xspeed / includes / class-settings-manager.php

class-settings-manager.php in xSpeed Cache: AI-Powered Performance Hub with MCP, Caching & CDN 1.1.6, at includes/class-settings-manager.php

781 lines 29.3 KB

Raw Download Zip

1	<?php
2	/**
3	* Settings_Manager — per-module typed settings storage, validation, and
4	* versioned migrations.
5	*
6	* Storage layout: one wp_option per module under the key
7	* `xspeed_module_<slug>`. The option value is an associative array that
8	* also carries a `_version` field (the module VERSION at the time of last
9	* write) so migrations know what schema produced the stored data.
10	*
11	* The pre-Module v1 settings (the global cache_enabled / minify_* /
12	* gzip_enabled / cache_expiry / excluded_urls) keep living in
13	* `xspeed_options` under the existing Settings class — Settings_Manager
14	* does not touch them. When v1 features are refactored into Modules,
15	* they'll migrate from `xspeed_options` to their per-module options as
16	* part of that PR.
17	*
18	* @package XSpeed
19	*/
20
21	namespace XSpeed;
22
23	defined( 'ABSPATH' ) \|\| exit;
24
25	final class Settings_Manager {
26
27	public const OPTION_PREFIX = 'xspeed_module_';
28
29	/**
30	* Marker prefixing a secret value that has been encrypted at rest. A stored
31	* value without this prefix is legacy plaintext (or empty) and is read back
32	* verbatim — so the encryption rollout is lazy and non-destructive.
33	*/
34	private const SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX = 'xsenc:v1:';
35
36	/**
37	* Bullet run embedded in a masked secret hint. Also the write-preserve
38	* sentinel: an incoming value containing it (or an empty string) is treated
39	* as "the client is echoing the mask, keep the stored secret" — so saving an
40	* unrelated field on the same panel never wipes the credential. (#115)
41	*/
42	public const SECRET_MASK_BULLETS = '••••';
43
44	/**
45	* Read settings for a module slug. Returns defaults merged with stored
46	* values + the schema applied (unknown keys stripped). Always safe to
47	* call before activation — returns pure defaults if nothing is stored.
48	*/
49	public static function get( string $slug ): array {
50	$module = Module_Registry::get( $slug );
51	if ( ! $module ) {
52	return array();
53	}
54	$schema = $module->settings_schema();
55	$defaults = self::defaults_from_schema( $schema );
56	$stored = get_option( self::option_key( $slug ), array() );
57	if ( ! is_array( $stored ) ) {
58	$stored = array();
59	}
60	$merged = array_merge( $defaults, $stored );
61
62	// Strip keys not in schema; coerce types to what the schema declares.
63	$clean = array();
64	foreach ( $schema as $key => $spec ) {
65	$clean[ $key ] = array_key_exists( $key, $merged )
66	? self::coerce( $merged[ $key ], $spec )
67	: ( $spec['default'] ?? null );
68	}
69
70	// Carry through any out-of-schema keys the module explicitly preserves
71	// (e.g. the REST-cache route `rules` array) so a schema-driven save
72	// doesn't silently drop them. (FBS-82408)
73	foreach ( $module->preserved_keys() as $key ) {
74	if ( array_key_exists( $key, $stored ) ) {
75	$clean[ $key ] = $stored[ $key ];
76	}
77	}
78
79	return $clean;
80	}
81
82	/**
83	* Validate input against the module's schema, merge over stored values,
84	* and persist. Returns the final clean array. Unknown keys are stripped
85	* silently. Out-of-range / wrong-type values fall back to the previous
86	* stored value (or default).
