| 1 |
<?php |
| 2 |
/** |
| 3 |
* Security Verifier Trait — a denylist. It blocks commands that violate |
| 4 |
* the WordPress.org Plugin Guidelines. It also blocks commands that |
| 5 |
* destroy block-editor content. |
| 6 |
* |
| 7 |
* The policy was moved out of RunWpCli into one focused file. The trait is |
| 8 |
* a pure function on a parsed args array. It has no side effects. It does |
| 9 |
* not depend on RunWpCli state. It calls `RunWpCli::parse_flags()` on |
| 10 |
* purpose. The security decision must read the slots that execute. It must |
| 11 |
* not run a second parse of its own (DSA-16, see `candidate_positionals()`). |
| 12 |
* |
| 13 |
* @package zip-ai |
| 14 |
*/ |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
namespace ZipAI\MCP\Classes\Abilities\Core; |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
defined( 'ABSPATH' ) || exit; |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
use ZipAI\MCP\Classes\Security\Protected_Options_Filter; |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
/** |
| 23 |
* Trait holding `verify_command_security`. |
| 24 |
*/ |
| 25 |
trait Security_Verifier_Trait { |
| 26 |
|
| 27 |
/** |
| 28 |
* Block commands that violate WordPress.org Plugin Guidelines or would |
| 29 |
* destroy block-editor content. |
| 30 |
* |
| 31 |
* @param string[] $args Parsed command tokens. |
| 32 |
* @return true|\WP_Error |
| 33 |
*/ |
| 34 |
private function verify_command_security( array $args ) { |
| 35 |
// The native dispatcher does not interpret shell operators. The |
| 36 |
// tokeniser treats them as ordinary tokens. So a chained command like |
| 37 |
// `option update foo bar && option update baz qux` would dispatch only |
| 38 |
// the first sub-command. It would drop the rest. Reject it upfront. So |
| 39 |
// the model learns to issue one command per call. |
| 40 |
$shell_operators = array( '&&', '||', ';' ); |
| 41 |
foreach ( $args as $arg ) { |
| 42 |
if ( in_array( $arg, $shell_operators, true ) ) { |
| 43 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 44 |
'security_blocked', |
| 45 |
sprintf( |
| 46 |
'Security policy: shell operator "%s" is not supported — run one command per call.', |
| 47 |
$arg |
| 48 |
) |
| 49 |
); |
| 50 |
} |
| 51 |
} |
| 52 |
|
| 53 |
// Every rule keys off positional slots. So a rule only holds when the |
| 54 |
// verifier's word split matches the split that EXECUTES. Run the rules |
| 55 |
// against every parse that could execute. Refuse the command if ANY |
| 56 |
// rule trips. See `candidate_positionals()` for why there is more than |
| 57 |
// one split. |
| 58 |
foreach ( $this->candidate_positionals( $args ) as $positional ) { |
| 59 |
$verdict = $this->verify_positional_rules( $args, $positional ); |
| 60 |
if ( is_wp_error( $verdict ) ) { |
| 61 |
return $verdict; |
| 62 |
} |
| 63 |
} |
| 64 |
|
| 65 |
return true; |
| 66 |
} |
| 67 |
|
| 68 |
/** |
| 69 |
* Every word split this command could execute under, deduped. |
| 70 |
* |
| 71 |
* Two parsers can run the tokens this ability accepts. They disagree: |
| 72 |
* |
| 73 |
* • `parse_flags()` (`dispatch_native`) reads the NEXT token as the |
| 74 |
* value of about 60 known keys (`format`, `search`, `fields`, `role`, |
| 75 |
* …). It treats a single-dash `-x` as a positional. |
| 76 |
* • The WP-CLI runtime (`run_via_wpcli_api`) binds values only with `=`. |
| 77 |
* So every `-`-prefixed token is a standalone flag. The ability uses |
| 78 |
* this runtime when a wp-cli process invokes it. |
| 79 |
* |
| 80 |
* DSA-16 came from picking ONE parser. The verifier stripped flag tokens |
| 81 |
* but not their values. So `--format json user add-cap 5 manage_options` |
| 82 |
* read as base `json`. No rule fired. But the dispatcher ran `user |
