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<?php |
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/** |
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* The approval screen an administrator sees when a URL-only client asks to |
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* connect (spec 044, FR-031–FR-035, FR-038). |
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* |
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* ## Why this is a front-end page and not a REST route |
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* |
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* A browser returning from wp-login.php carries an authentication cookie but no |
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* REST nonce. Inside REST, core therefore does not treat the visitor as logged |
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* in — so the screen would bounce them to log in again, and again, forever. |
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* Serving it as an ordinary front-end page on `parse_request` is what satisfies |
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* FR-032. The reference implementation documents hitting exactly this. |
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* |
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* @package Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\OAuth |
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*/ |
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|
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namespace Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\OAuth; |
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|
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use Templately\Modules\McpCore\Registry\ToolDescriptor; |
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|
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class ConsentScreen { |
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|
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const NONCE_ACTION = 'templately_mcp_consent'; |
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|
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/** |
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* @param string $client_id |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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private static function nonce_action( string $client_id ): string { |
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return self::NONCE_ACTION . '_' . $client_id; |
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} |
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|
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public static function render(): void { |
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$params = self::request_params(); |
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|
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$client = RecordStore::get_client( (string) ( $params['client_id'] ?? '' ) ); |
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|
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if ( null === $client ) { |
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self::render_error( __( 'Unknown client. Ask the application to register again.', 'templately' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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$redirect_uri = (string) ( $params['redirect_uri'] ?? '' ); |
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|
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// Exact match against a PRE-REGISTERED destination. On mismatch we |
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// redirect NOWHERE — bouncing to an unverified destination is precisely |
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// the open redirect this guards against (FR-034). |
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if ( ! self::redirect_uri_registered( $redirect_uri, (array) $client['redirect_uris'] ) ) { |
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self::render_error( __( 'This application asked to return to an address it did not register.', 'templately' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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$challenge = (string) ( $params['code_challenge'] ?? '' ); |
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$method = (string) ( $params['code_challenge_method'] ?? '' ); |
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|
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// Authentication comes FIRST, before any branch that can redirect off-site. |
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// |
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// Returning a protocol error to the client's registered address is |
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// correct per RFC 6749 — but registration here is public and |
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// unauthenticated, so doing it before the login check turned this page |
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// into an open redirect anyone could aim anywhere: register a client |
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// with redirect_uri https://evil.example/x, hand out a link to |
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// /templately/authorize?...&code_challenge_method=x on the victim's own |
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// domain, and every visitor gets 302'd to the attacker. Now an anonymous |
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// visitor only ever sees a rendered error on this site. |