87	*/
88	public static function update( string $slug, array $input ): array {
89	$module = Module_Registry::get( $slug );
90	if ( ! $module ) {
91	return array();
92	}
93	$schema = $module->settings_schema();
94	$current = self::get( $slug );
95
96	// An MCP agent must not silently rewrite credentials — repointing the
97	// Cloudflare or object-cache backend at an attacker endpoint — unless the
98	// connection was explicitly granted the `configure` scope. Strip secret
99	// fields from an unprivileged MCP write here so every write path (the
100	// update_settings tool AND run_command → CLI) is covered at one choke
101	// point. The tool handler surfaces the refusal as a clear error. (#116)
102	if ( self::mcp_write_blocked() ) {
103	foreach ( $schema as $key => $spec ) {
104	if ( self::is_secret_field( $key, $spec ) ) {
105	unset( $input[ $key ] );
106	}
107	}
108	}
109
110	$clean = $current;
111	foreach ( $schema as $key => $spec ) {
112	if ( ! array_key_exists( $key, $input ) ) {
113	continue;
114	}
115	// A secret field whose incoming value is the masked placeholder means
116	// the client is echoing back what get_public() sent, not setting a new
117	// credential — keep the stored value so an unrelated save on the same
118	// panel never wipes the key. An empty value is NOT a mask echo: it's a
119	// deliberate clear and flows through to remove the credential. (#115)
120	if ( self::is_secret_field( $key, $spec ) && self::is_masked_secret( (string) $input[ $key ] ) ) {
121	continue;
122	}
123	[ $value, $valid ] = self::validate_field( $input[ $key ], $spec );
124	if ( $valid ) {
125	$clean[ $key ] = $value;
126	}
127	// Invalid → keep $current[$key]. We do not throw; REST layer can
128	// add its own strict-mode validation that 400s on invalid input.
129	}
130
131	// Carry through out-of-schema keys the module explicitly preserves when
132	// they arrive in the INPUT — not only when already stored. Otherwise a
133	// caller that routes through update() to SET a preserved key (e.g. a
134	// migration/profile writing `mobile_separate_review`) has it silently
135	// stripped, because it isn't in $current yet. (FBS-83144)
136	foreach ( $module->preserved_keys() as $key ) {
137	if ( array_key_exists( $key, $input ) ) {
138	$clean[ $key ] = $input[ $key ];
139	}
140	}
141
142	// Change annotation (issue #45): every real mutation — from the UI,
143	// REST, CLI, or an MCP agent — lands in the activity log with the
144	// old→new diff and its source channel, so the dashboard can tell the
145	// causal story ("expiry raised → hit ratio climbed").
146	//
147	// $clean holds plaintext secrets (carried from $current, which get()
148	// decrypts, or freshly validated). Log + diff BEFORE encrypting, so the
149	// change annotation compares like-for-like (log_changes redacts secret
150	// values by key anyway). The encrypted copy is persisted below. (#115)
151	//
152	// Pass the FULL schema, not just its keys — log_changes() needs each
153	// field's `label` to write "Disable Dashicons on Frontend" instead of
154	// `disable_dashicons_frontend`. The schema was already in scope here
155	// and was simply being discarded. (#88)
156	self::log_changes( $slug, $current, $clean, $schema );
157
158	// Encrypt at rest ONLY fields explicitly typed `secret`. This must match
159	// coerce(), which decrypts only for `type === 'secret'` — encrypting a
160	// merely name-matched `string` field (a credential a module author typed
161	// as string) would store ciphertext that the string coercer then hands
162	// back verbatim, breaking the engine. Such fields are still masked and
163	// write-preserved via the broader is_secret_field() (masking a plaintext
164	// is always safe); they just aren't encrypted until retyped to `secret`.
165	$stored = $clean;
166	foreach ( $schema as $key => $spec ) {
167	if ( 'secret' === ( $spec['type'] ?? '' ) ) {
168	$stored[ $key ] = self::encrypt_for_storage( (string) ( $stored[ $key ] ?? '' ) );
169	}
170	}
171	$stored['_version'] = $module->version();
172	update_option( self::option_key( $slug ), $stored );
173
174	// Return the PUBLIC view: real non-secret values, masked secrets. This
175	// is the REST/CLI/MCP response, so it must never carry credentials. (#115)
176	return self::get_public( $slug );
177	}
178
179	/**
180	* The public, safe-to-serialize view of a module's settings: identical to
181	* get() except every secret field is replaced by a masked hint (first/last
182	* few chars, never the middle). This is what the REST GET handler, the MCP
183	* read tools, and the dashboard bootstrap payload return — get() itself
184	* stays plaintext for the engine.
