_transient( $key ); |
| 1194 | $this->delete_session_mapping_for_record( $token_data ); |
| 1195 | $this->release_token_exchange_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1196 | |
| 1197 | // Notify the merchant out-of-band so they're aware of a fresh sign-in |
| 1198 | // even when they aren't currently looking at wc-admin. Wrapped in a |
| 1199 | // try/catch + filter to keep the exchange path uninterrupted if the |
| 1200 | // site's mailer is misconfigured. |
| 1201 | $this->maybe_send_sign_in_notification_email( $user, $consumed_record ); |
| 1202 | |
| 1203 | return rest_ensure_response( |
| 1204 | array( |
| 1205 | 'success' => true, |
| 1206 | 'user_login' => $user->user_login, |
| 1207 | 'user_email' => $user->user_email, |
| 1208 | 'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 1209 | 'site_url' => $site_url, |
| 1210 | 'application_password' => $new_password, |
| 1211 | 'uuid' => $item['uuid'], |
| 1212 | ) |
| 1213 | ); |
| 1214 | } |
| 1215 | |
| 1216 | /** |
| 1217 | * Get the status of a previously generated QR login token. |
| 1218 | * |
| 1219 | * Used by the wc-admin UI to poll while the QR is on screen. Returns one of: |
| 1220 | * - `pending` — token transient exists, has not been exchanged yet. |
| 1221 | * - `consumed` — token has been exchanged; payload includes the device that |
| 1222 | * signed in and the AP UUID so the UI can render the |
| 1223 | * confirmation panel and (optionally) revoke the AP. |
| 1224 | * - `expired` — neither transient exists, so the token has expired or |
| 1225 | * was never valid for this user. |
| 1226 | * |
| 1227 | * The user calling this endpoint must be the same user who minted the token. |
| 1228 | * That's defense in depth — tokens are 64 random chars and not realistically |
| 1229 | * guessable, but cross-user status reads should be impossible regardless. |
| 1230 | * |
| 1231 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 1232 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 1233 | */ |
| 1234 | public function get_status( $request ) { |
| 1235 | // Defeat any intermediary cache (Cloudflare, NGINX micro-cache, browser, edge proxy) |
| 1236 | // that might pin this GET to its first response. Polling endpoints are by definition |
| 1237 | // state-bearing — every tick must see the live transient. Returning a stale `scanned` |
| 1238 | // response forever is exactly the symptom we'd see if the cache pins the first hit. |
| 1239 | nocache_headers(); |
| 1240 | |
| 1241 | $user_id = get_current_user_id(); |
| 1242 | |
| 1243 | if ( ! $this->check_status_rate_limit( $user_id ) ) { |
| 1244 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1245 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1246 | __( 'Too many QR login status checks. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1247 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1248 | ); |
| 1249 | } |
| 1250 | |
| 1251 | $token = (string) $request->get_param( 'token' ); |
| 1252 | if ( '' === $token ) { |
| 1253 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => 'expired' ) ); |
| 1254 | } |
| 1255 | |
| 1256 | $token_hash = hash( 'sha256', $token ); |
| 1257 | |
| 1258 | // Consumed lookup first — once a token has been exchanged the main |
| 1259 | // transient is deleted, but we keep a one-way breadcrumb at the |
| 1260 | // `_wc_qr_login_consumed_` key so the polling client (which still |
| 1261 | // has the plaintext token) can render the success panel. |
| 1262 | $consumed = get_transient( self::CONSUMED_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash ); |
| 1263 | if ( is_array( $consumed ) ) { |
| 1264 | if ( ! isset( $consumed['user_id'] ) || (int) $consumed['user_id'] !== (int) $user_id ) { |
| 1265 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => 'expired' ) ); |
| 1266 | } |
| 1267 | |
| 1268 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( |
| 1269 | array( |
| 1270 | 'status' => self::STATE_CONSUMED, |
| 1271 | 'consumed_at' => isset( $consumed['consumed_at'] ) ? (int) $consumed['consumed_at'] : null, |
| 1272 | 'ap_uuid' => isset( $consumed['ap_uuid'] ) ? (string) $consumed['ap_uuid'] : null, |
| 1273 | 'ap_name' => isset( $consumed['ap_name'] ) ? (string) $consumed['ap_name'] : null, |
| 1274 | 'device' => isset( $consumed['device'] ) && is_array( $consumed['device'] ) ? $consumed['device'] : array(), |
| 1275 | ) |
| 1276 | ); |
| 1277 | } |
| 1278 | |
| 1279 | $record = get_transient( self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash ); |
| 1280 | if ( ! is_array( $record ) ) { |
| 1281 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1282 | } |
| 1283 | |
| 1284 | // Cross-user defense in depth — same as before. |
| 1285 | if ( ! isset( $record['user_id'] ) || (int) $record['user_id'] !== (int) $user_id ) { |
| 1286 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1287 | } |
| 1288 | |
| 1289 | $state = isset( $record['state'] ) ? (string) $record['state'] : self::STATE_PENDING; |
| 1290 | |
| 1291 | // Rejected / expired states are terminal — surface them directly so |
| 1292 | // wc-admin can render the "Login denied" terminal screen. |
| 1293 | if ( in_array( $state, array( self::STATE_REJECTED, self::STATE_EXPIRED ), true ) ) { |
| 1294 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => $state ) ); |
| 1295 | } |
| 1296 | |
| 1297 | if ( ! empty( $record['expires_at'] ) && time() >= (int) $record['expires_at'] ) { |
