| 1 |
<?php |
| 2 |
/** |
| 3 |
* Delegated approval for clients that hold only a site address (spec 044, |
| 4 |
* FR-028–FR-039). |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Some hosted agent clients accept a URL and nothing else — no field to paste a |
| 7 |
* credential into. This lets them obtain one without the administrator ever |
| 8 |
* handling a secret. |
| 9 |
* |
| 10 |
* @package Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\OAuth |
| 11 |
*/ |
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|
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namespace Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\OAuth; |
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|
| 15 |
use Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\Credentials; |
| 16 |
use Templately\Modules\McpServer\Auth\FailedAuthLimiter; |
| 17 |
use Templately\Modules\McpCore\Registry\ToolDescriptor; |
| 18 |
use Templately\Modules\McpServer\Server\HttpTransport; |
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use WP_Error; |
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use WP_REST_Request; |
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use WP_REST_Response; |
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|
| 23 |
class OAuthServer { |
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|
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/** |
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* Registration input bounds. The endpoint is unauthenticated by design |
| 27 |
* (RFC 7591 §5 accepts that and asks the server to "take appropriate steps |
| 28 |
* to mitigate"), so every field it persists has to be bounded. |
| 29 |
*/ |
| 30 |
const MAX_REDIRECT_URIS = 5; |
| 31 |
const MAX_REDIRECT_URI_LENGTH = 512; |
| 32 |
const MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LENGTH = 128; |
| 33 |
|
| 34 |
public static function register_routes(): void { |
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register_rest_route( |
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HttpTransport::NAMESPACE, |
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'/mcp/oauth/register', |
| 38 |
[ |
| 39 |
'methods' => 'POST', |
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'callback' => [ self::class, 'handle_register' ], |
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'permission_callback' => '__return_true', |
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] |
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); |
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|
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register_rest_route( |
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HttpTransport::NAMESPACE, |
| 47 |
'/mcp/oauth/token', |
| 48 |
[ |
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'methods' => 'POST', |
| 50 |
'callback' => [ self::class, 'handle_token' ], |
| 51 |
'permission_callback' => '__return_true', |
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] |
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); |
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} |
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|
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// ----------------------------------------------------------- discovery |
| 57 |
|
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/** |
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* Serve a discovery document. |
| 60 |
* |
| 61 |
* Only served when the site actually holds connection state, and passed |
| 62 |
* through a filter so another plugin or site owner can decline (FR-043). An |
| 63 |
* unconfigured site stays transparent to other OAuth-serving plugins — the |
| 64 |
* reference implementation serves unconditionally and wins by rewrite |
| 65 |
* priority regardless of which plugin the request was for. |
| 66 |
* |
| 67 |
* @param string $which |
| 68 |
* @return void |
| 69 |
*/ |
| 70 |
public static function serve_discovery( string $which ): void { |
| 71 |
if ( ! Credentials::site_has_any() ) { |
| 72 |
return; |
| 73 |
} |
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|
| 75 |
if ( ! apply_filters( 'templately_mcp_serve_wellknown', true, $which ) ) { |
| 76 |
return; |
| 77 |
} |
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|
| 79 |
$document = ( 'authorization-server' === $which ) |
| 80 |
? self::authorization_server_metadata() |
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: self::protected_resource_metadata(); |
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|
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status_header( 200 ); |
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header( 'Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8' ); |
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header( 'Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600' ); |
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|
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echo wp_json_encode( $document ); |
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|
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exit; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* @return array |
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*/ |
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public static function protected_resource_metadata(): array { |
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return [ |
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'resource' => rest_url( HttpTransport::NAMESPACE . '/mcp' ), |
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'authorization_servers' => [ RecordStore::issuer() ], |