185	*
186	* @return array<string,mixed>
187	*/
188	public static function get_public( string $slug ): array {
189	$module = Module_Registry::get( $slug );
190	if ( ! $module ) {
191	return array();
192	}
193	$settings = self::get( $slug );
194	foreach ( $module->settings_schema() as $key => $spec ) {
195	if ( self::is_secret_field( $key, $spec ) && array_key_exists( $key, $settings ) ) {
196	$settings[ $key ] = self::mask_secret_value( (string) $settings[ $key ] );
197	}
198	}
199	return $settings;
200	}
201
202	/**
203	* Record changed schema fields as one activity event. No-op when
204	* nothing actually changed (idempotent re-saves stay silent).
205	*
206	* @param string $slug Module slug.
207	* @param array $before Settings before the write.
208	* @param array $after Settings after the write.
209	* @param array $schema Full settings schema — used for each field's label.
210	*/
211	private static function log_changes( string $slug, array $before, array $after, array $schema ): void {
212	if ( ! class_exists( '\\XSpeed\\Activity_Log' ) ) {
213	return;
214	}
215	$diffs = array();
216	foreach ( array_keys( $schema ) as $key ) {
217	$old = $before[ $key ] ?? null;
218	$new = $after[ $key ] ?? null;
219	if ( $old === $new ) {
220	continue;
221	}
222
223	// The schema already declares a human label for every field — the
224	// same one rendered a few inches away on the settings screen. The
225	// feed used the raw storage key instead, so users read
226	// `disable_dashicons_frontend` rather than "Disable Dashicons on
227	// Frontend". Fall back to the key when a schema has no label, so
228	// an entry is never blank. (#88)
229	$label = isset( $schema[ $key ]['label'] ) && is_string( $schema[ $key ]['label'] ) && '' !== $schema[ $key ]['label']
230	? $schema[ $key ]['label']
231	: $key;
232
233	if ( self::is_redacted_key( $key ) ) {
234	// Never record the value itself — the annotation is served to
235	// the dashboard by the trend endpoints, so anything written
236	// here is readable by any user who can load the dashboard.
237	$diffs[] = sprintf( '%s changed', $label );
238	continue;
239	}
240	$diffs[] = sprintf( '%s %s→%s', $label, self::describe_value( $old ), self::describe_value( $new ) );
241	}
242	if ( empty( $diffs ) ) {
243	return;
244	}
245	Activity_Log::record(
246	'settings_changed',
247	sprintf( '%s: %s (via %s)', self::module_label( $slug ), implode( ', ', array_slice( $diffs, 0, 5 ) ), self::source_channel() )
248	);
249	}
250
251	/**
252	* A module's display name for the activity feed, e.g. `gzip` →
253	* "Compression".
254	*
255	* Resolved through the module registry rather than a lookup table here,
256	* so Pro modules (feed-cache, search-cache, …) get their labels from the
257	* same path — Pro persists through this class and contributes no logging
258	* code of its own.
259	*
260	* Falls back to the raw slug when the module isn't registered or declares
261	* no label; an entry is never blank.
262	*/
263	private static function module_label( string $slug ): string {
264	if ( ! class_exists( '\\XSpeed\\Module_Registry' ) ) {
265	return $slug;
266	}
267	$module = Module_Registry::get( $slug );
268	if ( ! $module ) {
269	return $slug;
270	}
271	$meta = $module->ui_metadata();
272	return ( isset( $meta['label'] ) && is_string( $meta['label'] ) && '' !== $meta['label'] )
273	? $meta['label']
274	: $slug;
275	}
276
277	/**
278	* Setting keys whose VALUE must never reach the activity log. The log is
279	* surfaced by the dashboard trend endpoints, so anything recorded here is
280	* readable by any user who can load the dashboard.
281	*
282	* Matched on the key name rather than the value, because a credential is
283	* indistinguishable from an ordinary string once it's been stringified.
284	* Pure — unit-tested.