| 1298 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1299 | } |
| 1300 | |
| 1301 | // While in `scanned`, surface the shuffled candidate triple and the |
| 1302 | // device that scanned so wc-admin can render the matching UI. The |
| 1303 | // REAL number is never returned via this endpoint — only the |
| 1304 | // shuffled triple of (real + 2 distractors) is, so an XSS / hostile |
| 1305 | // extension can't read which one is correct from JS state. |
| 1306 | if ( self::STATE_SCANNED === $state ) { |
| 1307 | $challenge = isset( $record['challenge'] ) && is_array( $record['challenge'] ) ? $record['challenge'] : array(); |
| 1308 | $numbers = $this->shuffled_candidate_numbers( $challenge ); |
| 1309 | |
| 1310 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( |
| 1311 | array( |
| 1312 | 'status' => self::STATE_SCANNED, |
| 1313 | 'numbers' => $numbers, |
| 1314 | 'device' => isset( $challenge['device'] ) && is_array( $challenge['device'] ) ? $challenge['device'] : array(), |
| 1315 | 'expires_at' => isset( $challenge['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $challenge['expires_at'] : null, |
| 1316 | ) |
| 1317 | ); |
| 1318 | } |
| 1319 | |
| 1320 | // Approved (post-tap, pre-exchange) — surface so a wc-admin tab that |
| 1321 | // reloaded between approve and exchange shows the "Signing in…" |
| 1322 | // transitional state rather than going back to the QR. |
| 1323 | if ( self::STATE_APPROVED === $state ) { |
| 1324 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'status' => self::STATE_APPROVED ) ); |
| 1325 | } |
| 1326 | |
| 1327 | // Pending: same shape as before, plus the new `state` field for |
| 1328 | // clients that want to switch on it directly. |
| 1329 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( |
| 1330 | array( |
| 1331 | 'status' => self::STATE_PENDING, |
| 1332 | 'expires_at' => isset( $record['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $record['expires_at'] : null, |
| 1333 | ) |
| 1334 | ); |
| 1335 | } |
| 1336 | |
| 1337 | /** |
| 1338 | * Revoke (delete) the Application Password issued by a QR login exchange. |
| 1339 | * |
| 1340 | * The current user must own the AP being revoked — verified via |
| 1341 | * `WP_Application_Passwords::get_user_application_password()`. We |
| 1342 | * deliberately do NOT use `current_user_can( 'edit_user', $user_id )` |
| 1343 | * because that would let a higher-privilege admin revoke another user's AP |
| 1344 | * here; the QR flow's revoke surface is for "I just authorized this — undo," |
| 1345 | * not for site-wide AP management (which lives at Users → Profile). |
| 1346 | * |
| 1347 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 1348 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 1349 | */ |
| 1350 | public function revoke_password( $request ) { |
| 1351 | $user_id = get_current_user_id(); |
| 1352 | |
| 1353 | if ( ! $this->check_revoke_rate_limit( $user_id ) ) { |
| 1354 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1355 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1356 | __( 'Too many QR login revoke attempts. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1357 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1358 | ); |
| 1359 | } |
| 1360 | |
| 1361 | if ( ! $this->are_application_passwords_available() ) { |
| 1362 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1363 | 'application_passwords_unavailable', |
| 1364 | __( 'Application Passwords are not available on this site.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1365 | array( 'status' => 501 ) |
| 1366 | ); |
| 1367 | } |
| 1368 | |
| 1369 | $uuid = (string) $request->get_param( 'uuid' ); |
| 1370 | |
| 1371 | // Ownership check: the AP must exist AND belong to the current user. |
| 1372 | $ap = \WP_Application_Passwords::get_user_application_password( $user_id, $uuid ); |
| 1373 | if ( ! is_array( $ap ) ) { |
| 1374 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1375 | 'application_password_not_found', |
| 1376 | __( 'No matching Application Password to revoke.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1377 | array( 'status' => 404 ) |
| 1378 | ); |
| 1379 | } |
| 1380 | |
| 1381 | $deleted = \WP_Application_Passwords::delete_application_password( $user_id, $uuid ); |
| 1382 | if ( true !== $deleted ) { |
| 1383 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1384 | 'application_password_revoke_failed', |
| 1385 | __( 'Could not revoke the Application Password. Please try again.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1386 | array( 'status' => 500 ) |
| 1387 | ); |
| 1388 | } |
| 1389 | |
| 1390 | return rest_ensure_response( |
| 1391 | array( |
| 1392 | 'success' => true, |
| 1393 | 'uuid' => $uuid, |
| 1394 | ) |
| 1395 | ); |
| 1396 | } |
| 1397 | |
| 1398 | /** |
| 1399 | * Whitelist + sanitize the `device` payload sent by the mobile app. |
| 1400 | * |
| 1401 | * Returns an array of strings keyed by the whitelisted keys defined in |
| 1402 | * `DEVICE_PAYLOAD_KEYS`. Anything outside that whitelist is dropped. Each |
| 1403 | * value is run through `sanitize_text_field()` and capped at |
| 1404 | * `DEVICE_FIELD_MAX_LENGTH` characters. The function is total — pass `null` |
| 1405 | * or anything non-array and you get back `array()`. |
| 1406 | * |
| 1407 | * @param mixed $device Raw payload from the request. |
| 1408 | * @return array<string, string> |
| 1409 | */ |