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// Advertised here too, not only on the authorization server: it is |
| 100 |
// what tells a client the levels it may ask for. Without it a client |
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// guesses — and a guess that does not include `full` silently gets a |
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// read-only connection. |
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'scopes_supported' => [ ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ, ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL ], |
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'bearer_methods_supported' => [ 'header' ], |
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]; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* @return array |
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*/ |
| 111 |
public static function authorization_server_metadata(): array { |
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return [ |
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'issuer' => RecordStore::issuer(), |
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'authorization_endpoint' => home_url( '/templately/authorize' ), |
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'token_endpoint' => rest_url( HttpTransport::NAMESPACE . '/mcp/oauth/token' ), |
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'registration_endpoint' => rest_url( HttpTransport::NAMESPACE . '/mcp/oauth/register' ), |
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'response_types_supported' => [ 'code' ], |
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'grant_types_supported' => [ 'authorization_code', 'refresh_token' ], |
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'code_challenge_methods_supported' => [ 'S256' ], |
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'token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported' => [ 'none' ], |
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'scopes_supported' => [ ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_READ, ToolDescriptor::ACCESS_FULL ], |
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]; |
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} |
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|
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// -------------------------------------------------------- registration |
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|
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/** |
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* @param WP_REST_Request $request |
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* @return WP_REST_Response |
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*/ |
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public static function handle_register( WP_REST_Request $request ) { |
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if ( FailedAuthLimiter::is_locked( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ) ) { |
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return self::error_response( 'too_many_requests', __( 'Too many requests.', 'templately' ), 429 ); |
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} |
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|
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$body = json_decode( $request->get_body(), true ); |
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$body = is_array( $body ) ? $body : []; |
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|
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$uris = isset( $body['redirect_uris'] ) && is_array( $body['redirect_uris'] ) ? $body['redirect_uris'] : []; |
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|
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// Bounded BEFORE validation. This endpoint is unauthenticated by design, |
| 142 |
// and nothing previously capped the number of URIs, their length, or the |
| 143 |
// client name — so a single request could persist a row the size of |
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// post_max_size, and nothing stopped an attacker repeating it. See |
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// create_client() for the matching expiry that lets the sweep reclaim it. |
| 146 |
$uris = array_slice( array_map( 'strval', $uris ), 0, self::MAX_REDIRECT_URIS ); |
| 147 |
$uris = array_values( |
| 148 |
array_filter( |
| 149 |
$uris, |
| 150 |
static function ( $uri ) { |
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return strlen( $uri ) <= self::MAX_REDIRECT_URI_LENGTH |
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&& self::is_allowed_redirect_uri( $uri ); |
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} |
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) |
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); |
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|
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if ( empty( $uris ) ) { |
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// Counts against the limiter so registration cannot be used to |
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// enumerate or to fill storage (FR-030). |
| 160 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
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|
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return self::error_response( |
| 163 |
'invalid_redirect_uri', |
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__( 'At least one https (or loopback http) redirect_uri is required.', 'templately' ), |
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400 |
