| 1 |
<?php |
| 2 |
/** |
| 3 |
* MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization server -- the "paste a URL only" connect path. |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* The pairing token (Mcp_Pairing) covers clients that accept a pasted Bearer |
| 6 |
* token; this class covers spec-compliant MCP clients (e.g. the claude.ai |
| 7 |
* remote-connector flow) that take only the server URL and run the OAuth 2.1 |
| 8 |
* authorization-code + PKCE flow themselves. See the security contract and |
| 9 |
* the end-to-end flow notes below. |
| 10 |
* |
| 11 |
* Flow: unauthenticated MCP call -> 401 + WWW-Authenticate (Mcp_Server) -> |
| 12 |
* client fetches /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/xspeed/mcp + |
| 13 |
* /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/xspeed/mcp -> dynamic registration |
| 14 |
* (RFC 7591) -> /authorize (admin consent + PKCE) -> /token (code + verifier |
| 15 |
* -> access + refresh) -> MCP calls with `Authorization: Bearer <access>` |
| 16 |
* validated by validate_token(). Both canonical identifiers -- issuer and |
| 17 |
* resource -- are the MCP endpoint URL, which is what puts the documents |
| 18 |
* under that path rather than at the contested site root (#266). The root |
| 19 |
* URLs are still answered, with the legacy host-only issuer, on sites where |
| 20 |
* no other plugin has claimed them -- see legacy_issuer(). |
| 21 |
* |
| 22 |
* Security contract: |
| 23 |
* - PKCE S256 REQUIRED (OAuth 2.1 public clients); codes are single-use, |
| 24 |
* 60 s TTL, bound to client_id + redirect_uri + challenge. |
| 25 |
* - /authorize gates on manage_options -- only an admin can grant access, |
| 26 |
* matching the pairing token's admin-only mint (anon -> wp-login first). |
| 27 |
* - Access/refresh tokens stored only as SHA-256 hashes; raw value exists |
| 28 |
* solely in the /token response. Constant-time comparison. |
| 29 |
* - Tokens carry the read/write scope model; a read-only grant refuses |
| 30 |
* every write tool, exactly like a read-only pairing token. |
| 31 |
* - Off until an admin approves consent; a fresh install exposes discovery |
| 32 |
* metadata but issues nothing. |
| 33 |
* |
| 34 |
* State lives in the `xspeed_mcp_oauth` option (clients, codes, tokens, |
| 35 |
* refresh -- keyed by id or sha256 of the secret); expired codes/tokens are |
| 36 |
* pruned lazily on every read. |
| 37 |
* |
| 38 |
* @package XSpeed |
| 39 |
*/ |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
declare(strict_types=1); |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
namespace XSpeed\Modules\Mcp; |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
defined( 'ABSPATH' ) || exit; |
| 46 |
|
| 47 |
final class Mcp_OAuth { |
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
/** Option key holding all OAuth server state. */ |
| 50 |
public const OPTION = 'xspeed_mcp_oauth'; |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
/** Authorization-code lifetime (seconds). Deliberately short. */ |
| 53 |
private const CODE_TTL = 60; |
| 54 |
|
| 55 |
/** Access-token lifetime (seconds) -- 1 hour, refreshable. */ |
| 56 |
private const ACCESS_TTL = 3600; |
| 57 |
|
| 58 |
/** Refresh-token lifetime (seconds) -- 30 days. */ |
| 59 |
private const REFRESH_TTL = 2592000; |
| 60 |
|
| 61 |
/** |
| 62 |
* Scopes we advertise + honor. `mcp` is the umbrella scope MCP clients |
| 63 |
* request (read+write). `configure` is an ADDITIONAL, opt-in scope that a |
| 64 |
* client must request explicitly to write credential/secret fields — it is |
| 65 |
* NOT implied by `mcp` or `write`, so credential writes stay off by default |
| 66 |
* on an ordinary connection. (#116) |
| 67 |
*/ |
| 68 |
private const SUPPORTED_SCOPES = array( 'mcp', 'read', 'write', 'configure' ); |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
/** |
| 71 |
* Resource bounds for dynamic client registration (RFC 7591). |
| 72 |
* |
| 73 |
* The register endpoint is public by design — that is what makes an MCP |
| 74 |
* client able to connect without an admin minting credentials first. What |
| 75 |
* was missing is a resource policy: every request appended a client to one |
| 76 |
* persistent option with no count, size, expiry or rate bound, so repeated |
| 77 |
* anonymous requests grew `xspeed_mcp_oauth` without limit. Every later |
| 78 |
* registration and OAuth operation then loaded and reserialized a larger |
| 79 |
* option, burning storage, memory and CPU until availability degraded. |
| 80 |
* |
| 81 |
* Codes, access tokens and refresh tokens were already pruned on expiry; |
| 82 |
* `clients` was the one collection retained forever. |
| 83 |
*/ |
| 84 |
private const MAX_CLIENTS = 100; |
| 85 |
|
| 86 |
/** Redirect URIs accepted per registration. */ |
| 87 |
private const MAX_REDIRECT_URIS = 5; |
| 88 |
|
| 89 |
/** Longest accepted redirect URI, in bytes. */ |
| 90 |
private const MAX_REDIRECT_URI_LEN = 2048; |
| 91 |
|
| 92 |
/** Longest accepted client_name, in bytes. */ |
| 93 |
private const MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LEN = 200; |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
/** |
| 96 |
* How long an UNUSED client survives. A client that never completes a |
| 97 |
* flow is almost always an abandoned or hostile registration, so it is |
| 98 |
* collected after this window. A client with a live code, access token or |
| 99 |
* refresh token is never collected on age — see prune_clients(). |
| 100 |
*/ |
| 101 |
private const UNUSED_CLIENT_TTL = 86400; |
| 102 |
|
| 103 |
/** Registrations allowed per IP inside RATE_WINDOW. */ |
| 104 |
private const RATE_MAX = 10; |
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
/** Window for the registration rate limit, in seconds. Fixed, not sliding. */ |