| 1410 | private function sanitize_device_payload( $device ) { |
| 1411 | if ( ! is_array( $device ) ) { |
| 1412 | return array(); |
| 1413 | } |
| 1414 | |
| 1415 | $sanitized = array(); |
| 1416 | foreach ( self::DEVICE_PAYLOAD_KEYS as $key ) { |
| 1417 | if ( ! isset( $device[ $key ] ) || ! is_scalar( $device[ $key ] ) ) { |
| 1418 | continue; |
| 1419 | } |
| 1420 | $value = sanitize_text_field( (string) $device[ $key ] ); |
| 1421 | if ( '' === $value ) { |
| 1422 | continue; |
| 1423 | } |
| 1424 | if ( strlen( $value ) > self::DEVICE_FIELD_MAX_LENGTH ) { |
| 1425 | $value = substr( $value, 0, self::DEVICE_FIELD_MAX_LENGTH ); |
| 1426 | } |
| 1427 | $sanitized[ $key ] = $value; |
| 1428 | } |
| 1429 | |
| 1430 | return $sanitized; |
| 1431 | } |
| 1432 | |
| 1433 | /** |
| 1434 | * Build a descriptive name for the Application Password issued by the QR |
| 1435 | * login exchange. |
| 1436 | * |
| 1437 | * Preferred: `Woo Mobile · iPhone 15 · 2026-04-28` (model + ISO date). |
| 1438 | * Falls back to `Woo Mobile · iOS · 2026-04-28` when only the OS is known. |
| 1439 | * The scan endpoint requires at least model or OS. The legacy fallback is |
| 1440 | * retained as a defensive guard in case stored token data is corrupted. |
| 1441 | * |
| 1442 | * The name is what the merchant sees in WP admin → Users → Profile → |
| 1443 | * Application Passwords, so it should be human-readable, single-line, and |
| 1444 | * not contain anything that would only make sense to an engineer. |
| 1445 | * |
| 1446 | * @param array<string, string> $device Sanitized device payload. |
| 1447 | * @return string |
| 1448 | */ |
| 1449 | private function format_application_password_name( array $device ): string { |
| 1450 | $model = isset( $device['model'] ) ? trim( $device['model'] ) : ''; |
| 1451 | $os = isset( $device['os'] ) ? trim( $device['os'] ) : ''; |
| 1452 | |
| 1453 | // Prefer model (e.g. "iPhone 15", "Pixel 10"); fall back to the OS |
| 1454 | // label if a particular device build returns an empty MODEL string. |
| 1455 | // Both fields come from the platform SDK on the mobile side and are |
| 1456 | // effectively always populated, but defending against an empty model |
| 1457 | // is cheaper than chasing the edge case at runtime. |
| 1458 | $descriptor = '' !== $model ? $model : $os; |
| 1459 | if ( '' === $descriptor ) { |
| 1460 | return __( 'WooCommerce Mobile App (QR Login)', 'woocommerce' ); |
| 1461 | } |
| 1462 | |
| 1463 | // Use the site's configured timezone so the date the merchant sees in |
| 1464 | // the AP list matches what they'd see in the rest of wp-admin. |
| 1465 | $date = wp_date( 'Y-m-d' ); |
| 1466 | |
| 1467 | /* translators: 1: device descriptor (model or OS, e.g. "iPhone 15"). 2: ISO date the AP was created. */ |
| 1468 | return sprintf( __( 'Woo Mobile · %1$s · %2$s', 'woocommerce' ), $descriptor, $date ); |
| 1469 | } |
| 1470 | |
| 1471 | /** |
| 1472 | * Per-user rate limit for the polling status endpoint. |
| 1473 | * |
| 1474 | * @param int $user_id The user ID. |
| 1475 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 1476 | */ |
| 1477 | private function check_status_rate_limit( $user_id ) { |
| 1478 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_STATUS, (string) $user_id ); |
| 1479 | } |
| 1480 | |
| 1481 | /** |
| 1482 | * Per-user rate limit for the revoke endpoint. |
| 1483 | * |
| 1484 | * @param int $user_id The user ID. |
| 1485 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 1486 | */ |
| 1487 | private function check_revoke_rate_limit( $user_id ) { |
| 1488 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_REVOKE, (string) $user_id ); |
| 1489 | } |
| 1490 | |
| 1491 | /** |
| 1492 | * Mobile app reports the QR was scanned. Generates the number-match |
| 1493 | * challenge, marks the state as `scanned`, and returns the *real* number |
| 1494 | * + a session id back to the app. Public — the token is the auth. |
| 1495 | * |
| 1496 | * Hard-break compat: clients that don't send `supports_number_matching` |
| 1497 | * get 426 Upgrade Required. The Android Task 7 PR adds the flag; older |
| 1498 | * apps in the wild see a clear "update required" error. |
| 1499 | * |
| 1500 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 1501 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 1502 | */ |
| 1503 | public function scan_token( $request ) { |
| 1504 | if ( ! is_ssl() ) { |
| 1505 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1506 | 'ssl_required', |
| 1507 | __( 'QR login requires an HTTPS connection.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1508 | array( 'status' => 403 ) |
| 1509 | ); |
| 1510 | } |
| 1511 | |
| 1512 | if ( true !== (bool) $request->get_param( 'supports_number_matching' ) ) { |
| 1513 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1514 | 'mobile_app_update_required', |
| 1515 | __( 'This Woo mobile app version is no longer supported for QR sign-in. Please update the app and try again.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1516 | array( 'status' => 426 ) |
| 1517 | ); |
| 1518 | } |
| 1519 | |
| 1520 | $token = (string) $request->get_param( 'token' ); |
| 1521 | $token_hash = hash( 'sha256', $token ); |
| 1522 | $key = self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash; |
| 1523 | |
| 1524 | $record = get_transient( $key ); |
| 1525 | if ( ! is_array( $record ) ) { |
| 1526 | if ( ! $this->check_invalid_scan_rate_limit() ) { |