285	*
286	* @param string $key Schema key, e.g. 'api_token'.
287	*/
288	public static function is_secret_key( string $key ): bool {
289	// `license_key` is matched explicitly: the pattern requires `api_key`
290	// rather than a bare `key` so that `key_prefix` (an ordinary,
291	// useful-to-see setting) isn't swallowed, which left a real license
292	// key printing in plaintext.
293	return 1 === preg_match( '/(token\|password\|secret\|api_key\|license_key\|passwd\|private_key\|credential)/i', $key );
294	}
295
296	/**
297	* Setting keys whose value is withheld from the activity feed.
298	*
299	* Secrets (above) plus infrastructure IDENTIFIERS. `redis_password` was
300	* correctly redacted while `redis_user`, `redis_host` and `key_prefix`
301	* were written out in full — and the feed is served to any user who can
302	* load the dashboard, not just admins (see the trend endpoints).
303	*
304	* A Redis hostname and username are most of a credential, and they
305	* describe internal infrastructure that has no business being readable by
306	* a subscriber. The feed's job — "this setting changed, when, and by
307	* whom" — is served without printing the value. (#88)
308	*
309	* Deliberately matched on the key NAME: once stringified, a hostname is
310	* indistinguishable from any other short string. Pure — unit-tested.
311	*
312	* @param string $key Schema key, e.g. 'redis_host'.
313	*/
314	public static function is_redacted_key( string $key ): bool {
315	if ( self::is_secret_key( $key ) ) {
316	return true;
317	}
318
319	// Deliberately an explicit list rather than a broad word match. A
320	// pattern like /(host\|user\|prefix\|port)/ also swallows
321	// `bypass_user_agents`, `preconnect_hosts` and `excluded_urls` —
322	// ordinary user-facing settings whose values are exactly what makes
323	// the feed useful. Over-redacting is a quieter failure than leaking,
324	// but it is still a failure.
325	//
326	// Scoped to connection details and account identifiers. A new backend
327	// or provider setting must be added here consciously — see the
328	// schema-coverage test that walks every registered module and fails
329	// on an unreviewed key.
330	$identifiers = array(
331	// Object-cache backends.
332	'redis_host',
333	'redis_port',
334	'redis_user',
335	'redis_socket',
336	'redis_database',
337	'memcached_host',
338	'memcached_port',
339	'memcached_user',
340	'key_prefix',
341	// Cloudflare. The same reasoning that withholds redis_user /
342	// redis_host applies at least as strongly here: an account email
343	// plus a full Zone ID together identify the account and the exact
344	// zone. api_token / api_key are already covered by
345	// is_secret_key(); these two were the gap.
346	'email',
347	'zone_id',
348	);
349
350	/**
351	* Setting keys whose value is withheld from the activity feed.
352	*
353	* @param string[] $identifiers Keys to redact, on top of is_secret_key().
354	*/
355	$identifiers = (array) apply_filters( 'xspeed_activity_redacted_keys', $identifiers );
356
357	return in_array( strtolower( $key ), array_map( 'strtolower', $identifiers ), true );
358	}
359
360	/**
361	* Whether a schema field holds credential material. A field is secret when
362	* it declares `type => 'secret'` (the explicit, preferred marker) OR its key
363	* name matches the credential pattern (is_secret_key) — the backstop that
364	* catches a credential a module author forgot to type, so a leak can't open
365	* just because a field was declared `string`.
366	*
367	* @param string $key Schema field key.
368	* @param array $spec Field spec from settings_schema().
369	*/
370	public static function is_secret_field( string $key, array $spec ): bool {
371	return ( ( $spec['type'] ?? '' ) === 'secret' ) \|\| self::is_secret_key( $key );
372	}
373
374	/**
375	* The subset of $input keys that are secret fields for this module's schema.
376	* Used by the MCP update_settings tool to name exactly which fields it
377	* refused. Returns [] for an unknown module.
378	*
379	* @param string $slug Module slug.
380	* @param array<string,mixed> $input Proposed settings patch.