| 107 |
private const RATE_WINDOW = 3600; |
| 108 |
|
| 109 |
/** |
| 110 |
* Fixed number of rate-limit counters. |
| 111 |
* |
| 112 |
* One transient per IP would let a distributed flood grow the options |
| 113 |
* TABLE without bound — the same CWE-770 shape this class exists to fix, |
| 114 |
* moved from the option value to the row count. Hashing the IP into a |
| 115 |
* fixed bucket space caps that at a constant, whatever the traffic. |
| 116 |
* (QA F2 on #254) |
| 117 |
*/ |
| 118 |
private const RATE_BUCKETS = 64; |
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
/** |
| 121 |
* True while a caller is between state() and its own save(). |
| 122 |
* |
| 123 |
* state() persists a self-heal prune on read-only paths, but a caller that |
| 124 |
* is about to save() anyway would then write twice — and the second write |
| 125 |
* would be against a $state it had already mutated. Callers that mutate |
| 126 |
* set this so the read-side write stands down. (QA F1 on #254) |
| 127 |
*/ |
| 128 |
private static $writing = false; |
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
// -- URLs ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
/** |
| 133 |
* The OAuth issuer identifier -- the MCP endpoint URL, identical to |
| 134 |
* resource(). |
| 135 |
* |
| 136 |
* RFC 8414 §2 allows an issuer to carry a path, and §3.1 then moves its |
| 137 |
* metadata to /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/xspeed/mcp, a URL |
| 138 |
* only this plugin answers. A bare-host issuer put the document at the |
| 139 |
* site root, which every other MCP-serving plugin on the same site also |
| 140 |
* wants, and WordPress hands that URL to whichever rewrite rule happens |
| 141 |
* to sit first in the table. |
| 142 |
* |
| 143 |
* Nothing stored carries the issuer -- access and refresh tokens are |
| 144 |
* opaque random strings, client records hold redirect_uris/name/created |
| 145 |
* -- so changing it invalidates no grant. A client that re-discovers |
| 146 |
* simply registers again and asks the admin for consent once more. |
| 147 |
* (#266) |
| 148 |
*/ |
| 149 |
public static function issuer(): string { |
| 150 |
return self::resource(); |
| 151 |
} |
| 152 |
|
| 153 |
/** |
| 154 |
* The host-only issuer earlier builds used, still served at the bare |
| 155 |
* /.well-known/oauth-* URLs when no other plugin has claimed them. |
| 156 |
* |
| 157 |
* RFC 8414 §3.3 makes a client reject a document whose `issuer` is not |
| 158 |
* the value it inserted into the URL it fetched, and a client that |
| 159 |
* fetched the ROOT document inserted nothing -- it derived that URL from |
| 160 |
* `https://site`. Stamping the path issuer there would be the same RFC |
| 161 |
* violation this change set out to remove, pointed the other way. So the |
| 162 |
* two locations carry two identities, each self-consistent, and a client |
| 163 |
* ends up on whichever one it asked for. (#266) |
| 164 |
*/ |
| 165 |
public static function legacy_issuer(): string { |
| 166 |
return untrailingslashit( home_url( '/' ) ); |
| 167 |
} |
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
/** The protected resource identifier -- the MCP endpoint URL. */ |
| 170 |
public static function resource(): string { |
| 171 |
return Mcp_Pairing::site_endpoint(); |
| 172 |
} |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
/** |
| 175 |
* The browser-facing authorize page. Served OUTSIDE the REST API (via a |
| 176 |
* rewrite rule) so standard cookie auth works after the wp-login |
| 177 |
* round-trip — a REST route would see the cookie without a nonce and |
| 178 |
* treat the admin as logged-out, looping back to login. |
| 179 |
*/ |
| 180 |
public static function authorize_url(): string { |
| 181 |
return Mcp_Pairing::absolute( home_url( '/xspeed/authorize' ) ); |
| 182 |
} |
| 183 |
|
| 184 |
public static function token_url(): string { |
| 185 |
return Mcp_Pairing::absolute( rest_url( 'xspeed/v1/mcp/oauth/token' ) ); |
| 186 |
} |
| 187 |
|
| 188 |
public static function register_url(): string { |
| 189 |
return Mcp_Pairing::absolute( rest_url( 'xspeed/v1/mcp/oauth/register' ) ); |
| 190 |
} |
| 191 |
|
| 192 |
// -- Discovery documents (RFC 8414 / RFC 9728) ----------------------- |
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
/** |
| 195 |
* RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata -- tells the client which |
| 196 |
* authorization server(s) protect the MCP endpoint (this site). |
| 197 |
* |
| 198 |
* @param string|null $issuer The authorization server to name. Defaults |
| 199 |
* to the canonical path issuer; the root |
| 200 |
* /.well-known/ location passes the legacy |
| 201 |
* host-only one, so that the AS document a |
| 202 |
* client goes on to fetch is the one served |
| 203 |
* at the URL that issuer derives. |
| 204 |
* @return array<string,mixed> |
| 205 |
*/ |
| 206 |
public static function protected_resource_metadata( ?string $issuer = null ): array { |
| 207 |
return array( |
| 208 |
'resource' => self::resource(), |
| 209 |
'authorization_servers' => array( $issuer ?? self::issuer() ), |
| 210 |
'scopes_supported' => self::SUPPORTED_SCOPES, |
| 211 |
'bearer_methods_supported' => array( 'header' ), |
| 212 |
); |
| 213 |
} |
| 214 |
|
| 215 |
/** |
| 216 |
* RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata -- the endpoint map + the |
| 217 |
* capabilities we actually implement (auth-code grant, PKCE S256, |
| 218 |
* dynamic registration, refresh tokens). |
| 219 |
* |
| 220 |
* @param string|null $issuer Which identity this copy of the document |
| 221 |
* speaks for; see protected_resource_metadata(). |
| 222 |
* Every endpoint URL below is identical either |
| 223 |
* way, which is why a client that switches |