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); |
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} |
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|
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// A SUCCESSFUL registration also counts — against its own generous QUOTA, |
| 170 |
// not the strike bucket. Charging only failures left the well-formed |
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// case completely unthrottled (the case an attacker filling the database |
| 172 |
// would use); charging it to the strike bucket locked legitimate users |
| 173 |
// out after a handful of ordinary reconnections. |
| 174 |
if ( FailedAuthLimiter::is_locked( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_REGISTER ) ) { |
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return self::error_response( 'too_many_requests', __( 'Too many client registrations.', 'templately' ), 429 ); |
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} |
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|
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FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_REGISTER ); |
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|
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$name = isset( $body['client_name'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( (string) $body['client_name'] ) : ''; |
| 181 |
$name = function_exists( 'mb_substr' ) |
| 182 |
? mb_substr( $name, 0, self::MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LENGTH ) |
| 183 |
: substr( $name, 0, self::MAX_CLIENT_NAME_LENGTH ); |
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$client = RecordStore::create_client( $name, $uris ); |
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|
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$response = new WP_REST_Response( |
| 187 |
[ |
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'client_id' => $client['client_id'], |
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'client_name' => $client['client_name'], |
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'redirect_uris' => $client['redirect_uris'], |
| 191 |
'token_endpoint_auth_method' => 'none', |
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], |
| 193 |
201 |
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); |
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|
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$response->header( 'Cache-Control', 'no-store' ); |
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|
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return $response; |
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} |
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|
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/** |
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* https, or http ONLY for loopback (FR-035). The reference implementation |
| 203 |
* accepts any scheme matching a generic pattern, including `javascript:`. |
| 204 |
* |
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* @param string $uri |
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* @return bool |
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*/ |
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public static function is_allowed_redirect_uri( string $uri ): bool { |
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$parts = wp_parse_url( $uri ); |
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|
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if ( empty( $parts['scheme'] ) || empty( $parts['host'] ) ) { |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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$scheme = strtolower( $parts['scheme'] ); |
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$host = strtolower( $parts['host'] ); |
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|
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if ( 'https' === $scheme ) { |
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return true; |
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} |
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|
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// wp_parse_url() returns an IPv6 host WITH its brackets ("[::1]"), and |
| 223 |
// brackets are the only syntactically valid way to write an IPv6 URI — |
| 224 |
// so matching the bare "::1" alone could never succeed. Strip them. |
| 225 |
$host = trim( $host, '[]' ); |
| 226 |
|
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return 'http' === $scheme && in_array( $host, [ '127.0.0.1', '::1', 'localhost' ], true ); |
| 228 |
} |
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|
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// -------------------------------------------------------------- token |
| 231 |
|
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/** |
| 233 |
* @param WP_REST_Request $request |
| 234 |
* @return WP_REST_Response |
| 235 |
*/ |
| 236 |
public static function handle_token( WP_REST_Request $request ) { |
| 237 |
if ( FailedAuthLimiter::is_locked( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ) ) { |
| 238 |
return self::error_response( 'too_many_requests', __( 'Too many requests.', 'templately' ), 429 ); |
| 239 |
} |
| 240 |
|
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$params = $request->get_params(); |
| 242 |
$grant_type = isset( $params['grant_type'] ) ? (string) $params['grant_type'] : ''; |
| 243 |
|
| 244 |
if ( 'authorization_code' === $grant_type ) { |
| 245 |
return self::grant_authorization_code( $params ); |
| 246 |
} |
| 247 |
|
| 248 |
if ( 'refresh_token' === $grant_type ) { |
| 249 |
