| 1 |
<?php |
| 2 |
/** |
| 3 |
* Under Attack Mode |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* Emergency mode with JavaScript challenge and aggressive restrictions. |
| 6 |
* Temporarily blocks automated traffic while allowing real browsers through. |
| 7 |
* |
| 8 |
* @package Vigilante |
| 9 |
*/ |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
// Prevent direct access |
| 12 |
if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { |
| 13 |
exit; |
| 14 |
} |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
/** |
| 17 |
* Class Vigilante_Under_Attack |
| 18 |
* |
| 19 |
* Provides temporary emergency protection against active attacks |
| 20 |
*/ |
| 21 |
class Vigilante_Under_Attack { |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
/** |
| 24 |
* Option name for Under Attack mode state |
| 25 |
*/ |
| 26 |
const OPTION_NAME = 'vigilante_under_attack_mode'; |
| 27 |
|
| 28 |
/** |
| 29 |
* Cookie name for JS challenge verification |
| 30 |
*/ |
| 31 |
const COOKIE_NAME = 'vigilante_ua_verified'; |
| 32 |
|
| 33 |
/** |
| 34 |
* Default duration in seconds (4 hours) |
| 35 |
*/ |
| 36 |
const DEFAULT_DURATION = 14400; |
| 37 |
|
| 38 |
/** |
| 39 |
* Challenge difficulty (number of leading zeros in hash) |
| 40 |
*/ |
| 41 |
const CHALLENGE_DIFFICULTY = 4; |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
/** |
| 44 |
* Challenge token lifetime in seconds (15 minutes). |
| 45 |
* |
| 46 |
* Long enough to tolerate slow Proof-of-Work on weak CPUs and short tab |
| 47 |
* idle, but short enough that a token copied from an old page is useless. |
| 48 |
*/ |
| 49 |
const NONCE_TTL = 900; |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
/** |
| 52 |
* Requests per minute per address while the mode is active |
| 53 |
*/ |
| 54 |
const RATE_LIMIT = 30; |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
/** |
| 57 |
* Requests per minute for a visitor who passed the challenge |
| 58 |
* |
| 59 |
* Ten times the aggressive limit: far above what a person browsing sends |
| 60 |
* through WordPress, far below a flood. |
| 61 |
* |
| 62 |
* @since 2.11.8 |
| 63 |
*/ |
| 64 |
const VERIFIED_RATE_LIMIT = 300; |
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
/** |
| 67 |
* .htaccess block markers for cache bypass |
| 68 |
*/ |
| 69 |
const HTACCESS_MARKER_START = '# BEGIN Vigilante Under Attack'; |
| 70 |
const HTACCESS_MARKER_END = '# END Vigilante Under Attack'; |
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
/** |
| 73 |
* Settings instance |
| 74 |
* |
| 75 |
* @var Vigilante_Settings |
| 76 |
*/ |
| 77 |
private $settings; |
| 78 |
|
| 79 |
/** |
| 80 |
* Activity log instance |
| 81 |
* |
| 82 |
* @var Vigilante_Activity_Log |
| 83 |
*/ |
| 84 |
private $activity_log; |
| 85 |
|
| 86 |
/** |
| 87 |
* Cached mode status |
| 88 |
* |
| 89 |
* @var array|null |
| 90 |
*/ |
| 91 |
private $status = null; |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
/** |
| 94 |
* Constructor |
| 95 |
* |
| 96 |
* Hooks are registered on wp_loaded/template_redirect to avoid |
| 97 |
* the init-within-init timing issue where callbacks registered |
| 98 |
* during init execution are silently skipped by WordPress. |
| 99 |
* |
| 100 |
* @param Vigilante_Settings $settings Settings instance. |
| 101 |
* @param Vigilante_Activity_Log $activity_log Activity log instance. |
| 102 |
*/ |
| 103 |
public function __construct( $settings, $activity_log ) { |
| 104 |
$this->settings = $settings; |
| 105 |
$this->activity_log = $activity_log; |
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
// Apply restrictions when active (is_active() auto-deactivates if expired) |
| 108 |
if ( $this->is_active() ) { |
| 109 |
// JS challenge for frontend visitors + challenge response handler |
| 110 |
add_action( 'template_redirect', array( $this, 'maybe_serve_challenge' ), 1 ); |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
// Override rate limiting to aggressive values. Verified visitors get a |
| 113 |
// higher limit from the same filter, not an exemption. |
| 114 |
add_filter( 'vigilante_rate_limit_requests', array( $this, 'aggressive_rate_limit' ) ); |
| 115 |
add_filter( 'vigilante_rate_limit_duration', array( $this, 'aggressive_block_duration' ) ); |