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if ( ! is_user_logged_in() ) { |
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// Return here afterwards — no loop, because this is not a REST route. |
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wp_safe_redirect( wp_login_url( self::current_url() ) ); |
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exit; |
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} |
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|
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if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) { |
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self::render_error( __( 'Only administrators can approve an agent connection for this site.', 'templately' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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if ( 'S256' !== $method || '' === $challenge ) { |
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self::redirect_error( $redirect_uri, 'invalid_request', (string) ( $params['state'] ?? '' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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// RFC 8707 / MCP: the client names the server it intends to use the |
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// token with. If that is not us, say so here rather than minting a |
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// credential the client will believe is scoped to someone else. |
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if ( ! RecordStore::resource_matches( (string) ( $params['resource'] ?? '' ) ) ) { |
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self::redirect_error( $redirect_uri, 'invalid_target', (string) ( $params['state'] ?? '' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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// Absent an explicit request, grant READ (FR-038). The reference |
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// implementation defaults the other way and silently grants write. |
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$requested = self::requested_level( (string) ( $params['scope'] ?? '' ) ); |
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|
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if ( 'POST' === strtoupper( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ?? 'GET' ) ) ) |
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&& isset( $_POST['templately_mcp_consent_nonce'] ) |
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&& wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['templately_mcp_consent_nonce'] ) ), self::nonce_action( (string) $client['client_id'] ) ) ) { |
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|
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// Explicit refusal. Without this the only way to decline was closing |
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// the tab, which leaves the client waiting on a request that will |
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// never resolve; the protocol expects `access_denied` instead. |
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$decision = isset( $_POST['templately_mcp_decision'] ) |
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? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['templately_mcp_decision'] ) ) |
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: 'approve'; |
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|
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if ( 'approve' !== $decision ) { |
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self::redirect_error( $redirect_uri, 'access_denied', (string) ( $params['state'] ?? '' ) ); |
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} |
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|
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// The approver decides; the client only PROPOSES. Without this the |
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// only way to get full access was for the client to ask for it in |
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// exactly the right way, leaving an administrator who wanted to |
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// grant more (or less) with no control at all. |
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$granted = isset( $_POST['templately_mcp_access'] ) |
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? self::normalize_level( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['templately_mcp_access'] ) ) ) |
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: $requested; |
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|
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$code = RecordStore::create_grant( |
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[ |
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'client_id' => $client['client_id'], |
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'user_id' => get_current_user_id(), |
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'access_level' => $granted, |
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'redirect_uri' => $redirect_uri, |
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'challenge' => $challenge, |
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// The MCP endpoint's canonical URI (audience), not the |
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// issuer — see RecordStore::audience(). |
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'resource' => RecordStore::audience(), |
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'expires_at' => time() + RecordStore::GRANT_TTL, |