| 224 |
* identities keeps its cached endpoints. |
| 225 |
* @return array<string,mixed> |
| 226 |
*/ |
| 227 |
public static function authorization_server_metadata( ?string $issuer = null ): array { |
| 228 |
return array( |
| 229 |
'issuer' => $issuer ?? self::issuer(), |
| 230 |
'authorization_endpoint' => self::authorize_url(), |
| 231 |
'token_endpoint' => self::token_url(), |
| 232 |
'registration_endpoint' => self::register_url(), |
| 233 |
'scopes_supported' => self::SUPPORTED_SCOPES, |
| 234 |
'response_types_supported' => array( 'code' ), |
| 235 |
'grant_types_supported' => array( 'authorization_code', 'refresh_token' ), |
| 236 |
'code_challenge_methods_supported' => array( 'S256' ), |
| 237 |
'token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported' => array( 'none' ), |
| 238 |
); |
| 239 |
} |
| 240 |
|
| 241 |
// -- Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591) -------------------------- |
| 242 |
|
| 243 |
/** |
| 244 |
* Register a public client. We accept the client's redirect_uris and |
| 245 |
* mint a client_id (no secret -- public clients rely on PKCE). Minimal |
| 246 |
* metadata is echoed back per RFC 7591. |
| 247 |
* |
| 248 |
* @param array<string,mixed> $body Parsed JSON registration request. |
| 249 |
* @return array<string,mixed>|\WP_Error |
| 250 |
*/ |
| 251 |
public static function register_client( array $body ) { |
| 252 |
// CHECK the rate limit before any work — an over-limit caller must not |
| 253 |
// be able to make us read, mutate or reserialize the option at all. |
| 254 |
// The COUNT happens later, only once the payload has proven valid, so |
| 255 |
// a legitimate but buggy client sending malformed bodies is not locked |
| 256 |
// out for an hour over registrations that never stored anything. |
| 257 |
// (QA F3 on #254) |
| 258 |
if ( ! self::rate_limit_ok( false ) ) { |
| 259 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 260 |
'too_many_requests', |
| 261 |
__( 'Too many client registrations. Try again later.', 'xspeed' ), |
| 262 |
array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 263 |
); |
| 264 |
} |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
$raw = isset( $body['redirect_uris'] ) && is_array( $body['redirect_uris'] ) |
| 267 |
? array_map( 'strval', $body['redirect_uris'] ) |
| 268 |
: array(); |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
// Cap the count before validating, so a huge array costs a count() |
| 271 |
// rather than a full validation pass. |
| 272 |
if ( count( $raw ) > self::MAX_REDIRECT_URIS ) { |
| 273 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 274 |
'invalid_redirect_uri', |
| 275 |
sprintf( |
| 276 |
/* translators: %d: maximum number of redirect URIs. */ |
| 277 |
__( 'At most %d redirect_uris are allowed.', 'xspeed' ), |
| 278 |
self::MAX_REDIRECT_URIS |
| 279 |
), |
| 280 |
array( 'status' => 400 ) |
| 281 |
); |
| 282 |
} |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
$redirect_uris = array_values( array_filter( $raw, array( self::class, 'is_valid_redirect_uri' ) ) ); |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
if ( empty( $redirect_uris ) ) { |
| 287 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 288 |
'invalid_redirect_uri', |
| 289 |
__( 'At least one valid redirect_uri is required.', 'xspeed' ), |
| 290 |
array( 'status' => 400 ) |
| 291 |
); |
| 292 |
} |
| 293 |
|
| 294 |
$name = isset( $body['client_name'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( (string) $body['client_name'] ) : 'MCP Client'; |
| 295 |
if ( strlen( $name ) > self::MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LEN ) { |
| 296 |
// mb_strcut, NOT substr: the bound is in BYTES (that is what the |
| 297 |
// storage limit is about), but cutting at byte 200 lands inside a |
| 298 |
// multi-byte character for any CJK or emoji name — 200 is not a |
| 299 |
// multiple of 3 — and the result is invalid UTF-8. MySQL then |
| 300 |
// refuses the whole option write, so the registration was silently |
| 301 |
// dropped while the endpoint still answered 201 with a client_id |
| 302 |
// that had never been stored. mb_strcut keeps the byte budget and |
| 303 |
// never splits a character. (QA on #254) |
| 304 |
$name = function_exists( 'mb_strcut' ) |
| 305 |
? mb_strcut( $name, 0, self::MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LEN, 'UTF-8' ) |
| 306 |
: substr( $name, 0, self::MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LEN ); |
| 307 |
} |
| 308 |
|
| 309 |
// The payload is valid, so this request counts against the window. |
| 310 |
// Deliberately AFTER validation (F3) but BEFORE the option read below, |
| 311 |
// so an over-limit caller still cannot make us touch the option. |
| 312 |
self::rate_limit_ok( true ); |
| 313 |
|
| 314 |
$client_id = 'xsc_' . bin2hex( random_bytes( 16 ) ); |
| 315 |
|
| 316 |
// state() has already pruned unused/expired clients on load. |
| 317 |
$state = self::state_for_write(); |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
// Hard cap. Pruning above already dropped unused and expired |
| 320 |
// registrations, so hitting this means MAX_CLIENTS clients are |
| 321 |
// genuinely in use — refuse rather than evict a live one, which would |
| 322 |
// break a working integration to satisfy an anonymous caller. |
| 323 |
if ( count( $state['clients'] ) >= self::MAX_CLIENTS ) { |
| 324 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 325 |
'too_many_clients', |
| 326 |
__( 'Client registration limit reached.', 'xspeed' ), |
| 327 |
array( 'status' => 429 ) |
| 328 |
); |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
$state['clients'][ $client_id ] = array( |
| 332 |
'redirect_uris' => $redirect_uris, |
| 333 |
'name' => $name, |
| 334 |