| 116 |
add_filter( 'vigilante_rate_limit_key', array( $this, 'verified_rate_limit_key' ) ); |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
// Block restricted HTTP methods and empty user agents (wp_loaded fires after init) |
| 119 |
add_action( 'wp_loaded', array( $this, 'restrict_http_methods' ) ); |
| 120 |
add_action( 'wp_loaded', array( $this, 'block_empty_user_agent' ) ); |
| 121 |
|
| 122 |
// Block XML-RPC completely |
| 123 |
add_filter( 'xmlrpc_enabled', '__return_false' ); |
| 124 |
add_filter( 'xmlrpc_methods', '__return_empty_array' ); |
| 125 |
|
| 126 |
// Restrict REST API to authenticated users only at the network layer. |
| 127 |
// (vigilante_options is also forced to authenticated_only via the snapshot, |
| 128 |
// but this filter is stricter — it doesn't allow the public endpoints |
| 129 |
// that the regular module's "selective" mode exposes.) |
| 130 |
add_filter( 'rest_authentication_errors', array( $this, 'restrict_rest_api' ), 99 ); |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
// Pause new user registrations regardless of WP core setting. |
| 133 |
add_filter( 'pre_option_users_can_register', '__return_zero' ); |
| 134 |
|
| 135 |
// Force every new comment to moderation queue. |
| 136 |
add_filter( 'pre_comment_approved', array( $this, 'force_comment_moderation' ), 99 ); |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
// Tell caching plugins to stop serving cached pages |
| 139 |
$this->send_nocache_headers_for_plugins(); |
| 140 |
} |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
/** |
| 144 |
* Check if Under Attack mode is currently active |
| 145 |
* |
| 146 |
* Self-correcting: if the mode has expired, it deactivates automatically |
| 147 |
* and returns false. This replaces the old check_expiration hook that |
| 148 |
* never fired due to the init-within-init timing issue. |
| 149 |
* |
| 150 |
* @return bool |
| 151 |
*/ |
| 152 |
public function is_active() { |
| 153 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 154 |
|
| 155 |
if ( empty( $status['active'] ) ) { |
| 156 |
return false; |
| 157 |
} |
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
// Auto-deactivate if expired |
| 160 |
$expires_at = ( $status['activated_at'] ?? 0 ) + ( $status['duration'] ?? 0 ); |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
if ( $expires_at <= time() ) { |
| 163 |
$this->deactivate( 'expired' ); |
| 164 |
return false; |
| 165 |
} |
| 166 |
|
| 167 |
return true; |
| 168 |
} |
| 169 |
|
| 170 |
/** |
| 171 |
* Get current mode status |
| 172 |
* |
| 173 |
* @return array Status array with keys: active, activated_at, duration, secret. |
| 174 |
*/ |
| 175 |
public function get_status() { |
| 176 |
if ( null === $this->status ) { |
| 177 |
$this->status = get_option( self::OPTION_NAME, array( |
| 178 |
'active' => false, |
| 179 |
'activated_at' => 0, |
| 180 |
'duration' => self::DEFAULT_DURATION, |
| 181 |
'secret' => '', |
| 182 |
'previous_options' => null, |
| 183 |
'previous_preset' => null, |
| 184 |
) ); |
| 185 |
} |
| 186 |
return $this->status; |
| 187 |
} |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
/** |
| 190 |
* Get remaining time in seconds |
| 191 |
* |
| 192 |
* @return int Seconds remaining, 0 if not active or expired. |
| 193 |
*/ |
| 194 |
public function get_remaining_time() { |
| 195 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
if ( empty( $status['active'] ) || empty( $status['activated_at'] ) ) { |
| 198 |
return 0; |
| 199 |
} |
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
$expires_at = $status['activated_at'] + $status['duration']; |
| 202 |
$remaining = $expires_at - time(); |
| 203 |
|
| 204 |
return max( 0, $remaining ); |
| 205 |
} |
| 206 |
|
| 207 |
/** |
| 208 |
* Activate Under Attack mode |
| 209 |
* |
| 210 |
* @param int $duration Duration in seconds. Default 4 hours. |
| 211 |
* @return bool Success. |
| 212 |
*/ |
| 213 |
public function activate( $duration = 0 ) { |
| 214 |
if ( $duration <= 0 ) { |
| 215 |
$duration = self::DEFAULT_DURATION; |
| 216 |
} |
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
// Snapshot the user's current configuration so we can restore it on |
| 219 |
// deactivate. We snapshot BEFORE applying the hardened config — any |