| 1527 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1528 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1529 | __( 'Too many QR login scans. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1530 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1531 | ); |
| 1532 | } |
| 1533 | |
| 1534 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1535 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1536 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1537 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1538 | ); |
| 1539 | } |
| 1540 | |
| 1541 | if ( ! $this->check_scan_rate_limit() ) { |
| 1542 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1543 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1544 | __( 'Too many QR login scans. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1545 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1546 | ); |
| 1547 | } |
| 1548 | |
| 1549 | $device = $this->sanitize_device_payload( $request->get_param( 'device' ) ); |
| 1550 | if ( empty( $device['model'] ) && empty( $device['os'] ) ) { |
| 1551 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1552 | 'invalid_device', |
| 1553 | __( 'QR login requires device information from the mobile app.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1554 | array( 'status' => 400 ) |
| 1555 | ); |
| 1556 | } |
| 1557 | |
| 1558 | // Atomic mutex on the read-mutate-write window. Without this, two |
| 1559 | // concurrent scans both pass the state==pending check below and both |
| 1560 | // write a new challenge — last writer wins, the loser's session_id |
| 1561 | // is silently orphaned. The state check is kept as defense-in-depth |
| 1562 | // for any path that bypasses the claim (e.g. the staleness branch). |
| 1563 | if ( ! $this->claim_token_for_scan( |
| 1564 | $token_hash, |
| 1565 | isset( $record['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $record['expires_at'] : time() + self::TOKEN_TTL |
| 1566 | ) ) { |
| 1567 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1568 | 'qr_login_already_scanned', |
| 1569 | __( 'This QR login session is no longer accepting scans.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1570 | array( 'status' => 409 ) |
| 1571 | ); |
| 1572 | } |
| 1573 | |
| 1574 | $current_state = isset( $record['state'] ) ? (string) $record['state'] : self::STATE_PENDING; |
| 1575 | if ( self::STATE_PENDING !== $current_state ) { |
| 1576 | $this->release_token_scan_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1577 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1578 | 'qr_login_already_scanned', |
| 1579 | __( 'This QR login session is no longer accepting scans.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1580 | array( 'status' => 409 ) |
| 1581 | ); |
| 1582 | } |
| 1583 | |
| 1584 | $challenge_numbers = $this->generate_challenge_numbers(); |
| 1585 | $session_id = wp_generate_uuid4(); |
| 1586 | $now = time(); |
| 1587 | $token_expires_at = isset( $record['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $record['expires_at'] : $now + self::TOKEN_TTL; |
| 1588 | |
| 1589 | if ( $token_expires_at <= $now ) { |
| 1590 | $this->release_token_scan_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1591 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1592 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1593 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1594 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1595 | ); |
| 1596 | } |
| 1597 | |
| 1598 | $challenge_expires_at = min( $now + self::CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS, $token_expires_at ); |
| 1599 | $challenge_ttl = max( 1, $challenge_expires_at - $now ); |
| 1600 | |
| 1601 | // Shuffle the candidate triple ONCE at scan time and persist the chosen ordering so |
| 1602 | // every subsequent /qr-login-status poll returns the same array. Re-shuffling per-poll |
| 1603 | // would make the wc-admin tile order flicker every 2.5 s — terrible UX, and makes the |
| 1604 | // merchant doubt they're reading the right number. |
| 1605 | $candidates = array_merge( array( $challenge_numbers['real'] ), $challenge_numbers['distractors'] ); |
| 1606 | shuffle( $candidates ); |
| 1607 | |
| 1608 | $record['state'] = self::STATE_SCANNED; |
| 1609 | $record['state_at'] = $now; |
| 1610 | $record['challenge'] = array( |
| 1611 | 'real' => $challenge_numbers['real'], |
| 1612 | 'distractors' => $challenge_numbers['distractors'], |
| 1613 | 'shuffled' => $candidates, |
| 1614 | 'session_id' => $session_id, |
| 1615 | 'expires_at' => $challenge_expires_at, |
| 1616 | 'device' => $device, |
| 1617 | ); |
| 1618 | |
| 1619 | // Re-use whatever TTL the original transient had left. The challenge |
| 1620 | // window itself is capped to the remaining token lifetime, while the |
| 1621 | // storage TTL keeps the full challenge visible for normal fresh scans. |
| 1622 | $ttl_left = max( 1, $token_expires_at - $now ); |
| 1623 | $storage_ttl = min( $ttl_left, self::CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS + 30 ); |
| 1624 | set_transient( $key, $record, $storage_ttl ); |
| 1625 | |
| 1626 | // Sibling transient that resolves session_id → token_hash for the |
| 1627 | // app's session-status poll. Stored hashed so the session id isn't |
| 1628 | // directly indexable in wp_options. |
| 1629 | set_transient( |