| 83 |
* add-cap` and granted the capability. Picking the other parser only moves |
| 84 |
* the hole. `--search db query "DROP …"` hides `db query` from |
| 85 |
* `parse_flags`. It then runs under the WP-CLI runtime. |
| 86 |
* |
| 87 |
* So the code picks neither. It evaluates both. A rule that trips under |
| 88 |
* either split refuses the command. This is fail-closed on ambiguity. It |
| 89 |
* does not over-reject. An unambiguous command makes one identical split. |
| 90 |
* That is the common case, deduped here. The valid space-form flag |
| 91 |
* (`plugin list --format json`) stays allowed. No rule trips under either |
| 92 |
* reading of it. |
| 93 |
* |
| 94 |
* Scope: these are the two FLAG-BINDING readings of the tokens |
| 95 |
* `parse_command_to_args()` made. They do not model the WP-CLI TOKENIZER. |
| 96 |
* That tokenizer re-splits the raw string on the passthrough path. It |
| 97 |
* differs at the quoting and escaping margins. It honours `\` inside double |
| 98 |
* quotes and nowhere else. It does not treat a newline as a separator. That |
| 99 |
* gap is pre-existing. It is not a known bypass. It is the reason this |
| 100 |
* docblock says "flag binding" and not "every possible split". |
| 101 |
* |
| 102 |
* @param string[] $args Parsed command tokens. |
| 103 |
* @return array<int,string[]> One or two lowercased positional lists. |
| 104 |
*/ |
| 105 |
private function candidate_positionals( array $args ) { |
| 106 |
list( $executor_tokens ) = $this->parse_flags( $args ); |
| 107 |
$executor = array_map( 'strtolower', $executor_tokens ); |
| 108 |
|
| 109 |
// The WP-CLI runtime split. Every `-`-prefixed token is a flag. It |
| 110 |
// binds no following value. |
| 111 |
$runtime = array(); |
| 112 |
foreach ( $args as $arg ) { |
| 113 |
if ( ! str_starts_with( $arg, '-' ) ) { |
| 114 |
$runtime[] = strtolower( $arg ); |
| 115 |
} |
| 116 |
} |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
return $executor === $runtime ? array( $executor ) : array( $executor, $runtime ); |
| 119 |
} |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
/** |
| 122 |
* The denylist itself, evaluated against one candidate word split. |
| 123 |
* |
| 124 |
* @param string[] $args Parsed command tokens (flag scans read these). |
| 125 |
* @param string[] $positional Lowercased positional slots for this candidate. |
| 126 |
* @return true|\WP_Error |
| 127 |
*/ |
| 128 |
private function verify_positional_rules( array $args, array $positional ) { |
| 129 |
$base_command = $positional[0] ?? ''; |
| 130 |
$sub_command = $positional[1] ?? ''; |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
// 1. Arbitrary code execution & shell access are forbidden. |
| 133 |
$forbidden_commands = array( 'eval', 'eval-file', 'shell', 'package', 'server' ); |
| 134 |
if ( in_array( $base_command, $forbidden_commands, true ) ) { |
| 135 |
return new \WP_Error( 'security_blocked', sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "%s" command is blocked.', $base_command ) ); |
| 136 |
} |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
// 2. Direct SQL is blocked (SQLi prevention). |
| 139 |
if ( 'db' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'query', 'import', 'drop', 'reset' ), true ) ) { |
| 140 |
return new \WP_Error( 'security_blocked', sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "db %s" is blocked.', $sub_command ) ); |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
// 2a. `option add` and `option patch` remain blocked. |
| 144 |
// `add` is rarely useful — `update` is idempotent (creates the option |
| 145 |
// if missing). `patch` performs array-key surgery on serialized |
| 146 |