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] |
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); |
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|
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// Encoded for the same reason as current_url(): a `state` on the |
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// standard base64 alphabet contains `+`, which travels raw through |
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// add_query_arg and reaches the client decoded as a space — read as |
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// a CSRF mismatch, so the callback is rejected. |
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$target = add_query_arg( |
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array_map( |
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'rawurlencode', |
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array_filter( |
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[ |
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'code' => $code, |
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'state' => (string) ( $params['state'] ?? '' ), |
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// RFC 9207. Lets a client that talks to more than one |
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// authorization server confirm WHICH one answered, which |
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// is the defence against mix-up attacks. A MUST for |
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// clients in the MCP 2026-07-28 revision, and the server |
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// has to emit it for them to check it. |
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'iss' => RecordStore::issuer(), |
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] |
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) |
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), |
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$redirect_uri |
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); |
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|
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// Not wp_safe_redirect: the destination is external by design, but it |
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// was verified above as an exact pre-registered match. |
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// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.SafeRedirect.wp_redirect_wp_redirect -- see above; wp_safe_redirect() would strip every valid OAuth client callback. |
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wp_redirect( $target ); |
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exit; |
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} |
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|
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self::render_form( $client, $requested, $params ); |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* Exact string match — EXCEPT the port for a loopback address. |
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* |
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* RFC 8252 §7.3: "The authorization server MUST allow any port to be |
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* specified at the time of the request for loopback IP redirect URIs, to |
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* accommodate clients that obtain an available ephemeral port from the |
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* operating system at the time of the request." RFC 9700 §2.1 restates the |
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* carve-out: exact matching "except for port numbers in localhost |
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* redirection URIs of native apps". |
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* |
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* Matching the port too meant a desktop agent whose OS handed it a different |
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* ephemeral port than the one it registered with was refused outright. It |
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* worked here only because the clients tested happen to re-register on every |
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* login attempt; one that registers once and reconnects later would not. |
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* |
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* The relaxation is scoped to loopback: any local port is by definition |
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* already the approver's own machine, so it grants no reach an attacker did |
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* not already have. It is NOT applied to https, where the port is part of |
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* the origin. |
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* |
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* @param string $presented |
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* @param array $registered |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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private static function redirect_uri_registered( string $presented, array $registered ): bool { |
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if ( in_array( $presented, $registered, true ) ) { |
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return true; |
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} |
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|
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$parts = wp_parse_url( $presented ); |