381	* @return string[]
382	*/
383	public static function secret_keys_in( string $slug, array $input ): array {
384	$module = Module_Registry::get( $slug );
385	if ( ! $module ) {
386	return array();
387	}
388	$schema = $module->settings_schema();
389	$out = array();
390	foreach ( $input as $key => $value ) {
391	if ( isset( $schema[ $key ] ) && self::is_secret_field( $key, $schema[ $key ] ) ) {
392	$out[] = $key;
393	}
394	}
395	return $out;
396	}
397
398	/**
399	* Masked hint for a stored secret: first 4 + bullets + last 4 (mirrors the
400	* support-snapshot license masking), or all-bullets for a short secret, or
401	* '' when unset. Enough to confirm "a key is saved, ending 4f2a" without
402	* disclosing it. Deterministic — unit-tested.
403	*/
404	public static function mask_secret_value( string $value ): string {
405	if ( '' === $value ) {
406	return '';
407	}
408	if ( strlen( $value ) <= 8 ) {
409	return str_repeat( '•', 8 );
410	}
411	return substr( $value, 0, 4 ) . self::SECRET_MASK_BULLETS . substr( $value, -4 );
412	}
413
414	/**
415	* Whether an incoming write value is the masked placeholder the client is
416	* echoing back, rather than a real new secret — i.e. it still carries the
417	* mask bullets. A genuine credential never contains the bullet run, so this
418	* can't swallow a real key. update() uses it to keep the stored secret.
419	*
420	* An EMPTY string is NOT a mask echo — it's a deliberate clear, so it flows
421	* through to storage and removes the credential. The dashboard always
422	* re-sends the masked hint (with bullets) on an unrelated save, never an
423	* empty string, so this still can't wipe a key by accident. (#115, QA B7)
424	*/
425	public static function is_masked_secret( string $value ): bool {
426	return false !== strpos( $value, self::SECRET_MASK_BULLETS );
427	}
428
429	/**
430	* Encrypt a plaintext secret for storage. Idempotent: an already-encrypted
431	* value (carrying the marker) is returned unchanged, so module migrations
432	* can call this over existing rows without double-wrapping. Empty stays
433	* empty. Used by update() and by the per-module encrypt-on-upgrade
434	* migrations. (#115)
435	*/
436	public static function encrypt_for_storage( string $value ): string {
437	if ( '' === $value \|\| 0 === strpos( $value, self::SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX ) ) {
438	return $value;
439	}
440	return self::encrypt( $value );
441	}
442
443	/**
444	* 32-byte encryption key derived from this site's WordPress salts, so the
445	* ciphertext is bound to the install and never stored alongside the data.
446	* Rotating the salts makes existing secrets undecryptable — decrypt() then
447	* returns '' (treated as "unset", the user re-enters the key) rather than
448	* fataling. Uses AUTH_KEY + SECURE_AUTH_SALT, falling back to wp_salt().
449	*/
450	private static function secret_key(): string {
451	$material = '';
452	if ( defined( 'AUTH_KEY' ) ) {
453	$material .= (string) AUTH_KEY;
454	}
455	if ( defined( 'SECURE_AUTH_SALT' ) ) {
456	$material .= (string) SECURE_AUTH_SALT;
457	}
458	if ( '' === $material && function_exists( 'wp_salt' ) ) {
459	$material = (string) wp_salt( 'secure_auth' );
460	}
461	return sodium_crypto_generichash( 'xspeed-secret-v1\|' . $material, '', SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES );
462	}
463
464	/**
465	* Authenticated-encrypt a non-empty plaintext with libsodium's secretbox
466	* (XSalsa20-Poly1305). The random nonce is prepended to the ciphertext and
467	* the whole thing base64'd behind the version marker. libsodium ships in
468	* PHP core from 7.2 (our floor is 7.4); if it were somehow unavailable we
469	* store plaintext rather than fatal — masking on read still applies.