'created' => time(), |
| 335 |
); |
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
// A freshly-minted client_id always changes the option, so a false here |
| 338 |
// is a genuine write failure and never the "value unchanged" case. Fail |
| 339 |
// loudly: handing back a 201 and a client_id that was never stored |
| 340 |
// leaves the caller holding a credential that can never authorize, and |
| 341 |
// the only symptom is a confusing "Unknown client_id" much later. |
| 342 |
if ( ! self::save( $state ) ) { |
| 343 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 344 |
'registration_failed', |
| 345 |
__( 'The client registration could not be stored.', 'xspeed' ), |
| 346 |
array( 'status' => 500 ) |
| 347 |
); |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
return array( |
| 351 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 352 |
'client_id_issued_at' => time(), |
| 353 |
'redirect_uris' => $redirect_uris, |
| 354 |
'client_name' => $name, |
| 355 |
'token_endpoint_auth_method' => 'none', |
| 356 |
'grant_types' => array( 'authorization_code', 'refresh_token' ), |
| 357 |
'response_types' => array( 'code' ), |
| 358 |
); |
| 359 |
} |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
// -- Authorization endpoint ------------------------------------------ |
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
/** |
| 364 |
* Validate an /authorize request's parameters WITHOUT issuing anything. |
| 365 |
* Returns a sanitized param bag on success, or WP_Error on a protocol |
| 366 |
* violation the client must fix. The caller (route handler) decides how |
| 367 |
* to surface it (redirect vs error page) based on whether redirect_uri |
| 368 |
* is trustworthy. |
| 369 |
* |
| 370 |
* @param array<string,string> $params Query params. |
| 371 |
* @return array<string,string>|\WP_Error |
| 372 |
*/ |
| 373 |
public static function validate_authorize_request( array $params ) { |
| 374 |
$client_id = isset( $params['client_id'] ) ? (string) $params['client_id'] : ''; |
| 375 |
$redirect_uri = isset( $params['redirect_uri'] ) ? (string) $params['redirect_uri'] : ''; |
| 376 |
$response_type = isset( $params['response_type'] ) ? (string) $params['response_type'] : ''; |
| 377 |
$challenge = isset( $params['code_challenge'] ) ? (string) $params['code_challenge'] : ''; |
| 378 |
$method = isset( $params['code_challenge_method'] ) ? (string) $params['code_challenge_method'] : ''; |
| 379 |
$scope = isset( $params['scope'] ) ? (string) $params['scope'] : 'mcp'; |
| 380 |
$state = isset( $params['state'] ) ? (string) $params['state'] : ''; |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
$client = self::client( $client_id ); |
| 383 |
if ( null === $client ) { |
| 384 |
return new \WP_Error( 'invalid_client', __( 'Unknown client_id.', 'xspeed' ), array( 'status' => 400 ) ); |
| 385 |
} |
| 386 |
if ( ! in_array( $redirect_uri, $client['redirect_uris'], true ) ) { |
| 387 |
// redirect_uri mismatch must NOT redirect (open-redirect guard). |
| 388 |
return new \WP_Error( 'invalid_redirect_uri', __( 'redirect_uri does not match a registered value.', 'xspeed' ), array( 'status' => 400 ) ); |
| 389 |
} |
| 390 |
if ( 'code' !== $response_type ) { |
| 391 |
return new \WP_Error( 'unsupported_response_type', __( 'Only response_type=code is supported.', 'xspeed' ), array( 'status' => 400, 'redirectable' => true ) ); |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
// OAuth 2.1: PKCE S256 is mandatory for public clients. |
| 394 |
if ( 'S256' !== $method || '' === $challenge ) { |
| 395 |
return new \WP_Error( 'invalid_request', __( 'PKCE with code_challenge_method=S256 is required.', 'xspeed' ), array( 'status' => 400, 'redirectable' => true ) ); |
| 396 |
} |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
return array( |
| 399 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 400 |
'client_name' => $client['name'], |
| 401 |
'redirect_uri' => $redirect_uri, |
| 402 |
'code_challenge' => $challenge, |
| 403 |
'scope' => self::normalize_scope( $scope ), |
| 404 |
'state' => $state, |
| 405 |
); |
| 406 |
} |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
/** |
| 409 |
* Issue an authorization code after the admin approves consent. Binds |
| 410 |
* the code to the client, redirect_uri, PKCE challenge, granted scope, |
| 411 |
* and the approving user. Single-use, 60 s TTL. |
| 412 |
* |
| 413 |
* @param array<string,string> $req Output of validate_authorize_request(). |
| 414 |
* @param int $user_id Approving admin user id. |
| 415 |
* @return string The authorization code. |
| 416 |
*/ |
| 417 |
public static function issue_code( array $req, int $user_id ): string { |
| 418 |
$code = bin2hex( random_bytes( 32 ) ); |
| 419 |
$state = self::state_for_write(); |
| 420 |
$state['codes'][ $code ] = array( |
| 421 |
'client_id' => $req['client_id'], |
| 422 |
'redirect_uri' => $req['redirect_uri'], |
| 423 |
'challenge' => $req['code_challenge'], |
| 424 |
'scope' => $req['scope'], |
| 425 |
'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 426 |
'expires' => time() + self::CODE_TTL, |
| 427 |
); |
| 428 |
self::save( $state ); |
| 429 |
return $code; |
| 430 |
} |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
// -- Token endpoint -------------------------------------------------- |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
/** |
| 435 |
* Exchange an authorization code (+ PKCE verifier) for tokens, or a |
| 436 |
* refresh token for a fresh access token. Returns the RFC 6749 token |
| 437 |
* response or a WP_Error whose data carries the OAuth error code. |
| 438 |
* |
| 439 |
* @param array<string,string> $body POST body params. |
| 440 |
* @return array<string,mixed>|\WP_Error |
| 441 |
*/ |
| 442 |
public static function exchange_token( array $body ) { |