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$host = strtolower( trim( (string) ( $parts['host'] ?? '' ), '[]' ) ); |
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|
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if ( 'http' !== strtolower( (string) ( $parts['scheme'] ?? '' ) ) |
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|| ! in_array( $host, [ '127.0.0.1', '::1', 'localhost' ], true ) ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$without_port = static function ( $uri ) { |
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$p = wp_parse_url( $uri ); |
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|
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if ( empty( $p['host'] ) ) { |
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return null; |
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} |
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|
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return strtolower( (string) ( $p['scheme'] ?? '' ) ) . '://' |
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. strtolower( trim( (string) $p['host'], '[]' ) ) |
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. ( $p['path'] ?? '' ) |
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. ( isset( $p['query'] ) ? '?' . $p['query'] : '' ); |
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}; |
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|
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$target = $without_port( $presented ); |
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|
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if ( null === $target ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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foreach ( $registered as $candidate ) { |
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if ( $target === $without_port( (string) $candidate ) ) { |
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return true; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* The access level a client's `scope` parameter asks for. |
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* |
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* `scope` is a SPACE-DELIMITED LIST (RFC 6749 §3.3), not a single value. |
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* This previously compared the whole string against `full`, so a client |
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* asking for everything it could — ChatGPT sends `scope=read full`, which is |
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* both correct and exactly what this server's own discovery document |
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* advertises in `scopes_supported` — matched neither branch and silently |
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* fell through to read-only, with no way for the approver to override it. |
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* |
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* Unrecognised or absent scopes still resolve to READ: least privilege is |
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* the safe default for a value the CLIENT controls (FR-038). Note this is |
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* the opposite default to `Credentials::normalize_level()`, which fails |
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* closed toward full for a level an ADMINISTRATOR typed into the settings |
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* UI — different source of truth, different safe direction. |
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* |
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* @param string $scope |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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private static function requested_level( string $scope ): string { |
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$scopes = preg_split( '/\s+/', trim( $scope ), -1, PREG_SPLIT_NO_EMPTY ); |
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|
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return in_array( ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL, (array) $scopes, true ) |
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? ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL |
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: ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* @param string $level |
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* @return string |
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*/ |
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private static function normalize_level( string $level ): string { |
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return ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL === $level |
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? ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL |
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: ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* @return array |
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*/ |
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private static function request_params(): array { |
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$source = ( 'POST' === strtoupper( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ?? 'GET' ) ) ) ) ? $_POST : $_GET; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification -- read-only parameter collection; the state-changing branch verifies a nonce before acting. |
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$out = []; |
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|