| 220 |
// changes the user makes to vigilante_options while the mode is active |
| 221 |
// will be reverted when the mode ends. The admin UI shows a banner |
| 222 |
// warning about this. |
| 223 |
$previous_options = get_option( Vigilante_Settings::OPTION_NAME, array() ); |
| 224 |
$previous_preset = get_option( 'vigilante_active_preset', '' ); |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
// Generate a secret for HMAC cookie signing |
| 227 |
$secret = wp_generate_password( 64, true, true ); |
| 228 |
|
| 229 |
$status = array( |
| 230 |
'active' => true, |
| 231 |
'activated_at' => time(), |
| 232 |
'duration' => absint( $duration ), |
| 233 |
'secret' => $secret, |
| 234 |
'previous_options' => $previous_options, |
| 235 |
'previous_preset' => $previous_preset, |
| 236 |
); |
| 237 |
|
| 238 |
$result = update_option( self::OPTION_NAME, $status ); |
| 239 |
$this->status = null; |
| 240 |
|
| 241 |
if ( $result ) { |
| 242 |
// Apply the hardened configuration: Maximum preset + Under Attack overrides. |
| 243 |
$this->apply_hardened_options( $previous_options ); |
| 244 |
|
| 245 |
// Refresh the Security Analyzer score so the dashboard reflects the |
| 246 |
// hardened config instead of the snapshot of the previous one. |
| 247 |
// |
| 248 |
// 1) Run the 'fast' phase synchronously (sub-second, offline checks |
| 249 |
// like filesystem, options, WP version, modules) so the dashboard |
| 250 |
// has at least the cheap checks refreshed when the AJAX returns |
| 251 |
// and the page reloads. |
| 252 |
// 2) Schedule a full ('all') scan in the background to also refresh |
| 253 |
// the slow HTTP-probe checks. The page reload triggers wp-cron, |
| 254 |
// which picks up the one-shot event. |
| 255 |
$this->run_analyzer_scan( 'fast' ); |
| 256 |
if ( ! wp_next_scheduled( 'vigilante_under_attack_post_scan' ) ) { |
| 257 |
wp_schedule_single_event( time() + 5, 'vigilante_under_attack_post_scan' ); |
| 258 |
} |
| 259 |
|
| 260 |
// Cache bypass - best-effort, must not break activation AJAX response |
| 261 |
$this->safe_manage_cache( 'activate' ); |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
if ( $this->activity_log ) { |
| 264 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 265 |
'security', |
| 266 |
'under_attack_activated', |
| 267 |
sprintf( |
| 268 |
/* translators: %s: Duration in hours */ |
| 269 |
__( 'Under Attack mode activated for %s hours', 'vigilante' ), |
| 270 |
round( $duration / 3600, 1 ) |
| 271 |
), |
| 272 |
array( 'duration' => $duration ), |
| 273 |
'warning' |
| 274 |
); |
| 275 |
} |
| 276 |
} |
| 277 |
|
| 278 |
// Send notification email |
| 279 |
$this->send_notification( 'activated', $duration ); |
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
return $result; |
| 282 |
} |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
/** |
| 285 |
* Deactivate Under Attack mode |
| 286 |
* |
| 287 |
* @param string $reason Reason for deactivation. |
| 288 |
* @return bool Success. |
| 289 |
*/ |
| 290 |
public function deactivate( $reason = 'manual' ) { |
| 291 |
// Restore the user's previous configuration BEFORE clearing the snapshot — |
| 292 |
// if the restore fails for any reason we want the snapshot to remain so |
| 293 |
// the next activation can recover. |
| 294 |
$current_status = $this->get_status(); |
| 295 |
$previous_options = $current_status['previous_options'] ?? null; |
| 296 |
$previous_preset = $current_status['previous_preset'] ?? null; |
| 297 |
|
| 298 |
if ( is_array( $previous_options ) && ! empty( $previous_options ) ) { |
| 299 |
$previous_options = $this->keep_file_settings_changed_meanwhile( $previous_options, $current_status ); |
| 300 |
update_option( Vigilante_Settings::OPTION_NAME, $previous_options ); |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
if ( null !== $previous_preset ) { |
| 303 |
if ( '' === $previous_preset ) { |
| 304 |
delete_option( 'vigilante_active_preset' ); |
| 305 |
} else { |
| 306 |
update_option( 'vigilante_active_preset', $previous_preset ); |
| 307 |
} |
| 308 |
} |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
$status = array( |
| 311 |
'active' => false, |
| 312 |
'activated_at' => 0, |
| 313 |
'duration' => self::DEFAULT_DURATION, |