| 443 |
$grant = isset( $body['grant_type'] ) ? (string) $body['grant_type'] : ''; |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
if ( 'authorization_code' === $grant ) { |
| 446 |
return self::grant_authorization_code( $body ); |
| 447 |
} |
| 448 |
if ( 'refresh_token' === $grant ) { |
| 449 |
return self::grant_refresh_token( $body ); |
| 450 |
} |
| 451 |
return self::oauth_error( 'unsupported_grant_type', 'Unsupported grant_type.' ); |
| 452 |
} |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
/** |
| 455 |
* authorization_code grant: verify the code + PKCE, mint tokens. |
| 456 |
* |
| 457 |
* @param array<string,string> $body POST body. |
| 458 |
* @return array<string,mixed>|\WP_Error |
| 459 |
*/ |
| 460 |
private static function grant_authorization_code( array $body ) { |
| 461 |
$code = isset( $body['code'] ) ? (string) $body['code'] : ''; |
| 462 |
$client_id = isset( $body['client_id'] ) ? (string) $body['client_id'] : ''; |
| 463 |
$redirect_uri = isset( $body['redirect_uri'] ) ? (string) $body['redirect_uri'] : ''; |
| 464 |
$verifier = isset( $body['code_verifier'] ) ? (string) $body['code_verifier'] : ''; |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
$state = self::state_for_write(); |
| 467 |
if ( '' === $code || ! isset( $state['codes'][ $code ] ) ) { |
| 468 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'Unknown or expired authorization code.' ); |
| 469 |
} |
| 470 |
$entry = $state['codes'][ $code ]; |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
// Single-use: remove immediately whether or not verification passes. |
| 473 |
unset( $state['codes'][ $code ] ); |
| 474 |
self::save( $state ); |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
if ( $entry['expires'] < time() ) { |
| 477 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'Authorization code expired.' ); |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
if ( ! hash_equals( (string) $entry['client_id'], $client_id ) ) { |
| 480 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'client_id mismatch.' ); |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
if ( ! hash_equals( (string) $entry['redirect_uri'], $redirect_uri ) ) { |
| 483 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'redirect_uri mismatch.' ); |
| 484 |
} |
| 485 |
// PKCE S256: BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)) must equal the stored challenge. |
| 486 |
if ( '' === $verifier || ! hash_equals( (string) $entry['challenge'], self::s256( $verifier ) ) ) { |
| 487 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'PKCE verification failed.' ); |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
return self::mint_tokens( $entry['client_id'], $entry['scope'], (int) $entry['user_id'] ); |
| 491 |
} |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
/** |
| 494 |
* refresh_token grant: rotate the refresh token, issue a fresh access |
| 495 |
* token. The old refresh + its access token are revoked. |
| 496 |
* |
| 497 |
* @param array<string,string> $body POST body. |
| 498 |
* @return array<string,mixed>|\WP_Error |
| 499 |
*/ |
| 500 |
private static function grant_refresh_token( array $body ) { |
| 501 |
$refresh = isset( $body['refresh_token'] ) ? (string) $body['refresh_token'] : ''; |
| 502 |
$client_id = isset( $body['client_id'] ) ? (string) $body['client_id'] : ''; |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
$state = self::state_for_write(); |
| 505 |
$rhash = self::hash( $refresh ); |
| 506 |
if ( '' === $refresh || ! isset( $state['refresh'][ $rhash ] ) ) { |
| 507 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'Unknown refresh token.' ); |
| 508 |
} |
| 509 |
$entry = $state['refresh'][ $rhash ]; |
| 510 |
if ( '' !== $client_id && ! hash_equals( (string) $entry['client_id'], $client_id ) ) { |
| 511 |
return self::oauth_error( 'invalid_grant', 'client_id mismatch.' ); |
| 512 |
} |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
// Rotate: drop old refresh + its access token. |
| 515 |
unset( $state['refresh'][ $rhash ] ); |
| 516 |
if ( isset( $entry['access_hash'] ) ) { |
| 517 |
unset( $state['tokens'][ $entry['access_hash'] ] ); |
| 518 |
} |
| 519 |
self::save( $state ); |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
return self::mint_tokens( $entry['client_id'], $entry['scope'], (int) $entry['user_id'] ); |
| 522 |
} |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
/** |
| 525 |
* Mint an access + refresh token pair, store them hashed, and return |
| 526 |
* the RFC 6749 token response with the raw values. |
| 527 |
* |
| 528 |
* @param string $client_id Client id. |
| 529 |
* @param string $scope Granted scope string. |
| 530 |
* @param int $user_id Resource-owner user id. |
| 531 |
* @return array<string,mixed> |
| 532 |
*/ |
| 533 |
private static function mint_tokens( string $client_id, string $scope, int $user_id ): array { |
| 534 |
$access = bin2hex( random_bytes( 32 ) ); |
| 535 |
$refresh = bin2hex( random_bytes( 32 ) ); |
| 536 |
$ahash = self::hash( $access ); |
| 537 |
$rhash = self::hash( $refresh ); |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
$state = self::state_for_write(); |
| 540 |
$state['tokens'][ $ahash ] = array( |
| 541 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 542 |
'scope' => $scope, |
| 543 |
'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 544 |
'expires' => time() + self::ACCESS_TTL, |
| 545 |
'refresh' => $rhash, |
| 546 |
); |
| 547 |
$state['refresh'][ $rhash ] = array( |
| 548 |
'access_hash' => $ahash, |
| 549 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 550 |
'scope' => $scope, |
| 551 |
'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 552 |
'expires' => time() + self::REFRESH_TTL, |
| 553 |
); |
| 554 |