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foreach ( [ 'client_id', 'redirect_uri', 'state', 'scope', 'code_challenge', 'code_challenge_method', 'resource' ] as $key ) { |
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if ( isset( $source[ $key ] ) ) { |
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$out[ $key ] = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $source[ $key ] ) ); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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return $out; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* @param array $client |
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* @param string $requested |
| 280 |
* @param array $params |
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* @return void |
| 282 |
*/ |
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private static function render_form( array $client, string $requested, array $params ): void { |
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$user = wp_get_current_user(); |
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$full = ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL === $requested; |
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|
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self::head( __( 'Approve agent connection', 'templately' ) ); |
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|
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self::brand(); |
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|
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echo '<h1>' . esc_html__( 'Approve agent connection', 'templately' ) . '</h1>'; |
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|
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printf( |
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'<p class="tmpl-lede">%s</p>', |
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esc_html__( 'An application is asking to connect to this site as an AI agent.', 'templately' ) |
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); |
| 297 |
|
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printf( |
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'<div class="tmpl-row"><span class="tmpl-key">%s</span>' |
| 300 |
. '<span class="tmpl-val" data-tlid="mcp-consent-client">%s</span></div>', |
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esc_html__( 'Application', 'templately' ), |
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// Self-reported by the client — untrusted, so escaped. |
| 303 |
esc_html( '' !== $client['client_name'] ? $client['client_name'] : __( 'Unnamed application', 'templately' ) ) |
| 304 |
); |
| 305 |
|
| 306 |
// The destination, shown plainly. MCP requires the authorization screen to |
| 307 |
// display the redirect URI hostname: the application NAME above is |
| 308 |
// self-reported and unverifiable, so where the credential is about to be |
| 309 |
// sent is the only fact on this screen an approver can actually check. |
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$destination = (string) ( $params['redirect_uri'] ?? '' ); |
| 311 |
$host = (string) wp_parse_url( $destination, PHP_URL_HOST ); |
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$loopback = in_array( strtolower( trim( $host, '[]' ) ), [ '127.0.0.1', '::1', 'localhost' ], true ); |
| 313 |
|
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printf( |
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'<div class="tmpl-row"><span class="tmpl-key">%1$s</span>' |
| 316 |
. '<span class="tmpl-val" data-tlid="mcp-consent-destination">%2$s</span></div>', |
| 317 |
esc_html__( 'Returns to', 'templately' ), |
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esc_html( '' !== $host ? $host : $destination ) |
| 319 |
); |
| 320 |
|
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// Loopback means "an application running on the approver's own computer". |
| 322 |
// That is normal for a desktop agent and wrong for anything else, and |
| 323 |
// nothing about the address itself proves which — so say so. |
| 324 |
if ( $loopback ) { |
| 325 |
printf( |
| 326 |
'<p class="tmpl-lede" style="margin:8px 0 0;font-size:12px">%s</p>', |
| 327 |
esc_html__( 'This address is on your own computer — expected for a desktop or command-line agent.', 'templately' ) |
| 328 |
); |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
// Opened HERE, not just around the buttons: the access control below is a |
| 332 |
// form field, so everything from this point must sit inside the form. |
| 333 |
echo '<form method="post" data-tlid="mcp-consent-form">'; |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
// A CONTROL, not a label. The client's `scope` only sets the default — |
| 336 |
// the person approving is the resource owner and decides what is |
| 337 |
// actually granted, without having to reconnect or hand-edit a URL. |
| 338 |
printf( |
| 339 |
'<div class="tmpl-row"><span class="tmpl-key">%1$s</span><span class="tmpl-val">' |
| 340 |
. '<select name="templately_mcp_access" id="templately-mcp-access" class="tmpl-select" data-tlid="mcp-consent-access">' |
| 341 |
. '<option value="%2$s"%4$s>%6$s</option>' |
| 342 |
. '<option value="%3$s"%5$s>%7$s</option>' |
| 343 |
. '</select></span></div>', |
| 344 |
esc_html__( 'Access', 'templately' ), |
| 345 |
esc_attr( ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ ), |
| 346 |
esc_attr( ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL ), |
| 347 |
$full ? '' : ' selected', |
| 348 |
$full ? ' selected' : '', |
| 349 |
esc_html__( 'Read-only', 'templately' ), |
| 350 |
esc_html__( 'Full access', 'templately' ) |
| 351 |