// options, which is a sharp edge that's almost never the right path |
| 147 |
// for an AI agent. `update` + `delete` cover the legitimate write |
| 148 |
// surface; the keys neither may touch are rule 2a-bis below. |
| 149 |
if ( 'option' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'add', 'patch' ), true ) ) { |
| 150 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 151 |
'security_blocked', |
| 152 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "option %s" is blocked. Use "option update" instead (it creates the option when missing).', $sub_command ) |
| 153 |
); |
| 154 |
} |
| 155 |
|
| 156 |
// 2a-bis. Protected option keys (DSA-17). This sits in the VERIFIER, not |
| 157 |
// only in `handle_option_update` / `handle_option_delete`, because |
| 158 |
// `execute()` has two executors and the handlers are reachable from just |
| 159 |
// one of them: when the ability runs inside a wp-cli process, |
| 160 |
// `run_via_wpcli_api()` hands the raw string to WP-CLI and never touches |
| 161 |
// `dispatch_native`. A guard here covers both, and inherits the |
| 162 |
// two-candidate parse above for free. |
| 163 |
// |
| 164 |
// The handler checks stay as defense-in-depth — same |
| 165 |
// `is_write_protected()` call, so there is still one key list — and they |
| 166 |
// are what produce the precise error instead of a silent filter no-op. |
| 167 |
if ( 'option' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'update', 'delete' ), true ) ) { |
| 168 |
$option_key = $positional[2] ?? ''; |
| 169 |
if ( '' !== $option_key && Protected_Options_Filter::is_write_protected( $option_key ) ) { |
| 170 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 171 |
'security_blocked', |
| 172 |
sprintf( |
| 173 |
'Security policy: option "%s" is protected and cannot be modified via the AI agent. Edit manually in wp-admin → Settings, or use the dedicated ability for it (theme activate / plugin activate).', |
| 174 |
$option_key |
| 175 |
) |
| 176 |
); |
| 177 |
} |
| 178 |
} |
| 179 |
|
| 180 |
// 2b. User creation/deletion and account mutation are blocked. |
| 181 |
// WordPress account management has reauth, email-confirmation, |
| 182 |
// password, and security-plugin hooks that generic automation must |
| 183 |
// not bypass. Read-only user discovery remains available. |
| 184 |
if ( 'user' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'create', 'update', 'delete' ), true ) ) { |
| 185 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 186 |
'security_blocked', |
| 187 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "user %s" is blocked. Manage users from WordPress admin or a dedicated, reviewed flow.', $sub_command ) |
| 188 |
); |
| 189 |
} |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
if ( 'user' === $base_command && 'meta' === $sub_command ) { |
| 192 |
$meta_verb = $positional[2] ?? ''; |
| 193 |
if ( in_array( $meta_verb, array( 'add', 'update', 'set', 'delete' ), true ) ) { |
| 194 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 195 |
'security_blocked', |
| 196 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "user meta %s" is blocked. User metadata writes can affect authentication and capabilities.', $meta_verb ) |
| 197 |
); |
| 198 |
} |
| 199 |
} |
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
// 2b-bis. Block administrator-promotion / lockout via role and cap |
| 202 |
// commands. Non-admin role changes (e.g. add-role <id> editor) are |
| 203 |
// allowed through to dispatch_native; only grants/removals of admin- |
| 204 |
// class roles and capabilities are refused here. |
| 205 |
if ( 'user' === $base_command |
| 206 |
&& in_array( $sub_command, array( 'add-role', 'remove-role', 'set-role' ), true ) ) { |
| 207 |
$role_arg = strtolower( $positional[3] ?? '' ); |