470	*/
471	private static function encrypt( string $plain ): string {
472	if ( ! function_exists( 'sodium_crypto_secretbox' ) ) {
473	return $plain;
474	}
475	try {
476	$nonce = random_bytes( SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES );
477	$cipher = sodium_crypto_secretbox( $plain, $nonce, self::secret_key() );
478	} catch ( \Throwable $e ) {
479	return $plain;
480	}
481	return self::SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX . base64_encode( $nonce . $cipher ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_encode -- transport encoding for ciphertext, not obfuscation.
482	}
483
484	/**
485	* Reverse encrypt(). A value without the marker is legacy plaintext (or
486	* empty) and is returned as-is — the encryption rollout is lazy, so reads
487	* keep working before the first re-save. A marked value that fails to
488	* decrypt (salts rotated, row tampered) returns '' so the caller behaves as
489	* "no credential set", never a fatal.
490	*/
491	private static function decrypt( string $stored ): string {
492	if ( 0 !== strpos( $stored, self::SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX ) ) {
493	return $stored;
494	}
495	if ( ! function_exists( 'sodium_crypto_secretbox_open' ) ) {
496	return '';
497	}
498	$raw = base64_decode( substr( $stored, strlen( self::SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX ) ), true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- decoding our own ciphertext envelope.
499	if ( false === $raw \|\| strlen( $raw ) <= SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES ) {
500	return '';
501	}
502	$nonce = substr( $raw, 0, SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES );
503	$cipher = substr( $raw, SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES );
504	try {
505	$plain = sodium_crypto_secretbox_open( $cipher, $nonce, self::secret_key() );
506	} catch ( \Throwable $e ) {
507	return '';
508	}
509	return ( false === $plain ) ? '' : $plain;
510	}
511
512	/**
513	* Whether the current write is an MCP write that may NOT touch secret
514	* fields — i.e. it came in over MCP and the connection lacks the `configure`
515	* grant. Keeps credential writes off the default MCP surface (#116). Guarded
516	* by class_exists so Settings_Manager never hard-depends on the MCP module.
517	*/
518	private static function mcp_write_blocked(): bool {
519	if ( ! class_exists( '\\XSpeed\\Modules\\Mcp\\Mcp_Tools' ) ) {
520	return false;
521	}
522	return \XSpeed\Modules\Mcp\Mcp_Tools::in_dispatch()
523	&& ! \XSpeed\Modules\Mcp\Mcp_Tools::can_configure();
524	}
525
526	/** Compact human form of a setting value for the change log. */
527	private static function describe_value( $value ): string {
528	if ( is_bool( $value ) ) {
529	return $value ? 'on' : 'off';
530	}
531	if ( is_array( $value ) ) {
532	return count( $value ) . ' item' . ( 1 === count( $value ) ? '' : 's' );
533	}
534	if ( null === $value ) {
535	return '—';
536	}
537	$str = (string) $value;
538	return strlen( $str ) > 40 ? substr( $str, 0, 39 ) . '…' : $str;
539	}
540
541	/**
542	* Which surface performed this write. MCP is detected via the tool
543	* dispatcher's in-flight flag; the dashboard UI writes through REST.
544	*/
545	private static function source_channel(): string {
546	if ( class_exists( '\\XSpeed\\Modules\\Mcp\\Mcp_Tools' ) && \XSpeed\Modules\Mcp\Mcp_Tools::in_dispatch() ) {
547	return 'mcp';
548	}
549	if ( defined( 'WP_CLI' ) && WP_CLI ) {
550	return 'cli';
551	}
552	if ( defined( 'REST_REQUEST' ) && REST_REQUEST ) {
553	return 'dashboard';
554	}
555	return 'admin';
556	}
557
558	/**
559	* Run any pending schema migrations for a module. Called by
560	* Module_Registry before boot(). Idempotent — migrations only run once
561	* per version bump because we persist `_version` after each successful
562	* migration step.
563	*/
564	public static function run_migrations( Module $module ): void {
565	$migrations = $module->migrations();
566	if ( empty( $migrations ) ) {
567	return;
568	}
569	$option_key = self::option_key( $module->slug() );
570	$stored = get_option( $option_key, null );
571	if ( null === $stored ) {
572	return; // fresh install — no data to migrate.