self::save( $state ); |
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
return array( |
| 557 |
'access_token' => $access, |
| 558 |
'token_type' => 'Bearer', |
| 559 |
'expires_in' => self::ACCESS_TTL, |
| 560 |
'refresh_token' => $refresh, |
| 561 |
'scope' => $scope, |
| 562 |
); |
| 563 |
} |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
// -- Access-token validation (called by Mcp_Server) ------------------ |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
/** |
| 568 |
* Validate a bearer access token presented to the MCP endpoint. |
| 569 |
* Returns the token's grant record (scope, user_id, client_id) when |
| 570 |
* valid + unexpired, or null. Constant-time via hashed lookup. |
| 571 |
* |
| 572 |
* @param string $token Raw access token from the Authorization header. |
| 573 |
* @return array{client_id:string,scope:string,user_id:int}|null |
| 574 |
*/ |
| 575 |
public static function validate_token( string $token ): ?array { |
| 576 |
if ( '' === $token ) { |
| 577 |
return null; |
| 578 |
} |
| 579 |
$state = self::state(); |
| 580 |
$hash = self::hash( $token ); |
| 581 |
if ( ! isset( $state['tokens'][ $hash ] ) ) { |
| 582 |
return null; |
| 583 |
} |
| 584 |
$entry = $state['tokens'][ $hash ]; |
| 585 |
if ( (int) $entry['expires'] < time() ) { |
| 586 |
return null; |
| 587 |
} |
| 588 |
return array( |
| 589 |
'client_id' => (string) $entry['client_id'], |
| 590 |
'scope' => (string) $entry['scope'], |
| 591 |
'user_id' => (int) $entry['user_id'], |
| 592 |
); |
| 593 |
} |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
/** |
| 596 |
* Whether a granted scope string is read-only. `mcp` is the umbrella |
| 597 |
* scope that grants read+write (matching a default pairing token), so |
| 598 |
* only a grant that carries NEITHER `write` NOR `mcp` -- i.e. `read` |
| 599 |
* alone -- is read-only. |
| 600 |
*/ |
| 601 |
public static function scope_is_read_only( string $scope ): bool { |
| 602 |
$parts = preg_split( '/\s+/', trim( $scope ) ) ?: array(); |
| 603 |
return ! in_array( 'write', $parts, true ) && ! in_array( 'mcp', $parts, true ); |
| 604 |
} |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
/** |
| 607 |
* Whether a granted scope string may write credential/secret fields. Unlike |
| 608 |
* read/write, `configure` is never implied by the `mcp` umbrella — the |
| 609 |
* client must ask for it by name — so an ordinary read-write connection |
| 610 |
* cannot rewrite API tokens or passwords. (#116) |
| 611 |
*/ |
| 612 |
public static function scope_allows_configure( string $scope ): bool { |
| 613 |
$parts = preg_split( '/\s+/', trim( $scope ) ) ?: array(); |
| 614 |
return in_array( 'configure', $parts, true ); |
| 615 |
} |
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
/** Revoke every OAuth token + client (used by disconnect). */ |
| 618 |
public static function revoke_all(): void { |
| 619 |
delete_option( self::OPTION ); |
| 620 |
} |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
// -- State + helpers ------------------------------------------------- |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
/** |
| 625 |
* Load state with defaults, pruning expired codes/tokens/refresh |
| 626 |
* entries on the way out so the option can't grow unbounded. |
| 627 |
* |
| 628 |
* @return array<string,array<string,mixed>> |
| 629 |
*/ |
| 630 |
private static function state(): array { |
| 631 |
$stored = get_option( self::OPTION, array() ); |
| 632 |
if ( ! is_array( $stored ) ) { |
| 633 |
$stored = array(); |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
$state = array( |
| 636 |
'clients' => isset( $stored['clients'] ) && is_array( $stored['clients'] ) ? $stored['clients'] : array(), |
| 637 |
'codes' => isset( $stored['codes'] ) && is_array( $stored['codes'] ) ? $stored['codes'] : array(), |
| 638 |
'tokens' => isset( $stored['tokens'] ) && is_array( $stored['tokens'] ) ? $stored['tokens'] : array(), |
| 639 |
'refresh' => isset( $stored['refresh'] ) && is_array( $stored['refresh'] ) ? $stored['refresh'] : array(), |
| 640 |
); |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
$now = time(); |
| 643 |
foreach ( $state['codes'] as $k => $v ) { |
| 644 |
if ( ! isset( $v['expires'] ) || $v['expires'] < $now ) { |
| 645 |
unset( $state['codes'][ $k ] ); |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
} |
| 648 |
foreach ( $state['tokens'] as $k => $v ) { |
| 649 |
if ( ! isset( $v['expires'] ) || $v['expires'] < $now ) { |
| 650 |
unset( $state['tokens'][ $k ] ); |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
} |
| 653 |
foreach ( $state['refresh'] as $k => $v ) { |
| 654 |
if ( isset( $v['expires'] ) && $v['expires'] < $now ) { |
| 655 |
unset( $state['refresh'][ $k ] ); |
| 656 |
} |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
// Clients were the one collection this method never pruned, which is |
| 660 |
// what let an anonymous caller grow the option without bound. Prune |
| 661 |
// them here too, AFTER the grant buckets above, so "in use" is |
| 662 |
// decided against live grants only. |
| 663 |
$before = count( $state['clients'] ); |
| 664 |
$state['clients'] = self::prune_clients( $state ); |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
// Persist when pruning ACTUALLY removed something. Pruning in memory |
| 667 |
// alone left a bloated option on disk until the next write happened to |
| 668 |
// land — so a site whose flood had stopped kept carrying the weight |
| 669 |
// indefinitely, which is not the self-heal this was described as. |
| 670 |
// (QA F1 on #254) |
| 671 |
// |
| 672 |
// Guarded on a real reduction, so the common case — nothing to prune — |
| 673 |
// stays a pure read and adds no write to an OAuth request. $writing |
| 674 |