); |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
printf( |
| 354 |
'<div class="tmpl-row"><span class="tmpl-key">%s</span><span class="tmpl-val">%s</span></div>', |
| 355 |
esc_html__( 'Acting as', 'templately' ), |
| 356 |
esc_html( $user->user_login ) |
| 357 |
); |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
printf( |
| 360 |
'<div class="tmpl-row"><span class="tmpl-key">%s</span><span class="tmpl-val">%s</span></div>', |
| 361 |
esc_html__( 'Site', 'templately' ), |
| 362 |
esc_html( (string) wp_parse_url( home_url(), PHP_URL_HOST ) ) |
| 363 |
); |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
// Both consequences are rendered; the one matching the current selection |
| 366 |
// is shown. With scripting off the initially-correct one is already |
| 367 |
// visible, so the screen never misdescribes what it is about to grant. |
| 368 |
printf( |
| 369 |
'<p class="tmpl-lede tmpl-consequence" data-level="%1$s" style="margin:16px 0 0;font-size:13px%2$s">%3$s</p>' |
| 370 |
. '<p class="tmpl-lede tmpl-consequence" data-level="%4$s" style="margin:16px 0 0;font-size:13px%5$s">%6$s</p>', |
| 371 |
esc_attr( ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ ), |
| 372 |
$full ? ';display:none' : '', |
| 373 |
esc_html__( 'This application will be able to browse Templately designs only. It cannot change anything on this site.', 'templately' ), |
| 374 |
esc_attr( ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL ), |
| 375 |
$full ? '' : ';display:none', |
| 376 |
esc_html__( 'This application will be able to browse Templately designs and import them — creating pages, templates and media on this site.', 'templately' ) |
| 377 |
); |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
// Confused-deputy guard: the site cannot tell a genuine request from one a |
| 380 |
// third party talked the user into opening, so it has to say so plainly. |
| 381 |
printf( |
| 382 |
'<div class="tmpl-note" data-tlid="mcp-consent-warning"><span>⚠</span><span>%s</span></div>', |
| 383 |
esc_html__( 'Only approve if you just asked this application to connect. If you did not start this, close this page.', 'templately' ) |
| 384 |
); |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
// Bound to THIS client, so a nonce minted while approving one |
| 387 |
// application cannot be replayed to approve a different one. |
| 388 |
wp_nonce_field( self::nonce_action( $client['client_id'] ), 'templately_mcp_consent_nonce' ); |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
// `resource` included: it is validated on POST as well as GET now, so |
| 391 |
// losing it here would turn an approve into a resource mismatch. |
| 392 |
foreach ( [ 'client_id', 'redirect_uri', 'state', 'scope', 'code_challenge', 'code_challenge_method', 'resource' ] as $key ) { |
| 393 |
printf( |
| 394 |
'<input type="hidden" name="%1$s" value="%2$s" />', |
| 395 |
esc_attr( $key ), |
| 396 |
esc_attr( (string) ( $params[ $key ] ?? '' ) ) |
| 397 |
); |
| 398 |
} |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
printf( |
| 401 |
'<div class="tmpl-actions">' |
| 402 |
. '<button type="submit" name="templately_mcp_decision" value="deny" class="tmpl-btn tmpl-btn-ghost" data-tlid="mcp-consent-deny">%1$s</button>' |
| 403 |
. '<button type="submit" name="templately_mcp_decision" value="approve" class="tmpl-btn tmpl-btn-primary" data-tlid="mcp-consent-approve">%2$s</button>' |
| 404 |
. '</div>', |
| 405 |
esc_html__( 'Cancel', 'templately' ), |
| 406 |
esc_html__( 'Approve', 'templately' ) |
| 407 |
); |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
echo '</form>'; |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
// Keeps the consequence copy honest when the selection changes. Inline |
| 412 |
// and dependency-free so it works on a site with no scripts enqueued. |
| 413 |
echo '<script>(function(){var s=document.getElementById("templately-mcp-access");if(!s)return;' |
| 414 |
. 'function sync(){var v=s.value;Array.prototype.forEach.call(' |
| 415 |
. 'document.querySelectorAll(".tmpl-consequence"),function(p){' |
| 416 |
. 'p.style.display=(p.getAttribute("data-level")===v)?"":"none";});}' |
| 417 |
. 's.addEventListener("change",sync);sync();})();</script>'; |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
self::foot( __( 'Templately · You can revoke this connection at any time from Templately → Settings → AI Agents.', 'templately' ) ); |
| 420 |
} |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
/** |
| 423 |
* @param string $message |
| 424 |
* @return void |
| 425 |
*/ |
| 426 |
private static function render_error( string $message ): void { |
| 427 |
status_header( 400 ); |
| 428 |
self::head( __( 'Connection request refused', 'templately' ) ); |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
self::brand(); |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
echo '<h1>' . esc_html__( 'Connection request refused', 'templately' ) . '</h1>'; |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
printf( |
| 435 |
'<div class="tmpl-error" data-tlid="mcp-consent-error"><span>⚠</span><span>%s</span></div>', |
| 436 |
esc_html( $message ) |
| 437 |
); |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
printf( |
| 440 |
'<p class="tmpl-lede" style="margin-top:16px;font-size:13px">%s</p>', |
| 441 |
esc_html__( 'Nothing was granted and no connection was created. You can close this page.', 'templately' ) |
| 442 |
); |
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
self::foot(); |
| 445 |
} |
| 446 |
|
| 447 |
/** |
| 448 |
* @param string $redirect_uri |
| 449 |
* @param string $error |
| 450 |
* @param string $state |
| 451 |
* @return void |
| 452 |
*/ |
| 453 |