| 208 |
$high_risk_roles = array( 'administrator', 'super-admin' ); |
| 209 |
if ( '' !== $role_arg && in_array( $role_arg, $high_risk_roles, true ) ) { |
| 210 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 211 |
'security_blocked', |
| 212 |
sprintf( |
| 213 |
'Security policy: `wp user %s <id> %s` is blocked. Promoting or demoting administrators must be done from wp-admin → Users.', |
| 214 |
$sub_command, |
| 215 |
$role_arg |
| 216 |
) |
| 217 |
); |
| 218 |
} |
| 219 |
} |
| 220 |
|
| 221 |
if ( 'user' === $base_command |
| 222 |
&& in_array( $sub_command, array( 'add-cap', 'remove-cap' ), true ) ) { |
| 223 |
$cap_arg = strtolower( $positional[3] ?? '' ); |
| 224 |
// Admin-class capabilities — granting any of these elevates a |
| 225 |
// user to admin in practice; removing manage_options from the |
| 226 |
// only admin can lock out site access. |
| 227 |
$admin_caps = array( |
| 228 |
'manage_options', |
| 229 |
'install_plugins', |
| 230 |
'activate_plugins', |
| 231 |
'delete_plugins', |
| 232 |
'edit_plugins', |
| 233 |
'install_themes', |
| 234 |
'switch_themes', |
| 235 |
'edit_themes', |
| 236 |
'delete_themes', |
| 237 |
'unfiltered_html', |
| 238 |
'create_users', |
| 239 |
'delete_users', |
| 240 |
'edit_users', |
| 241 |
'promote_users', |
| 242 |
'manage_network', |
| 243 |
'manage_sites', |
| 244 |
); |
| 245 |
if ( '' !== $cap_arg && in_array( $cap_arg, $admin_caps, true ) ) { |
| 246 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 247 |
'security_blocked', |
| 248 |
sprintf( |
| 249 |
'Security policy: `wp user %s <id> %s` is blocked. "%s" is an admin-class capability — manage it from wp-admin → Users.', |
| 250 |
$sub_command, |
| 251 |
$cap_arg, |
| 252 |
$cap_arg |
| 253 |
) |
| 254 |
); |
| 255 |
} |
| 256 |
} |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
// 2c. `wp post|comment meta add/update/set/delete/patch` is blocked. |
| 259 |
// Caller-supplied object id + caller-supplied meta key is a generic |
| 260 |
// write primitive equivalent to `option update` — it can target |
| 261 |
// `_edit_lock`, `_thumbnail_id`, theme/plugin private meta, or any |
| 262 |
// custom field. Specific edits route through dedicated abilities. |
| 263 |
if ( in_array( $base_command, array( 'post', 'comment' ), true ) && 'meta' === $sub_command ) { |
| 264 |
$meta_verb = $positional[2] ?? ''; |
| 265 |
if ( in_array( $meta_verb, array( 'add', 'update', 'set', 'delete', 'patch' ), true ) ) { |
| 266 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 267 |
'security_blocked', |
| 268 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "%s meta %s" is blocked. Use a dedicated ability for the specific meta key you need to modify.', $base_command, $meta_verb ) |
| 269 |
); |
| 270 |
} |
| 271 |
} |
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
// 2d. `wp transient set` and `transient patch` are always blocked — |
| 274 |
// caller-supplied key + value is a generic write primitive (same |
| 275 |
// shape as `option update`) that can clobber internal WP transients |
| 276 |
// like `update_plugins`, `update_themes`, session caches, etc. |
| 277 |
if ( 'transient' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'set', 'patch' ), true ) ) { |
| 278 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 279 |
'security_blocked', |
| 280 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI "transient %s" is blocked.', $sub_command ) |
| 281 |
); |
| 282 |
} |
| 283 |
// `wp transient delete` is conditional: |
| 284 |
// - `wp transient delete --expired` ALLOW (safe bulk-cleanup) |
| 285 |
// - `wp transient delete --all` ALLOW (destructive cache flush, approval-gated) |
| 286 |
// - `wp transient delete <key>` BLOCK (specific-key deletion can nuke |