return self::grant_refresh_token( $params ); |
| 250 |
} |
| 251 |
|
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return self::error_response( 'unsupported_grant_type', __( 'Unsupported grant type.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 253 |
} |
| 254 |
|
| 255 |
/** |
| 256 |
* @param array $params |
| 257 |
* @return WP_REST_Response |
| 258 |
*/ |
| 259 |
private static function grant_authorization_code( array $params ): WP_REST_Response { |
| 260 |
$code = isset( $params['code'] ) ? (string) $params['code'] : ''; |
| 261 |
|
| 262 |
// Consumed (and deleted) BEFORE verification — see RecordStore::consume_grant(). |
| 263 |
$grant = RecordStore::consume_grant( $code ); |
| 264 |
|
| 265 |
if ( null === $grant ) { |
| 266 |
// A code that was already spent: deny (MUST) and revoke everything |
| 267 |
// issued from it (RFC 6749 §4.1.2 SHOULD), since a replay means the |
| 268 |
// code reached someone it should not have. |
| 269 |
$chain = RecordStore::spent_chain( $code ); |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
if ( '' !== $chain ) { |
| 272 |
RecordStore::revoke_chain( $chain ); |
| 273 |
} |
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
| 276 |
|
| 277 |
return self::error_response( 'invalid_grant', __( 'Invalid or expired authorization code.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 278 |
} |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
$client_id = isset( $params['client_id'] ) ? (string) $params['client_id'] : ''; |
| 281 |
$redirect_uri = isset( $params['redirect_uri'] ) ? (string) $params['redirect_uri'] : ''; |
| 282 |
$verifier = isset( $params['code_verifier'] ) ? (string) $params['code_verifier'] : ''; |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
if ( ! hash_equals( (string) $grant['client_id'], $client_id ) |
| 285 |
|| ! hash_equals( (string) $grant['redirect_uri'], $redirect_uri ) ) { |
| 286 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
return self::error_response( 'invalid_grant', __( 'Grant does not match this client.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 289 |
} |
| 290 |
|
| 291 |
// Proof that the client completing the exchange is the one that began it. |
| 292 |
if ( '' === $verifier || ! hash_equals( (string) $grant['challenge'], self::s256( $verifier ) ) ) { |
| 293 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
| 294 |
|
| 295 |
return self::error_response( 'invalid_grant', __( 'Proof of origination failed.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 296 |
} |
| 297 |
|
| 298 |
// RFC 8707 §2: refuse to mint a token for a resource that is not ours, |
| 299 |
// rather than issuing one the client will believe is scoped elsewhere. |
| 300 |
$requested_resource = isset( $params['resource'] ) ? (string) $params['resource'] : ''; |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
if ( ! RecordStore::resource_matches( $requested_resource ) ) { |
| 303 |
return self::error_response( |
| 304 |
'invalid_target', |
| 305 |
__( 'This server does not issue tokens for that resource.', 'templately' ), |
| 306 |
400 |
| 307 |
); |
| 308 |
} |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
$chain = RecordStore::new_chain(); |
| 311 |
|
| 312 |
// Tombstone the code under the SAME chain as the tokens it produces, so |
| 313 |
// a later replay of this code can revoke them. |
| 314 |
RecordStore::tombstone_refresh( hash( 'sha256', $code ), $chain, RecordStore::REFRESH_TTL ); |
| 315 |
|
| 316 |
return self::issue_tokens( |
| 317 |
(string) $grant['client_id'], |
| 318 |
(int) $grant['user_id'], |
| 319 |
(string) $grant['access_level'], |
| 320 |
$chain |
| 321 |
); |
| 322 |
} |
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
/** |
| 325 |
* Rotation: the prior refresh token AND its paired access token are |
| 326 |
* invalidated before new ones are issued (FR-036). |
| 327 |
* |
| 328 |
* @param array $params |
| 329 |
* @return WP_REST_Response |
| 330 |
*/ |
| 331 |
private static function grant_refresh_token( array $params ): WP_REST_Response { |
| 332 |
$secret = isset( $params['refresh_token'] ) ? (string) $params['refresh_token'] : ''; |
| 333 |
$refresh = RecordStore::find_refresh_token( $secret ); |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
if ( null === $refresh ) { |
| 336 |
// REPLAY DETECTION. A token we no longer hold but have a tombstone |
| 337 |
// for was already spent — so either it leaked and the thief is using |
| 338 |
// it, or the legitimate client is retrying with a token the thief |
| 339 |
// already burned. The server cannot tell which, and OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1 |
| 340 |
// answers that by revoking the whole grant chain: the attacker is |
| 341 |
// stopped, at the cost of making the honest client re-authorize. |
| 342 |
// |
| 343 |
// Without this, rotation was cosmetic — whoever redeemed a stolen |
| 344 |
// token first simply kept the connection, and the real client's |
| 345 |
// failure looked like an ordinary expiry. |
| 346 |
$chain = RecordStore::spent_chain( $secret ); |
| 347 |
|
| 348 |
if ( '' !== $chain ) { |
| 349 |
RecordStore::revoke_chain( $chain ); |
| 350 |
|
| 351 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
return self::error_response( |
| 354 |
'invalid_grant', |
| 355 |
__( 'This refresh token has already been used. The connection has been revoked; reconnect to continue.', 'templately' ), |
| 356 |
400 |
| 357 |
); |
| 358 |
} |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
FailedAuthLimiter::record_failure( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ); |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