573	}
574	if ( ! is_array( $stored ) ) {
575	$stored = array();
576	}
577	$from = isset( $stored['_version'] ) ? (string) $stored['_version'] : '0.0.0';
578
579	// Sort migrations by version ascending.
580	uksort(
581	$migrations,
582	static function ( $a, $b ) {
583	return version_compare( (string) $a, (string) $b );
584	}
585	);
586
587	$dirty = false;
588	foreach ( $migrations as $target => $callable ) {
589	$target = (string) $target;
590	if ( version_compare( $from, $target, '>=' ) ) {
591	continue;
592	}
593	$migrated = call_user_func( $callable, $stored );
594	if ( is_array( $migrated ) ) {
595	$stored = $migrated;
596	$stored['_version'] = $target;
597	$from = $target;
598	$dirty = true;
599	}
600	}
601
602	if ( $dirty ) {
603	update_option( $option_key, $stored );
604	}
605	}
606
607	/**
608	* Coerce a stored value to the schema's declared type — used on read
609	* to defend against options edited by hand or imported across versions.
610	*/
611	private static function coerce( $value, array $spec ) {
612	$type = $spec['type'] ?? 'string';
613	switch ( $type ) {
614	case 'bool':
615	return (bool) $value;
616	case 'int':
617	$v = (int) $value;
618	if ( isset( $spec['min'] ) ) {
619	$v = max( (int) $spec['min'], $v );
620	}
621	if ( isset( $spec['max'] ) ) {
622	$v = min( (int) $spec['max'], $v );
623	}
624	return $v;
625	case 'enum':
626	return in_array( $value, $spec['options'] ?? array(), true )
627	? $value
628	: ( $spec['default'] ?? null );
629	case 'list':
630	if ( ! is_array( $value ) ) {
631	return $spec['default'] ?? array();
632	}
633	return array_values( array_filter( $value, 'is_scalar' ) );
634	case 'url':
635	$url = esc_url_raw( (string) $value );
636	return $url ?: ( $spec['default'] ?? '' );
637	case 'media':
638	// Media-library image URL. Empty is a valid "no image" state.
639	// esc_url_raw alone lets through any safe URL (…/evil.txt,
640	// non-images) which then renders as a broken <img>; require it
641	// to look like an image and drop anything else to empty.
642	$media = esc_url_raw( (string) $value );
643	return ( '' === $media \|\| self::is_image_url( $media ) ) ? $media : '';
644	case 'secret':
645	// A credential (API token, password, …). Stored encrypted at
646	// rest (SECRET_CIPHER_PREFIX). Reading decrypts to plaintext so
647	// the engine — Cloudflare purge, Redis auth — gets the real
648	// value; the masking that keeps it out of REST/MCP/dashboard
649	// payloads happens later, at the output boundary (get_public),
650	// never here. Legacy unencrypted values pass straight through.
651	return self::decrypt( (string) $value );
652	case 'string':
653	default:
654	return sanitize_text_field( (string) $value );
655	}
656	}
657
658	/**
659	* Validate one field; returns [ coerced_value, was_valid ]. Distinct
660	* from coerce() because validate is strict (out-of-range int is
661	* INVALID) while coerce is forgiving (clamps to range).