private static function redirect_error( string $redirect_uri, string $error, string $state ): void { |
| 454 |
// Not wp_safe_redirect: RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 requires the error to be delivered |
| 455 |
// to the client's own redirect_uri, which is external by design and was |
| 456 |
// verified against the registration before this is reached. |
| 457 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.SafeRedirect.wp_redirect_wp_redirect -- see above. |
| 458 |
wp_redirect( |
| 459 |
add_query_arg( |
| 460 |
array_map( 'rawurlencode', array_filter( [ 'error' => $error, 'state' => $state ] ) ), |
| 461 |
$redirect_uri |
| 462 |
) |
| 463 |
); |
| 464 |
exit; |
| 465 |
} |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
/** |
| 468 |
* Where to send the visitor back to once they have logged in. |
| 469 |
* |
| 470 |
* Rebuilt from the PARSED parameters — never from `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']`. |
| 471 |
* `sanitize_text_field()` deletes every `%XX` sequence it finds, and |
| 472 |
* REQUEST_URI is still percent-encoded at this point, so filtering it there |
| 473 |
* silently destroys the exact characters a redirect_uri is made of: |
| 474 |
* `http://127.0.0.1:53895/callback/abc` came back as |
| 475 |
* `http127.0.0.153895callbackabc`, which then failed the exact-match check |
| 476 |
* against the registered value with "This application asked to return to an |
| 477 |
* address it did not register." |
| 478 |
* |
| 479 |
* It only ever fired for a visitor who was NOT already logged in — i.e. the |
| 480 |
* ordinary first connection, and never in local testing from an open |
| 481 |
* wp-admin session. Guarded by `tests/e2e/specs/046-mcp-oauth.spec.js`, |
| 482 |
* which deliberately starts from a cold context so the login bounce runs. |
| 483 |
* |
| 484 |
* The parsed values are safe to re-encode: they were sanitized AFTER PHP |
| 485 |
* decoded them, so no percent-encoding remained to be eaten. |
| 486 |
* |
| 487 |
* @return string |
| 488 |
*/ |
| 489 |
private static function current_url(): string { |
| 490 |
// rawurlencode is NOT optional here. add_query_arg() urlencodes only the |
| 491 |
// args ALREADY present in the base URL; the ones passed to it are |
| 492 |
// serialised by build_query() with $urlencode = false, i.e. emitted raw. |
| 493 |
// So an unencoded `&` in a redirect_uri truncates it on the way back |
| 494 |
// (`…/cb?a=1&b=2` returns as `…/cb?a=1`) and a `+` in a base64 `state` |
| 495 |
// decodes to a space — reintroducing the same "address it did not |
| 496 |
// register" failure this method exists to prevent, just by a different |
| 497 |
// route. Verified against add_query_arg directly, not assumed. |
| 498 |
$params = array_map( 'rawurlencode', self::request_params() ); |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
// Preserve the non-pretty entry point for sites without rewrites, where |
| 501 |
// the screen is reached as `/?templately_mcp_authorize=1&…`. |
| 502 |
if ( ! empty( $_GET['templately_mcp_authorize'] ) ) { // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification -- read-only routing check; the state-changing branch verifies a nonce. |
| 503 |
$params['templately_mcp_authorize'] = '1'; |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
return add_query_arg( $params, home_url( '/' ) ); |
| 506 |
} |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
return add_query_arg( $params, home_url( '/templately/authorize' ) ); |
| 509 |
} |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
/** |
| 512 |
* Styles are INLINE and self-contained on purpose. |
| 513 |
* |
| 514 |
* This is a front-end page, not wp-admin, so the admin bundle (and Tailwind |
| 515 |
* with it) is not loaded here — and should not be, for one page. More |
| 516 |
* importantly this screen must render correctly whatever theme is active, |
| 517 |
* including a broken one: it is where a user grants an AI write access to |
| 518 |
* their site, and an unstyled or theme-mangled consent screen is one a |
| 519 |
* careful user is right to distrust. |
| 520 |
* |
| 521 |
* Values mirror the Templately tokens used by the settings UI |
| 522 |
* (#5453fd primary, #1d2939 title, #667085 muted, #eaecf0 border) so the two |
| 523 |
* surfaces read as the same product. |
| 524 |
* |
| 525 |
* @param string $title |
| 526 |
* @return void |
| 527 |
*/ |
| 528 |
private static function head( string $title ): void { |
| 529 |
nocache_headers(); |
| 530 |
header( 'Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8' ); |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
// Must be set HERE. Core's send_frame_options_header() is hooked on |
| 533 |
// admin_init/login_init, and this is deliberately a front-end page, so |
| 534 |
// nothing else protects it. Framed, an attacker who registered their own |
| 535 |
// client (registration is public by design) could overlay this screen and |
| 536 |
// UI-redress the Approve button into granting themselves full access — |
| 537 |
// and the confused-deputy warning below would never be seen. |
| 538 |
header( 'X-Frame-Options: DENY' ); |
| 539 |
header( "Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'" ); |
| 540 |
header( 'Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin' ); |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
$css = ' |
| 543 |
*{box-sizing:border-box;margin:0;padding:0} |
| 544 |
body{font-family:Inter,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif; |
| 545 |
background:#f4f4f5;color:#1d2939;line-height:1.6; |
| 546 |
display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;min-height:100vh;padding:24px} |
| 547 |
.tmpl-card{width:100%;max-width:460px;background:#fff;border:1px solid #eaecf0; |