// stops a caller that is about to save() anyway from writing twice. |
| 675 |
if ( ! self::$writing && count( $state['clients'] ) < $before ) { |
| 676 |
self::save( $state ); |
| 677 |
} |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
return $state; |
| 680 |
} |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
/** |
| 683 |
* Load state for a caller that intends to mutate and save() it. |
| 684 |
* |
| 685 |
* Identical to state(), except it suppresses the read-side self-heal |
| 686 |
* write — the caller's own save() persists the same prune moments later, |
| 687 |
* so doing it here would write twice per request. (QA F1 on #254) |
| 688 |
* |
| 689 |
* @return array<string,array<string,mixed>> |
| 690 |
*/ |
| 691 |
private static function state_for_write(): array { |
| 692 |
self::$writing = true; |
| 693 |
try { |
| 694 |
return self::state(); |
| 695 |
} finally { |
| 696 |
self::$writing = false; |
| 697 |
} |
| 698 |
} |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
/** Persist state (autoload off -- this is a hot-write, request-scoped option). */ |
| 701 |
private static function save( array $state ): bool { |
| 702 |
// Report the outcome rather than discarding it. update_option() returns |
| 703 |
// false when the DB refuses the write — e.g. a value MySQL rejects as |
| 704 |
// invalid — and swallowing that let register_client() answer 201 with a |
| 705 |
// client_id it had never stored. A caller that mints a credential must |
| 706 |
// be able to tell a real write from a silent no-op. (QA on #254) |
| 707 |
// |
| 708 |
// Note update_option() also returns false when the value is UNCHANGED, |
| 709 |
// so this is "did not write", not "failed" — only callers that just |
| 710 |
// added something to $state may treat false as an error. |
| 711 |
return (bool) update_option( self::OPTION, $state, false ); |
| 712 |
} |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
/** |
| 715 |
* Look up a registered client. |
| 716 |
* |
| 717 |
* @param string $client_id Client id. |
| 718 |
* @return array{redirect_uris:string[],name:string,created:int}|null |
| 719 |
*/ |
| 720 |
private static function client( string $client_id ): ?array { |
| 721 |
if ( '' === $client_id ) { |
| 722 |
return null; |
| 723 |
} |
| 724 |
$clients = self::state()['clients']; |
| 725 |
if ( ! isset( $clients[ $client_id ] ) || ! is_array( $clients[ $client_id ] ) ) { |
| 726 |
return null; |
| 727 |
} |
| 728 |
$c = $clients[ $client_id ]; |
| 729 |
return array( |
| 730 |
'redirect_uris' => isset( $c['redirect_uris'] ) && is_array( $c['redirect_uris'] ) ? array_map( 'strval', $c['redirect_uris'] ) : array(), |
| 731 |
'name' => isset( $c['name'] ) ? (string) $c['name'] : 'MCP Client', |
| 732 |
'created' => isset( $c['created'] ) ? (int) $c['created'] : 0, |
| 733 |
); |
| 734 |
} |
| 735 |
|
| 736 |
/** SHA-256 hash used to store tokens at rest. */ |
| 737 |
private static function hash( string $value ): string { |
| 738 |
return hash( 'sha256', $value ); |
| 739 |
} |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
/** BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)) -- the PKCE S256 transformation. */ |
| 742 |
private static function s256( string $verifier ): string { |
| 743 |
return rtrim( strtr( base64_encode( hash( 'sha256', $verifier, true ) ), '+/', '-_' ), '=' ); |
| 744 |
} |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
/** |
| 747 |
* Constrain a requested scope to what we support. Defaults to `mcp` |
| 748 |
* (read+write umbrella). An explicit `mcp:read` / `read`-only request |
| 749 |
* yields a read-only grant. |
| 750 |
*/ |
| 751 |
private static function normalize_scope( string $requested ): string { |
| 752 |
$parts = preg_split( '/\s+/', trim( $requested ) ) ?: array(); |
| 753 |
$parts = array_values( array_intersect( $parts, self::SUPPORTED_SCOPES ) ); |
| 754 |
if ( empty( $parts ) ) { |
| 755 |
return 'mcp'; |
| 756 |
} |
| 757 |
return implode( ' ', $parts ); |
| 758 |
} |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
/** Whether a redirect_uri is structurally acceptable (http(s) or a custom scheme). */ |
| 761 |
private static function is_valid_redirect_uri( string $uri ): bool { |
| 762 |
$uri = trim( $uri ); |
| 763 |
if ( '' === $uri ) { |
| 764 |
return false; |
| 765 |
} |
| 766 |
// Bound the length: without this a single registration could carry |
| 767 |
// multi-megabyte URIs straight into the stored option. |
| 768 |
if ( strlen( $uri ) > self::MAX_REDIRECT_URI_LEN ) { |
| 769 |
return false; |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
// Allow standard web redirect URIs and native-client custom schemes. |
| 772 |
return (bool) preg_match( '#^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.\-]*://#', $uri ); |
| 773 |
} |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
/** |
| 776 |
* Drop registered clients that are neither in use nor recent. |
| 777 |
* |
| 778 |
* "In use" means the client still owns a live authorization code, access |
| 779 |
* token or refresh token — state() has already pruned the expired ones, so |
| 780 |
* whatever remains is genuinely live. Those are kept whatever their age; a |
| 781 |
* connected client must never be collected out from under a working |
| 782 |
* integration. |
| 783 |
* |
| 784 |
* Everything else is a registration that never completed a flow. Those are |
| 785 |
* kept for UNUSED_CLIENT_TTL so a slow but legitimate authorization can |
| 786 |
* finish, then collected. |
| 787 |
* |
| 788 |
* @param array<string,array<string,mixed>> $state Loaded state. |
| 789 |
* @return array<string,mixed> The surviving clients. |
| 790 |
*/ |
| 791 |
private static function prune_clients( array $state ): array { |
| 792 |