| 314 |
'secret' => '', |
| 315 |
'previous_options' => null, |
| 316 |
'previous_preset' => null, |
| 317 |
); |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
$result = update_option( self::OPTION_NAME, $status ); |
| 320 |
$this->status = null; |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
if ( $result ) { |
| 323 |
// Remove cache bypass rules - best-effort |
| 324 |
$this->safe_manage_cache( 'manual' === $reason ? 'deactivate' : 'deactivate_auto' ); |
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
// Refresh the Security Analyzer with a full scan so the dashboard |
| 327 |
// reflects the restored configuration (including the slow HTTP/header |
| 328 |
// probes that we couldn't run safely while UA was active). Schedule |
| 329 |
// it for ~10 seconds out so the AJAX response returns immediately |
| 330 |
// and the WP cache layer has time to settle. |
| 331 |
if ( ! wp_next_scheduled( 'vigilante_under_attack_post_scan' ) ) { |
| 332 |
wp_schedule_single_event( time() + 10, 'vigilante_under_attack_post_scan' ); |
| 333 |
} |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
if ( $this->activity_log ) { |
| 336 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 337 |
'security', |
| 338 |
'under_attack_deactivated', |
| 339 |
sprintf( |
| 340 |
/* translators: %s: Reason */ |
| 341 |
__( 'Under Attack mode deactivated (%s)', 'vigilante' ), |
| 342 |
$reason |
| 343 |
), |
| 344 |
array( 'reason' => $reason ), |
| 345 |
'info' |
| 346 |
); |
| 347 |
} |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
// Send notification email |
| 351 |
$this->send_notification( 'deactivated' ); |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
return $result; |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
/** |
| 357 |
* Run the Security Analyzer and persist its results. |
| 358 |
* |
| 359 |
* Used by activate() (fast phase only — offline checks) and by the cron |
| 360 |
* hook scheduled at deactivate() (full scan — fast + slow). Lazy-loads the |
| 361 |
* analyzer the same way vigilante.php does for the weekly scan, so the |
| 362 |
* extra classes only get loaded when actually needed. |
| 363 |
* |
| 364 |
* @param string $phase 'fast' | 'slow' | 'all'. |
| 365 |
* @return void |
| 366 |
*/ |
| 367 |
public function run_analyzer_scan( $phase = 'all' ) { |
| 368 |
if ( ! class_exists( 'Vigilante_Security_Analyzer' ) ) { |
| 369 |
$analyzer_file = VIGILANTE_INCLUDES_DIR . 'class-security-analyzer.php'; |
| 370 |
if ( ! file_exists( $analyzer_file ) ) { |
| 371 |
return; |
| 372 |
} |
| 373 |
require_once $analyzer_file; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
try { |
| 377 |
$analyzer = new Vigilante_Security_Analyzer( $this->settings, $this->activity_log ); |
| 378 |
// run_scan() persists the report internally via persist_scan(), |
| 379 |
// so the dashboard widget will read fresh data on the next page load. |
| 380 |
$analyzer->run_scan( $phase ); |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
if ( $this->activity_log ) { |
| 383 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 384 |
'security', |
| 385 |
'under_attack_scan_completed', |
| 386 |
sprintf( |
| 387 |
/* translators: %s: phase name (fast / slow / all) */ |
| 388 |
__( 'Security Analyzer refresh after Under Attack mode change (phase: %s)', 'vigilante' ), |
| 389 |
$phase |
| 390 |
), |
| 391 |
array( 'phase' => $phase ), |
| 392 |
'info' |
| 393 |
); |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
} catch ( \Throwable $e ) { |
| 396 |
// Best-effort: never let a scan failure block UA activation/deactivation. |
| 397 |
if ( $this->activity_log ) { |
| 398 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 399 |
'security', |
| 400 |
'under_attack_scan_failed', |
| 401 |
$e->getMessage(), |
| 402 |
array( 'phase' => $phase ), |
| 403 |
'warning' |
| 404 |
); |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
} |
| 407 |
} |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
/** |
| 410 |
* Build and persist the hardened vigilante_options for Under Attack mode. |
| 411 |
* |
| 412 |
* Layered: Maximum preset overrides on top of the user's current config, |
| 413 |
* then Under Attack-specific overrides (stricter login, all activity log |