| 1630 | self::SESSION_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . hash( 'sha256', $session_id ), |
| 1631 | $token_hash, |
| 1632 | $storage_ttl |
| 1633 | ); |
| 1634 | |
| 1635 | $this->release_token_scan_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1636 | |
| 1637 | return rest_ensure_response( |
| 1638 | array( |
| 1639 | 'session_id' => $session_id, |
| 1640 | 'real_number' => $challenge_numbers['real'], |
| 1641 | 'expires_in' => $challenge_ttl, |
| 1642 | ) |
| 1643 | ); |
| 1644 | } |
| 1645 | |
| 1646 | /** |
| 1647 | * Merchant taps a number on wc-admin. Server validates against the |
| 1648 | * stored real number with `hash_equals()` (constant-time). Correct → |
| 1649 | * `approved` + mints `exchange_grant`. Wrong → `rejected` (terminal, |
| 1650 | * security event logged). One-strike: no retry. |
| 1651 | * |
| 1652 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 1653 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 1654 | */ |
| 1655 | public function approve_token( $request ) { |
| 1656 | $user_id = get_current_user_id(); |
| 1657 | |
| 1658 | if ( ! $this->check_approve_rate_limit( $user_id ) ) { |
| 1659 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1660 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1661 | __( 'Too many QR login approval attempts. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1662 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1663 | ); |
| 1664 | } |
| 1665 | |
| 1666 | $token = (string) $request->get_param( 'token' ); |
| 1667 | $token_hash = hash( 'sha256', $token ); |
| 1668 | $key = self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash; |
| 1669 | |
| 1670 | $record = get_transient( $key ); |
| 1671 | if ( ! is_array( $record ) ) { |
| 1672 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1673 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1674 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1675 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1676 | ); |
| 1677 | } |
| 1678 | |
| 1679 | $approval_claim_expires_at = ! empty( $record['challenge']['expires_at'] ) |
| 1680 | ? (int) $record['challenge']['expires_at'] |
| 1681 | : ( isset( $record['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $record['expires_at'] : time() + self::TOKEN_TTL ); |
| 1682 | if ( ! $this->claim_token_for_approval( $token_hash, $approval_claim_expires_at ) ) { |
| 1683 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1684 | 'qr_login_approval_in_progress', |
| 1685 | __( 'This QR login session is already being approved.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1686 | array( 'status' => 409 ) |
| 1687 | ); |
| 1688 | } |
| 1689 | |
| 1690 | // Re-read after acquiring the database claim in case another request |
| 1691 | // approved, rejected, or expired the challenge while this one was waiting. |
| 1692 | $record = get_transient( $key ); |
| 1693 | if ( ! is_array( $record ) ) { |
| 1694 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1695 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1696 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1697 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1698 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1699 | ); |
| 1700 | } |
| 1701 | |
| 1702 | // Same cross-user defense as get_status — only the user that minted |
| 1703 | // the token can approve it. |
| 1704 | if ( ! isset( $record['user_id'] ) || (int) $record['user_id'] !== (int) $user_id ) { |
| 1705 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1706 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1707 | 'invalid_token', |
| 1708 | __( 'Invalid or expired QR login token.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1709 | array( 'status' => 401 ) |
| 1710 | ); |
| 1711 | } |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | if ( ! empty( $record['expires_at'] ) && time() >= (int) $record['expires_at'] ) { |
| 1714 | $record['state'] = self::STATE_EXPIRED; |
| 1715 | $record['state_at'] = time(); |
| 1716 | set_transient( $key, $record, 60 ); |
| 1717 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1718 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1719 | 'qr_login_expired', |
| 1720 | __( 'The QR login challenge has expired. Please generate a new code.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1721 | array( 'status' => 410 ) |
| 1722 | ); |
| 1723 | } |
| 1724 | |
| 1725 | $current_state = isset( $record['state'] ) ? (string) $record['state'] : self::STATE_PENDING; |
| 1726 | if ( self::STATE_SCANNED !== $current_state ) { |
| 1727 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1728 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1729 | 'qr_login_not_scanned', |
| 1730 | __( 'This QR login session is not waiting for approval.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1731 | array( 'status' => 409 ) |
| 1732 | ); |
| 1733 | } |
| 1734 | |
| 1735 | // Challenge expiry — normally 90 s after scan, capped by token expiry. |
| 1736 | if ( ! empty( $record['challenge']['expires_at'] ) && time() > (int) $record['challenge']['expires_at'] ) { |
| 1737 | $record['state'] = self::STATE_EXPIRED; |
| 1738 | $record['state_at'] = time(); |
| 1739 | set_transient( $key, $record, 60 ); |
| 1740 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1741 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1742 | 'qr_login_expired', |