return self::error_response( 'invalid_grant', __( 'Invalid or expired refresh token.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 363 |
} |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
// RFC 8707 §2.2: on a refresh, the requested resource must stay within |
| 366 |
// what was originally granted. |
| 367 |
$requested_resource = isset( $params['resource'] ) ? (string) $params['resource'] : ''; |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
if ( ! RecordStore::resource_matches( $requested_resource ) ) { |
| 370 |
return self::error_response( |
| 371 |
'invalid_target', |
| 372 |
__( 'This server does not issue tokens for that resource.', 'templately' ), |
| 373 |
400 |
| 374 |
); |
| 375 |
} |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
// Spend it. The DELETE inside arbitrates concurrent refreshes: exactly |
| 378 |
// one caller may proceed, where find-then-delete let both mint a pair. |
| 379 |
$refresh = RecordStore::consume_refresh_token( $secret ); |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
if ( null === $refresh ) { |
| 382 |
return self::error_response( 'invalid_grant', __( 'Invalid or expired refresh token.', 'templately' ), 400 ); |
| 383 |
} |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
$chain = (string) ( $refresh['chain'] ?? '' ); |
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
if ( ! empty( $refresh['paired_access'] ) ) { |
| 388 |
// delete_option alone left the index pointing at a deleted row on |
| 389 |
// every rotation. Harmless in isolation, but the index is what |
| 390 |
// has_any() reads, so the debris kept the site looking connected. |
| 391 |
RecordStore::delete_token_by_hash( (string) $refresh['paired_access'] ); |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
// Tombstone for the lifetime the token would have had, so a replay |
| 395 |
// within its original validity window is still recognised as reuse. |
| 396 |
RecordStore::tombstone_refresh( hash( 'sha256', $secret ), $chain, RecordStore::REFRESH_TTL ); |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
return self::issue_tokens( |
| 399 |
(string) $refresh['client_id'], |
| 400 |
(int) $refresh['user_id'], |
| 401 |
(string) $refresh['access_level'], |
| 402 |
$chain |
| 403 |
); |
| 404 |
} |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
/** |
| 407 |
* @param string $client_id |
| 408 |
* @param int $user_id |
| 409 |
* @param string $access_level |
| 410 |
* @return WP_REST_Response |
| 411 |
*/ |
| 412 |
private static function issue_tokens( string $client_id, int $user_id, string $access_level, string $chain = '' ): WP_REST_Response { |
| 413 |
$level = Credentials::normalize_level( $access_level ); |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
// One chain id per authorization grant, carried forward across every |
| 416 |
// rotation, so a reuse detected at any point can revoke the lot. |
| 417 |
$chain = '' !== $chain ? $chain : RecordStore::new_chain(); |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
$access = RecordStore::create_token( |
| 420 |
[ |
| 421 |
'type' => 'access', |
| 422 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 423 |
'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 424 |
'access_level' => $level, |
| 425 |
// The MCP endpoint's canonical URI, NOT the issuer — see |
| 426 |
// RecordStore::audience(). |
| 427 |
'resource' => RecordStore::audience(), |
| 428 |
'chain' => $chain, |
| 429 |
], |
| 430 |
RecordStore::ACCESS_TTL |
| 431 |
); |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
$refresh = RecordStore::create_token( |
| 434 |
[ |
| 435 |
'type' => 'refresh', |
| 436 |
'client_id' => $client_id, |
| 437 |
'user_id' => $user_id, |
| 438 |
'access_level' => $level, |
| 439 |
'resource' => RecordStore::audience(), |
| 440 |
'chain' => $chain, |
| 441 |
'paired_access' => hash( 'sha256', $access ), |
| 442 |
], |
| 443 |
RecordStore::REFRESH_TTL |
| 444 |
); |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
$response = new WP_REST_Response( |
| 447 |
[ |
| 448 |
'access_token' => $access, |
| 449 |
'token_type' => 'Bearer', |
| 450 |
'expires_in' => RecordStore::ACCESS_TTL, |
| 451 |
'refresh_token' => $refresh, |
| 452 |
'scope' => $level, |
| 453 |
], |
| 454 |
200 |
| 455 |
); |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
$response->header( 'Cache-Control', 'no-store' ); |
| 458 |
$response->header( 'Pragma', 'no-cache' ); |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
return $response; |
| 461 |
} |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
/** |
| 464 |
* @param string $verifier |
| 465 |
* @return string |
| 466 |
*/ |
| 467 |
public static function s256( string $verifier ): string { |
| 468 |
return rtrim( strtr( base64_encode( hash( 'sha256', $verifier, true ) ), '+/', '-_' ), '=' ); |
| 469 |
} |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
/** |
| 472 |
* @param string $code |
| 473 |
* @param string $message |
| 474 |
* @param int $status |
| 475 |
* @return WP_REST_Response |
| 476 |
*/ |
| 477 |
private static function error_response( string $code, string $message, int $status ): WP_REST_Response { |
| 478 |
$response = new WP_REST_Response( |
| 479 |
[ |
| 480 |
'error' => $code, |
| 481 |
'error_description' => $message, |
| 482 |
], |
| 483 |
$status |
| 484 |
); |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
$response->header( 'Cache-Control', 'no-store' ); |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
if ( 429 === $status ) { |
| 489 |
$response->header( 'Retry-After', (string) FailedAuthLimiter::retry_after( FailedAuthLimiter::BUCKET_OAUTH ) ); |
| 490 |
} |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
return $response; |
| 493 |
} |
| 494 |
} |
| 495 |
|