| 414 |
* events, all modules forced on) on top of that. Any setting not touched |
| 415 |
* by either layer keeps the user's original value. |
| 416 |
* |
| 417 |
* @param array $base_options User's current vigilante_options (snapshot). |
| 418 |
*/ |
| 419 |
private function apply_hardened_options( $base_options ) { |
| 420 |
if ( ! is_array( $base_options ) ) { |
| 421 |
$base_options = array(); |
| 422 |
} |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
$presets = $this->settings->get_presets(); |
| 425 |
$maximum_preset = $presets['maximum'] ?? array(); |
| 426 |
// Drop the metadata fields ('name', 'description') that the preset array carries. |
| 427 |
unset( $maximum_preset['name'], $maximum_preset['description'] ); |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
// Activity Log retention: don't downgrade if the user already keeps |
| 430 |
// logs for longer, but bump it up if they have a tight retention that |
| 431 |
// would lose visibility during an attack. Same logic for max_entries. |
| 432 |
$current_log = $base_options['activity_log'] ?? array(); |
| 433 |
$current_days = isset( $current_log['retention_days'] ) ? absint( $current_log['retention_days'] ) : 30; |
| 434 |
$current_entries = isset( $current_log['max_entries'] ) ? absint( $current_log['max_entries'] ) : 10000; |
| 435 |
$forced_days = max( $current_days, 30 ); |
| 436 |
$forced_entries = max( $current_entries, 10000 ); |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
// Under Attack-specific overrides on top of Maximum. |
| 439 |
$ua_overrides = array( |
| 440 |
// All security modules forced on regardless of user's config. |
| 441 |
'modules' => array( |
| 442 |
'firewall' => true, |
| 443 |
'security_headers' => true, |
| 444 |
'login_security' => true, |
| 445 |
'rest_api_security' => true, |
| 446 |
'user_security' => true, |
| 447 |
'wp_hardening' => true, |
| 448 |
'file_integrity' => true, |
| 449 |
'activity_log' => true, |
| 450 |
), |
| 451 |
// Login: stricter than Maximum (2 attempts vs Maximum's 3). |
| 452 |
'login_security' => array( |
| 453 |
'max_attempts' => 2, |
| 454 |
), |
| 455 |
// File Integrity: full scope plus daily auto-scan (Maximum already |
| 456 |
// forces these, but we restate them here in case Maximum is edited |
| 457 |
// in the future and to make the UA contract explicit). |
| 458 |
'file_integrity' => array( |
| 459 |
'scan_core' => true, |
| 460 |
'scan_plugins' => true, |
| 461 |
'scan_themes' => true, |
| 462 |
'scan_uploads' => true, |
| 463 |
'scan_critical_config' => true, |
| 464 |
'auto_scan' => true, |
| 465 |
'scan_frequency' => 'daily', |
| 466 |
), |
| 467 |
// Activity Log: bump retention to default if user has it lower. |
| 468 |
'activity_log' => array( |
| 469 |
'retention_days' => $forced_days, |
| 470 |
'max_entries' => $forced_entries, |
| 471 |
), |
| 472 |
); |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
// Same list-aware merge the presets use: array_replace_recursive() would |
| 475 |
// combine the role lists position by position instead of replacing them. |
| 476 |
$hardened = Vigilante_Settings::merge_preset( $base_options, $maximum_preset ); |
| 477 |
$hardened = Vigilante_Settings::merge_preset( $hardened, $ua_overrides ); |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
// The hardening is for this site. On the main site of a network, a user |
| 480 |
// without network rights does not get to rewrite the rules every site |
| 481 |
// shares with it (2.11.6). The restore does not use this check: it runs |
| 482 |
// from whichever request switches the mode off or notices that it |
| 483 |
// expired, often with no user, and deactivate() sorts out instead what |
| 484 |
// changed while the mode was on. |
| 485 |
$hardened = Vigilante_Settings::keep_locked_file_settings( $hardened, $base_options ); |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
update_option( Vigilante_Settings::OPTION_NAME, $hardened ); |
| 488 |
$this->settings->clear_cache(); |
| 489 |
$this->remember_applied_file_settings(); |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
// Drop any lingering active preset marker — under-attack is not a preset |
| 492 |
// and the previous preset is already saved in our own status option. |