| 1743 | __( 'The QR login challenge has expired. Please generate a new code.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1744 | array( 'status' => 410 ) |
| 1745 | ); |
| 1746 | } |
| 1747 | |
| 1748 | $choice = (string) $request->get_param( 'choice' ); |
| 1749 | $real = isset( $record['challenge']['real'] ) ? (string) $record['challenge']['real'] : ''; |
| 1750 | |
| 1751 | // Constant-time compare. Defends against PHP string-comparison fast |
| 1752 | // paths that can leak prefix-matching info via timing. |
| 1753 | if ( '' === $real || ! hash_equals( $real, $choice ) ) { |
| 1754 | $record['state'] = self::STATE_REJECTED; |
| 1755 | $record['state_at'] = time(); |
| 1756 | set_transient( $key, $record, 60 ); |
| 1757 | |
| 1758 | wc_get_logger()->warning( |
| 1759 | 'QR login number-match rejected — wrong choice submitted', |
| 1760 | array( |
| 1761 | 'source' => 'qr-login-security', |
| 1762 | 'user_id' => (int) $user_id, |
| 1763 | 'ip' => $this->get_client_ip(), |
| 1764 | 'device' => isset( $record['challenge']['device'] ) ? $record['challenge']['device'] : array(), |
| 1765 | ) |
| 1766 | ); |
| 1767 | |
| 1768 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1769 | return rest_ensure_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_REJECTED ) ); |
| 1770 | } |
| 1771 | |
| 1772 | $record['state'] = self::STATE_APPROVED; |
| 1773 | $record['state_at'] = time(); |
| 1774 | $record['exchange_grant'] = bin2hex( random_bytes( self::EXCHANGE_GRANT_BYTES ) ); |
| 1775 | $ttl = max( |
| 1776 | 1, |
| 1777 | isset( $record['expires_at'] ) ? (int) $record['expires_at'] - time() : self::CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS |
| 1778 | ); |
| 1779 | |
| 1780 | set_transient( $key, $record, $ttl ); |
| 1781 | $this->release_token_approval_claim( $token_hash ); |
| 1782 | |
| 1783 | return rest_ensure_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_APPROVED ) ); |
| 1784 | } |
| 1785 | |
| 1786 | /** |
| 1787 | * Mobile app polls this with the session id from /scan. Returns the |
| 1788 | * current state of the underlying token, plus — when state is |
| 1789 | * `approved` — the `exchange_grant` nonce required by /qr-login-exchange. |
| 1790 | * |
| 1791 | * @param \WP_REST_Request<array<string, mixed>> $request Full details about the request. |
| 1792 | * @return \WP_REST_Response|\WP_Error |
| 1793 | */ |
| 1794 | public function get_session_status( $request ) { |
| 1795 | // Defeat any intermediary cache (Cloudflare, NGINX micro-cache, OkHttp's shared |
| 1796 | // cache, edge proxy) that might pin this GET to its first response. Polling |
| 1797 | // endpoints are by definition state-bearing — every tick must see the live |
| 1798 | // transient. Returning a stale `scanned` response forever is exactly the |
| 1799 | // symptom we see if the cache pins the first hit. |
| 1800 | nocache_headers(); |
| 1801 | |
| 1802 | if ( ! is_ssl() ) { |
| 1803 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1804 | 'ssl_required', |
| 1805 | __( 'QR login requires an HTTPS connection.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1806 | array( 'status' => 403 ) |
| 1807 | ); |
| 1808 | } |
| 1809 | |
| 1810 | $session_id = (string) $request->get_param( 'session_id' ); |
| 1811 | $submitted_hash = (string) $request->get_param( 'token_hash' ); |
| 1812 | |
| 1813 | $token_hash = get_transient( self::SESSION_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . hash( 'sha256', $session_id ) ); |
| 1814 | if ( ! is_string( $token_hash ) || '' === $token_hash ) { |
| 1815 | // Either the session never existed or it has expired. Either way, |
| 1816 | // surface as expired to the polling app. |
| 1817 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1818 | } |
| 1819 | |
| 1820 | // Bind grant delivery to proof of token knowledge: an attacker who |
| 1821 | // learns the session_id alone (mobile logs, network capture, debug |
| 1822 | // output) cannot poll for state transitions and walk away with the |
| 1823 | // `exchange_grant` the moment the merchant approves. The mobile app |
| 1824 | // already holds the plaintext token from the QR scan — passing |
| 1825 | // SHA-256(token) on every poll is essentially free for it. |
| 1826 | // `hash_equals` for constant-time comparison; `expired` opacity so |
| 1827 | // we never leak whether the session_id is real or not. |
| 1828 | if ( ! hash_equals( $token_hash, $submitted_hash ) ) { |
| 1829 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1830 | } |
| 1831 | |
| 1832 | if ( ! $this->check_session_status_rate_limit( $session_id ) ) { |
| 1833 | return new \WP_Error( |
| 1834 | 'rate_limit_exceeded', |
| 1835 | __( 'Too many QR login session-status checks. Please try again later.', 'woocommerce' ), |
| 1836 | array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 1837 | ); |
| 1838 | } |
| 1839 | |
| 1840 | $record = get_transient( self::TOKEN_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token_hash ); |
| 1841 | if ( ! is_array( $record ) ) { |
| 1842 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1843 | } |
| 1844 | |
| 1845 | $state = isset( $record['state'] ) ? (string) $record['state'] : self::STATE_PENDING; |
| 1846 | $response = array( 'state' => $state ); |
| 1847 | |
| 1848 | if ( in_array( $state, array( self::STATE_REJECTED, self::STATE_EXPIRED ), true ) ) { |
| 1849 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( $response ); |
| 1850 | } |
| 1851 | |