| 548 |
border-radius:12px;padding:32px;box-shadow:0 1px 3px rgba(16,24,40,.06)} |
| 549 |
.tmpl-brand{margin-bottom:22px;line-height:0} |
| 550 |
.tmpl-brand svg{width:132px;height:auto;display:block} |
| 551 |
.tmpl-brand-text{font-size:12px;font-weight:600;letter-spacing:.08em; |
| 552 |
text-transform:uppercase;color:#5453fd;line-height:1.6} |
| 553 |
h1{font-size:20px;font-weight:600;color:#1d2939;margin-bottom:8px;line-height:1.3} |
| 554 |
.tmpl-lede{font-size:14px;color:#667085;margin-bottom:24px} |
| 555 |
.tmpl-row{display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:16px; |
| 556 |
padding:12px 0;border-top:1px solid #f2f4f7;font-size:14px} |
| 557 |
.tmpl-row:last-of-type{border-bottom:1px solid #f2f4f7} |
| 558 |
.tmpl-key{color:#667085} |
| 559 |
.tmpl-val{color:#1d2939;font-weight:500;text-align:right;word-break:break-word} |
| 560 |
.tmpl-badge{display:inline-block;border-radius:999px;padding:3px 10px; |
| 561 |
font-size:12px;font-weight:500} |
| 562 |
.tmpl-badge-read{background:#f2f4f7;color:#475467} |
| 563 |
.tmpl-badge-full{background:#fef0c7;color:#b54708} |
| 564 |
.tmpl-select{font:inherit;font-size:13px;font-weight:500;color:#1d2939;background:#fff; |
| 565 |
border:1px solid #d0d5dd;border-radius:8px;padding:6px 10px;min-width:140px; |
| 566 |
box-shadow:0 1px 2px rgba(16,24,40,.05);cursor:pointer} |
| 567 |
.tmpl-select:focus{outline:none;border-color:#5453fd;box-shadow:0 0 0 3px rgba(84,83,253,.16)} |
| 568 |
.tmpl-note{display:flex;gap:8px;margin-top:20px;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:8px; |
| 569 |
background:#fffcf5;border:1px solid #fedf89;color:#93370d;font-size:12.5px;line-height:1.55} |
| 570 |
.tmpl-actions{display:flex;gap:10px;margin-top:24px} |
| 571 |
.tmpl-btn{flex:1;display:inline-block;text-align:center;border-radius:8px;padding:11px 16px; |
| 572 |
font-size:14px;font-weight:500;cursor:pointer;border:1px solid transparent; |
| 573 |
font-family:inherit;text-decoration:none;transition:background .15s} |
| 574 |
.tmpl-btn-primary{background:#5453fd;border-color:#5453fd;color:#fff} |
| 575 |
.tmpl-btn-primary:hover{background:#4341e0} |
| 576 |
.tmpl-btn-ghost{background:#fff;border-color:#d0d5dd;color:#344054} |
| 577 |
.tmpl-btn-ghost:hover{background:#f9fafb} |
| 578 |
.tmpl-error{display:flex;gap:10px;padding:14px 16px;border-radius:8px; |
| 579 |
background:#fffbfa;border:1px solid #fda29b;color:#b42318;font-size:14px;line-height:1.55} |
| 580 |
.tmpl-foot{margin-top:20px;font-size:12px;color:#98a2b3;text-align:center} |
| 581 |
'; |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
printf( |
| 584 |
'<!DOCTYPE html><html %1$s><head><meta charset="utf-8">' |
| 585 |
. '<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">' |
| 586 |
. '<meta name="robots" content="noindex,nofollow">' |
| 587 |
. '<title>%2$s</title><style>%3$s</style></head><body><div class="tmpl-card">', |
| 588 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.EscapeOutput.OutputNotEscaped -- WP core builds this attribute string itself; there is no escaping function for it. |
| 589 |
get_language_attributes(), |
| 590 |
esc_html( $title ), |
| 591 |
$css // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.EscapeOutput.OutputNotEscaped -- static stylesheet, no dynamic input. |
| 592 |
); |
| 593 |
} |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
/** |
| 596 |
* The Templately lockup, inlined. |
| 597 |
* |
| 598 |
* Read from the shipped asset rather than pasted into PHP so a brand update |
| 599 |
* propagates on its own, and INLINED rather than linked because this page |
| 600 |
* must render standalone — an <img> that 404s on a misconfigured site would |
| 601 |
* leave the consent screen looking broken, which is the one impression it |
| 602 |
* cannot afford. Falls back to the wordmark as text if the file is missing. |
| 603 |
* |
| 604 |
* @return void |
| 605 |
*/ |
| 606 |
private static function brand(): void { |
| 607 |
$svg = defined( 'TEMPLATELY_PATH' ) |
| 608 |
? TEMPLATELY_PATH . 'assets/images/logos/logo-full.svg' |
| 609 |
: ''; |
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
if ( '' !== $svg && is_readable( $svg ) ) { |
| 612 |
$markup = file_get_contents( $svg ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.AlternativeFunctions.file_get_contents_file_get_contents -- local plugin asset, not a remote fetch. |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
if ( is_string( $markup ) && 0 === strpos( ltrim( $markup ), '<svg' ) ) { |
| 615 |
printf( |
| 616 |
'<div class="tmpl-brand" role="img" aria-label="%s">%s</div>', |
| 617 |
esc_attr__( 'Templately', 'templately' ), |
| 618 |
$markup // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.EscapeOutput.OutputNotEscaped -- first-party asset shipped with the plugin. |
| 619 |
); |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
return; |
| 622 |
} |
| 623 |
} |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
printf( '<div class="tmpl-brand tmpl-brand-text">%s</div>', esc_html__( 'Templately', 'templately' ) ); |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
/** |
| 629 |
* @param string $note Footer line. Empty on screens where the default |
| 630 |
* "you can revoke this later" would be untrue — nothing |
| 631 |
* is created on the error path. |
| 632 |
* @return void |
| 633 |
*/ |
| 634 |
private static function foot( string $note = '' ): void { |
| 635 |
if ( '' !== $note ) { |
| 636 |
printf( '<div class="tmpl-foot">%s</div>', esc_html( $note ) ); |
| 637 |
} |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
echo '</div></body></html>'; |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
exit; |
| 642 |
} |
| 643 |
} |
| 644 |
|