| 287 |
// `update_plugins` and break the WP update system) |
| 288 |
if ( 'transient' === $base_command && 'delete' === $sub_command ) { |
| 289 |
$has_expired_flag = false; |
| 290 |
$has_all_flag = false; |
| 291 |
$has_positional = false; |
| 292 |
foreach ( $args as $arg ) { |
| 293 |
$arg_lower = strtolower( $arg ); |
| 294 |
if ( '--expired' === $arg_lower || str_starts_with( $arg_lower, '--expired=' ) ) { |
| 295 |
$has_expired_flag = true; |
| 296 |
continue; |
| 297 |
} |
| 298 |
if ( '--all' === $arg_lower || str_starts_with( $arg_lower, '--all=' ) ) { |
| 299 |
$has_all_flag = true; |
| 300 |
continue; |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
if ( ! str_starts_with( $arg, '-' ) |
| 303 |
&& 'transient' !== strtolower( $arg ) |
| 304 |
&& 'delete' !== strtolower( $arg ) ) { |
| 305 |
$has_positional = true; |
| 306 |
} |
| 307 |
} |
| 308 |
if ( $has_positional ) { |
| 309 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 310 |
'security_blocked', |
| 311 |
'Security policy: WP-CLI "transient delete <key>" is blocked. Use "transient delete --expired" (safe bulk cleanup) or "transient delete --all" (full cache flush, approval required).' |
| 312 |
); |
| 313 |
} |
| 314 |
if ( ! $has_expired_flag && ! $has_all_flag ) { |
| 315 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 316 |
'security_blocked', |
| 317 |
'Security policy: WP-CLI "transient delete" requires either --expired or --all. Specific-key deletion is blocked.' |
| 318 |
); |
| 319 |
} |
| 320 |
} |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
// 3. Honor DISALLOW_FILE_MODS for install/update/delete on plugin/theme/core. |
| 323 |
$modifying_commands = array( 'plugin', 'theme', 'core' ); |
| 324 |
$modifying_subs = array( 'install', 'update', 'delete' ); |
| 325 |
if ( in_array( $base_command, $modifying_commands, true ) && in_array( $sub_command, $modifying_subs, true ) ) { |
| 326 |
if ( ! wp_is_file_mod_allowed( 'zipai_run_wp_cli_file_mods' ) ) { |
| 327 |
return new \WP_Error( 'security_blocked', 'Security policy: file modifications are disabled on this site (DISALLOW_FILE_MODS or the file_mod_allowed filter).' ); |
| 328 |
} |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
// 4. Block code-execution and path-traversal flags. |
| 332 |
$forbidden_flags = array( '--require', '--exec', '--ssh', '--config', '--path', '--prompt' ); |
| 333 |
foreach ( $args as $arg ) { |
| 334 |
$arg_lower = strtolower( $arg ); |
| 335 |
foreach ( $forbidden_flags as $flag ) { |
| 336 |
if ( $arg_lower === $flag || str_starts_with( $arg_lower, $flag . '=' ) ) { |
| 337 |
return new \WP_Error( 'security_blocked', sprintf( 'Security policy: WP-CLI flag "%s" is blocked.', $flag ) ); |
| 338 |
} |
| 339 |
} |
| 340 |
} |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
// 5. Block post_content replacement — it destroys block markup. |
| 343 |
if ( 'post' === $base_command && in_array( $sub_command, array( 'update', 'create' ), true ) ) { |
| 344 |
foreach ( $args as $arg ) { |
| 345 |
if ( str_starts_with( strtolower( $arg ), '--post_content' ) ) { |
| 346 |
return new \WP_Error( |
| 347 |
'security_blocked', |
| 348 |
sprintf( 'Security policy: "wp post %s --post_content=" is blocked. It replaces the entire post_content with a plain string, destroying all block markup. ', $sub_command ) |
| 349 |
. 'For block edits, use editor__apply_change with the page open in the block editor. ' |
| 350 |
. 'There is no server-side path for editing page content without the editor — ask the user to open the page in the block editor.' |
| 351 |
); |
| 352 |
} |
| 353 |
} |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
return true; |
| 357 |
} |
| 358 |
} |
| 359 |
|