| 1852 | if ( ! empty( $record['expires_at'] ) && time() >= (int) $record['expires_at'] ) { |
| 1853 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( array( 'state' => self::STATE_EXPIRED ) ); |
| 1854 | } |
| 1855 | |
| 1856 | if ( self::STATE_APPROVED === $state && ! empty( $record['exchange_grant'] ) ) { |
| 1857 | $response['exchange_grant'] = (string) $record['exchange_grant']; |
| 1858 | } |
| 1859 | |
| 1860 | return $this->rest_ensure_nocache_response( $response ); |
| 1861 | } |
| 1862 | |
| 1863 | /** |
| 1864 | * Generate a 1-real + 2-distractor number triple for the match |
| 1865 | * challenge. Distractors must differ from the real number and from each |
| 1866 | * other by ≥ 100 — defends against a partial-read leak fingerprinting |
| 1867 | * the real one (no `042` vs `043` near-misses). |
| 1868 | * |
| 1869 | * Uses `random_int()` (CSPRNG-backed) rather than `wp_rand()`, which can |
| 1870 | * fall back to mt_rand() and is predictable. |
| 1871 | * |
| 1872 | * @return array{real: string, distractors: array<int, string>} |
| 1873 | * @throws \RuntimeException If a valid distractor set cannot be generated. |
| 1874 | */ |
| 1875 | private function generate_challenge_numbers(): array { |
| 1876 | $real = random_int( 0, 999 ); |
| 1877 | $valid_candidates = array(); |
| 1878 | |
| 1879 | for ( $candidate = 0; $candidate <= 999; $candidate++ ) { |
| 1880 | if ( $candidate !== $real && abs( $candidate - $real ) >= 100 ) { |
| 1881 | $valid_candidates[] = $candidate; |
| 1882 | } |
| 1883 | } |
| 1884 | |
| 1885 | if ( empty( $valid_candidates ) ) { |
| 1886 | throw new \RuntimeException( 'QR login challenge generator could not find a valid first distractor.' ); |
| 1887 | } |
| 1888 | |
| 1889 | $first_index = random_int( 0, count( $valid_candidates ) - 1 ); |
| 1890 | $first = $valid_candidates[ $first_index ]; |
| 1891 | |
| 1892 | $second_candidates = array_values( |
| 1893 | array_filter( |
| 1894 | $valid_candidates, |
| 1895 | static function ( $candidate ) use ( $first ) { |
| 1896 | return abs( $candidate - $first ) >= 100; |
| 1897 | } |
| 1898 | ) |
| 1899 | ); |
| 1900 | |
| 1901 | if ( empty( $second_candidates ) ) { |
| 1902 | throw new \RuntimeException( 'QR login challenge generator could not find a valid second distractor.' ); |
| 1903 | } |
| 1904 | |
| 1905 | $second = $second_candidates[ random_int( 0, count( $second_candidates ) - 1 ) ]; |
| 1906 | $distractors = array( $first, $second ); |
| 1907 | |
| 1908 | return array( |
| 1909 | 'real' => str_pad( (string) $real, 3, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT ), |
| 1910 | 'distractors' => array_map( |
| 1911 | static function ( $n ) { |
| 1912 | return str_pad( (string) $n, 3, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT ); |
| 1913 | }, |
| 1914 | $distractors |
| 1915 | ), |
| 1916 | ); |
| 1917 | } |
| 1918 | |
| 1919 | /** |
| 1920 | * Build the shuffled candidate triple returned by `/qr-login-status` |
| 1921 | * while in the `scanned` state. The order is fixed at scan time (in |
| 1922 | * `scan_token`) and stored in `challenge.shuffled` so every poll returns |
| 1923 | * the same array — re-shuffling per-poll caused visible tile flicker on |
| 1924 | * wc-admin. Falls back to building + shuffling on the fly for any token |
| 1925 | * record that predates the persisted-shuffle change. |
| 1926 | * |
| 1927 | * @param array<string, mixed> $challenge The challenge payload from the token record. |
| 1928 | * @return array<int, string> |
| 1929 | */ |
| 1930 | private function shuffled_candidate_numbers( array $challenge ): array { |
| 1931 | if ( isset( $challenge['shuffled'] ) && is_array( $challenge['shuffled'] ) ) { |
| 1932 | return array_map( 'strval', $challenge['shuffled'] ); |
| 1933 | } |
| 1934 | |
| 1935 | $real = isset( $challenge['real'] ) ? (string) $challenge['real'] : ''; |
| 1936 | $distractors = isset( $challenge['distractors'] ) && is_array( $challenge['distractors'] ) |
| 1937 | ? array_map( 'strval', $challenge['distractors'] ) |
| 1938 | : array(); |
| 1939 | |
| 1940 | $candidates = array_merge( array( $real ), $distractors ); |
| 1941 | shuffle( $candidates ); |
| 1942 | return $candidates; |
| 1943 | } |
| 1944 | |
| 1945 | /** |
| 1946 | * Per-IP rate limit on /qr-login-scan. |
| 1947 | * |
| 1948 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 1949 | */ |
| 1950 | private function check_scan_rate_limit() { |
| 1951 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_SCAN, $this->get_client_ip() ); |
| 1952 | } |
| 1953 | |
| 1954 | /** |
| 1955 | * Per-user rate limit on /qr-login-approve. |
| 1956 | * |
| 1957 | * @param int $user_id The user ID. |
| 1958 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 1959 | */ |
| 1960 | private function check_approve_rate_limit( $user_id ) { |
| 1961 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_APPROVE, (string) $user_id ); |
| 1962 | } |
| 1963 | |
| 1964 | /** |
| 1965 | * Per-session rate limit on /qr-login-session-status. |
| 1966 | * |
| 1967 | * @param string $session_id The session ID. |
| 1968 | * @return bool True if within rate limit. |
| 1969 | */ |
| 1970 | private function check_session_status_rate_limit( $session_id ) { |
| 1971 | return QRLoginRateLimits::consume( QRLoginRateLimits::BUCKET_SESSION_STATUS, $session_id ); |
| 1972 | } |
| 1973 | |
| 1974 | /** |
| 1975 | * Send the merchant a transactional email summarizing a successful QR |