$clients = isset( $state['clients'] ) && is_array( $state['clients'] ) ? $state['clients'] : array(); |
| 793 |
if ( empty( $clients ) ) { |
| 794 |
return array(); |
| 795 |
} |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
// Which client ids still hold live grants? |
| 798 |
$in_use = array(); |
| 799 |
foreach ( array( 'codes', 'tokens', 'refresh' ) as $bucket ) { |
| 800 |
if ( empty( $state[ $bucket ] ) || ! is_array( $state[ $bucket ] ) ) { |
| 801 |
continue; |
| 802 |
} |
| 803 |
foreach ( $state[ $bucket ] as $entry ) { |
| 804 |
if ( is_array( $entry ) && ! empty( $entry['client_id'] ) ) { |
| 805 |
$in_use[ (string) $entry['client_id'] ] = true; |
| 806 |
} |
| 807 |
} |
| 808 |
} |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
$cutoff = time() - self::UNUSED_CLIENT_TTL; |
| 811 |
foreach ( $clients as $id => $client ) { |
| 812 |
if ( isset( $in_use[ (string) $id ] ) ) { |
| 813 |
continue; |
| 814 |
} |
| 815 |
$created = ( is_array( $client ) && isset( $client['created'] ) ) ? (int) $client['created'] : 0; |
| 816 |
if ( $created < $cutoff ) { |
| 817 |
unset( $clients[ $id ] ); |
| 818 |
} |
| 819 |
} |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
return $clients; |
| 822 |
} |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
/** |
| 825 |
* Per-IP sliding-window rate limit for dynamic client registration. |
| 826 |
* |
| 827 |
* Deliberately mirrors Mcp_Rate_Limiter's approach (transient counter |
| 828 |
* keyed on a hashed IP) rather than adding a dependency: that class gates |
| 829 |
* failed *authentication*, while this gates *creation* of state, and the |
| 830 |
* two must be tunable apart. |
| 831 |
* |
| 832 |
* Fails OPEN when the IP is unavailable — a proxy that hides REMOTE_ADDR |
| 833 |
* must not lock every client out of registering. |
| 834 |
*/ |
| 835 |
private static function rate_limit_ok( bool $count = true ): bool { |
| 836 |
$ip = isset( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) : ''; |
| 837 |
if ( '' === $ip ) { |
| 838 |
return true; |
| 839 |
} |
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
/** |
| 842 |
* Filter the dynamic-client-registration rate limit. |
| 843 |
* |
| 844 |
* @param int $max Registrations allowed per IP inside the window. |
| 845 |
*/ |
| 846 |
$max = (int) apply_filters( 'xspeed_mcp_register_rate_limit', self::RATE_MAX ); |
| 847 |
if ( $max <= 0 ) { |
| 848 |
return true; |
| 849 |
} |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
// Bucket the IP into a FIXED key space instead of one transient per |
| 852 |
// IP. Per-IP keys meant a distributed flood grew the options TABLE |
| 853 |
// without bound — the same CWE-770 shape as the bug this class fixes, |
| 854 |
// just moved from the option value to the row count. RATE_BUCKETS |
| 855 |
// caps it at a constant: 64 counters, whatever the traffic. |
| 856 |
// (QA F2 on #254) |
| 857 |
// |
| 858 |
// Collisions make the limit stricter for the colliding IPs, never |
| 859 |
// looser, so the bound still holds. With 64 buckets a handful of |
| 860 |
// unrelated clients may share a counter; that is the deliberate trade |
| 861 |
// for a storage ceiling, and RATE_MAX is generous enough to absorb it. |
| 862 |
$bucket = hexdec( substr( md5( $ip ), 0, 4 ) ) % self::RATE_BUCKETS; |
| 863 |
$key = 'xspeed_mcp_reg_' . $bucket; |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
$entry = get_transient( $key ); |
| 866 |
$now = time(); |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
// Window START is stored with the counter, so the window is genuinely |
| 869 |
// FIXED rather than extending on every hit. set_transient()'s TTL was |
| 870 |
// previously reset on each accepted request, which quietly turned |
| 871 |
// "10 per hour" into "10, then locked until an hour after your LAST |
| 872 |
// attempt". (QA F4 on #254) |
| 873 |
if ( ! is_array( $entry ) || ! isset( $entry['start'], $entry['count'] ) || ( $now - (int) $entry['start'] ) >= self::RATE_WINDOW ) { |
| 874 |
$entry = array( |
| 875 |
'start' => $now, |
| 876 |
'count' => 0, |
| 877 |
); |
| 878 |
} |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
if ( (int) $entry['count'] >= $max ) { |
| 881 |
return false; |
| 882 |
} |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
// CHECK-only mode writes nothing. The caller re-invokes with $count |
| 885 |
// true once the payload has proven valid, so a malformed request |
| 886 |
// costs the caller nothing — it never consumed a slot and never |
| 887 |
// touched the database. (QA F3 on #254) |
| 888 |
if ( ! $count ) { |
| 889 |
return true; |
| 890 |
} |
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
++$entry['count']; |
| 893 |
|
| 894 |
// TTL covers only the REMAINDER of the current window, so the entry |
| 895 |
// expires when the window does instead of being pushed forward. |
| 896 |
$remaining = self::RATE_WINDOW - ( $now - (int) $entry['start'] ); |
| 897 |
set_transient( $key, $entry, max( 1, $remaining ) ); |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
return true; |
| 900 |
} |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
/** |
| 903 |
* Build a WP_Error whose data carries an OAuth 2.0 `error` code so the |
| 904 |
* token route can render the RFC 6749 error body. |
| 905 |
* |
| 906 |
* @param string $code OAuth error code (invalid_grant, ...). |
| 907 |
* @param string $message Human-readable description. |
| 908 |
* @return \WP_Error |
| 909 |
*/ |
| 910 |
private static function oauth_error( string $code, string $message ): \WP_Error { |
| 911 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 912 |
$code, |
| 913 |
$message, |
| 914 |
array( |
| 915 |
'status' => 400, |
| 916 |
'error' => $code, |
| 917 |
'error_description' => $message, |
| 918 |
) |
| 919 |
); |
| 920 |
} |
| 921 |
} |
| 922 |
|