662	*/
663	private static function validate_field( $value, array $spec ): array {
664	$type = $spec['type'] ?? 'string';
665	switch ( $type ) {
666	case 'bool':
667	// Strictly validate (don't blindly (bool)-cast). A plain cast
668	// treated every non-empty string as true, so a client sending
669	// the string "false" (or any junk text) silently ENABLED the
670	// toggle. filter_var with FILTER_NULL_ON_FAILURE accepts the
671	// real bool-ish forms (true/false, 1/0, "1"/"0", "true"/
672	// "false", "yes"/"no", "on"/"off") and returns null for
673	// anything else — which we report as invalid so the previous
674	// stored value is kept, mirroring int/enum. (FBS-82158)
675	$b = filter_var( $value, FILTER_VALIDATE_BOOLEAN, FILTER_NULL_ON_FAILURE );
676	if ( null === $b ) {
677	return array( null, false );
678	}
679	return array( $b, true );
680	case 'int':
681	if ( ! is_numeric( $value ) ) {
682	return array( null, false );
683	}
684	$v = (int) $value;
685	if ( isset( $spec['min'] ) && $v < (int) $spec['min'] ) {
686	return array( null, false );
687	}
688	if ( isset( $spec['max'] ) && $v > (int) $spec['max'] ) {
689	return array( null, false );
690	}
691	return array( $v, true );
692	case 'enum':
693	$ok = in_array( $value, $spec['options'] ?? array(), true );
694	return array( $ok ? $value : null, $ok );
695	case 'list':
696	if ( ! is_array( $value ) ) {
697	return array( null, false );
698	}
699	$item_type = $spec['item_type'] ?? 'string';
700	$out = array();
701	foreach ( $value as $item ) {
702	// Skip non-scalar items (e.g. a nested array). Casting one
703	// with (string) emits an "Array to string conversion"
704	// warning and stores the garbage literal "Array" — coerce()
705	// already filters these via is_scalar; mirror it here.
706	// (FBS-82172 Bug 4)
707	if ( ! is_scalar( $item ) ) {
708	continue;
709	}
710	if ( 'url' === $item_type ) {
711	$u = esc_url_raw( (string) $item );
712	if ( $u ) {
713	$out[] = $u;
714	}
715	} else {
716	$out[] = sanitize_text_field( (string) $item );
717	}
718	}
719	return array( $out, true );
720	case 'url':
721	$u = esc_url_raw( (string) $value );
722	return array( $u, (bool) $u );
723	case 'media':
724	// Empty (cleared logo) is valid; any non-empty value must be a
725	// safe URL after esc_url_raw AND look like an image, so a
726	// non-image URL (…/evil.txt) is rejected rather than stored to
727	// render as a broken <img>.
728	$m = esc_url_raw( (string) $value );
729	if ( '' === (string) $value ) {
730	return array( '', true );
731	}
732	$ok = '' !== $m && self::is_image_url( $m );
733	return array( $ok ? $m : '', $ok );
734	case 'secret':
735	// Validated like a string; encryption is applied uniformly in
736	// update() after this returns, so a secret carried over from the
737	// current stored value gets encrypted the same way a freshly
738	// entered one does. Masked placeholders never reach here — update()
739	// filters them out before validating. (#115)
740	return array( sanitize_text_field( (string) $value ), true );
741	case 'string':
742	default:
743	return array( sanitize_text_field( (string) $value ), true );
744	}
745	}
746
747	/**
748	* Whether a URL looks like an image — used to gate `media` fields so a
749	* non-image URL can't be stored and later rendered as a broken <img>
750	* (e.g. the white-label brand logo, FBS-82222). Tests the path extension
751	* against the known image types (query/fragment tolerated). Not a content
752	* check — a cheap, deterministic guard that pairs with the front-end
753	* onError fallback; the Media Library picker already yields conforming
754	* http(s) upload URLs. (data: URIs are stripped by esc_url_raw upstream,
755	* since `data` isn't an allowed protocol, so they never reach here.)
756	*/
757	private static function is_image_url( string $url ): bool {
758	$url = trim( $url );
759	if ( '' === $url ) {
760	return false;
761	}
762	// Drop the query string + fragment so ?ver=… / #frag don't defeat the
763	// extension test (e.g. logo.webp?v=2). Plain string ops — no WP URL
764	// parser dependency on this low-level coercion path.
765	$path = (string) preg_replace( '/[?#].*$/', '', $url );
766	return (bool) preg_match( '/\.(jpe?g\|png\|gif\|svg\|webp\|avif\|ico\|bmp)$/i', $path );
767	}
768
769	private static function defaults_from_schema( array $schema ): array {
770	$out = array();
771	foreach ( $schema as $key => $spec ) {
772	$out[ $key ] = $spec['default'] ?? null;
773	}
774	return $out;
775	}
776
777	private static function option_key( string $slug ): string {
778	return self::OPTION_PREFIX . $slug;
779	}
780	}
781