| 1976 | * sign-in, unless they (or a site owner) opt out via the |
| 1977 | * `woocommerce_qr_login_should_send_signin_email` filter. |
| 1978 | * |
| 1979 | * Wrapped so a misconfigured mailer cannot break the exchange path. Mailer |
| 1980 | * false returns and exceptions are logged, but delivery never blocks the API |
| 1981 | * response. |
| 1982 | * |
| 1983 | * @param \WP_User $user The user who minted the token (recipient). |
| 1984 | * @param array<string, mixed> $consumed_record The record persisted to the consumed transient (keys: consumed_at, user_id, ap_uuid, ap_name, device). |
| 1985 | * @return void |
| 1986 | */ |
| 1987 | private function maybe_send_sign_in_notification_email( \WP_User $user, array $consumed_record ): void { |
| 1988 | /** |
| 1989 | * Filter whether to send the QR sign-in notification email. |
| 1990 | * |
| 1991 | * Default: true. Return false to suppress the send for a specific |
| 1992 | * user, environment (e.g. staging), or test run. |
| 1993 | * |
| 1994 | * @since 10.9.0 |
| 1995 | * |
| 1996 | * @param bool $should_send Whether to send the email. |
| 1997 | * @param \WP_User $user The user who minted the QR token. |
| 1998 | * @param array<string, mixed> $consumed_record The consumed record about to be emailed (keys: consumed_at, user_id, ap_uuid, ap_name, device). |
| 1999 | */ |
| 2000 | $should_send = (bool) apply_filters( |
| 2001 | 'woocommerce_qr_login_should_send_signin_email', |
| 2002 | true, |
| 2003 | $user, |
| 2004 | $consumed_record |
| 2005 | ); |
| 2006 | |
| 2007 | if ( ! $should_send ) { |
| 2008 | return; |
| 2009 | } |
| 2010 | |
| 2011 | try { |
| 2012 | if ( ! $this->send_sign_in_notification_email( $user, $consumed_record ) ) { |
| 2013 | wc_get_logger()->warning( |
| 2014 | sprintf( |
| 2015 | 'QR sign-in notification email failed for user %d: wp_mail returned false', |
| 2016 | $user->ID |
| 2017 | ), |
| 2018 | array( 'source' => 'mobile-app-qr-login' ) |
| 2019 | ); |
| 2020 | } |
| 2021 | } catch ( \Throwable $e ) { |
| 2022 | // Don't surface mailer failures to the exchange response — the |
| 2023 | // merchant already has the API result, and the email is best-effort. |
| 2024 | // Log instead so a misconfigured mailer is observable rather than |
| 2025 | // invisible. Catch \Throwable so an \Error from the mailer also |
| 2026 | // stays out of the exchange path. |
| 2027 | wc_get_logger()->warning( |
| 2028 | sprintf( |
| 2029 | 'QR sign-in notification email failed for user %d: %s', |
| 2030 | $user->ID, |
| 2031 | $e->getMessage() |
| 2032 | ), |
| 2033 | array( 'source' => 'mobile-app-qr-login' ) |
| 2034 | ); |
| 2035 | } |
| 2036 | } |
| 2037 | |
| 2038 | /** |
| 2039 | * Render and dispatch the sign-in notification email. |
| 2040 | * |
| 2041 | * Uses `wp_mail()` directly with our own minimal HTML shell rather than |
| 2042 | * `WC()->mailer()->wrap_message()` — the WC wrapper auto-prepends a small |
| 2043 | * site-name header that duplicates the subject line shown by most clients |
| 2044 | * and constrains the body width. Owning the wrapper lets us deliver one |
| 2045 | * coherent layout. |
| 2046 | * |
| 2047 | * @param \WP_User $user Recipient. |
| 2048 | * @param array<string, mixed> $consumed_record The consumed record (same shape as `maybe_send_sign_in_notification_email`). |
| 2049 | * @return bool True if WordPress accepted the message for delivery. |
| 2050 | */ |
| 2051 | private function send_sign_in_notification_email( \WP_User $user, array $consumed_record ): bool { |
| 2052 | $site_name = wp_specialchars_decode( |
| 2053 | (string) get_bloginfo( 'name' ), |
| 2054 | ENT_QUOTES |
| 2055 | ); |
| 2056 | |
| 2057 | /* translators: %s: site name. */ |
| 2058 | $subject = sprintf( __( 'A new device signed in to %s', 'woocommerce' ), $site_name ); |
| 2059 | |
| 2060 | $body_html = $this->render_sign_in_notification_email_body( $user, $consumed_record, $site_name, $subject ); |
| 2061 | |
| 2062 | return wp_mail( |
| 2063 | $user->user_email, |
| 2064 | $subject, |
| 2065 | $body_html, |
| 2066 | array( 'Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8' ) |
| 2067 | ); |
| 2068 | } |
| 2069 | |
| 2070 | /** |
| 2071 | * Render the full HTML email document for the sign-in notification. |
| 2072 | * |
| 2073 | * @param \WP_User $user Recipient. |
| 2074 | * @param array<string, mixed> $consumed_record The consumed record (same shape as `maybe_send_sign_in_notification_email`). |
| 2075 | * @param string $site_name Decoded site name (passed in to avoid double-decoding). |
| 2076 | * @param string $subject Email subject; rendered as the in-body heading. |
| 2077 | * @return string Rendered HTML document. |
| 2078 | */ |
| 2079 | private function render_sign_in_notification_email_body( \WP_User $user, array $consumed_record, string $site_name, string $subject ): string { |
| 2080 | $device = $consumed_record['device'] ?? array(); |
| 2081 | $consumed_at = isset( $consumed_record['consumed_at'] ) ? (int) $consumed_record['consumed_at'] : time(); |
| 2082 | $ap_name = $consumed_record['ap_name'] ?? ''; |
| 2083 | $applications_url = admin_url( 'profile.php#application-passwords-section' ); |
| 2084 | |
| 2085 | ob_start(); |
| 2086 | include __DIR__ . '/views/mobile-app-qr-login-signin-email.php'; |
| 2087 | $html = ob_get_clean(); |
| 2088 | |
| 2089 | return is_string( $html ) ? $html : ''; |
| 2090 | } |
| 2091 | } |
| 2092 |