| 493 |
delete_option( 'vigilante_active_preset' ); |
| 494 |
} |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
/** |
| 497 |
* Record what the hardening left in the settings the shared files are built from |
| 498 |
* |
| 499 |
* deactivate() compares them with what is stored when the mode ends, to tell |
| 500 |
* a value the mode applied from one somebody changed while it was on. |
| 501 |
* |
| 502 |
* @since 2.11.7 |
| 503 |
*/ |
| 504 |
private function remember_applied_file_settings() { |
| 505 |
$status = get_option( self::OPTION_NAME, array() ); |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
if ( ! is_array( $status ) || empty( $status['active'] ) ) { |
| 508 |
return; |
| 509 |
} |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
$status['applied_file_settings'] = self::file_settings_values( get_option( Vigilante_Settings::OPTION_NAME, array() ) ); |
| 512 |
update_option( self::OPTION_NAME, $status ); |
| 513 |
$this->status = null; |
| 514 |
} |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
/** |
| 517 |
* Keep the shared file settings that somebody changed while the mode was on |
| 518 |
* |
| 519 |
* The snapshot is what the site had before the mode, and putting all of it |
| 520 |
* back also undid what a network administrator changed meanwhile in the |
| 521 |
* settings the shared wp-config.php and .htaccess are built from. Any |
| 522 |
* administrator of the main site can switch the mode off, so one without |
| 523 |
* network rights could roll those changes back, and the next rewrite of the |
| 524 |
* files would publish the old values (wordpress.org automated review of |
| 525 |
* 2.11.6). |
| 526 |
* |
| 527 |
* Asking who switches the mode off, as the saving code does, is not enough |
| 528 |
* here: the mode also ends on the first request after it expires, usually |
| 529 |
* with no user, and there that check would keep the hardened values for |
| 530 |
* good. So each of those settings is compared with what the mode applied: |
| 531 |
* the unchanged ones go back to the snapshot and the changed ones keep their |
| 532 |
* current value. A mode switched on by a version that kept no record falls |
| 533 |
* back to the check. |
| 534 |
* |
| 535 |
* @since 2.11.7 |
| 536 |
* |
| 537 |
* @param array $previous Snapshot taken when the mode was switched on. |
| 538 |
* @param array $status Mode status, with the record of what it applied. |
| 539 |
* @return array |
| 540 |
*/ |
| 541 |
private function keep_file_settings_changed_meanwhile( $previous, $status ) { |
| 542 |
if ( ! is_multisite() ) { |
| 543 |
return $previous; |
| 544 |
} |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
$current = get_option( Vigilante_Settings::OPTION_NAME, array() ); |
| 547 |
$current = is_array( $current ) ? $current : array(); |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
if ( ! isset( $status['applied_file_settings'] ) || ! is_array( $status['applied_file_settings'] ) ) { |
| 550 |
return Vigilante_Settings::keep_locked_file_settings( $previous, $current ); |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
$applied = $status['applied_file_settings']; |
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
foreach ( self::file_settings_values( $current ) as $path => $now ) { |
| 556 |
if ( ! array_key_exists( $path, $applied ) || $now === $applied[ $path ] ) { |
| 557 |
continue; |
| 558 |
} |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
$parts = explode( '.', $path, 2 ); |
| 561 |
$section = $parts[0]; |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
if ( ! isset( $parts[1] ) ) { |
| 564 |
if ( $now['set'] ) { |
| 565 |
$previous[ $section ] = $now['value']; |
| 566 |
} else { |
| 567 |
unset( $previous[ $section ] ); |
| 568 |
} |
| 569 |
continue; |
| 570 |
} |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
if ( $now['set'] ) { |
| 573 |
if ( ! isset( $previous[ $section ] ) || ! is_array( $previous[ $section ] ) ) { |
| 574 |
$previous[ $section ] = array(); |
| 575 |
} |
| 576 |
$previous[ $section ][ $parts[1] ] = $now['value']; |
| 577 |
} elseif ( isset( $previous[ $section ] ) && is_array( $previous[ $section ] ) ) { |
| 578 |
unset( $previous[ $section ][ $parts[1] ] ); |
| 579 |
} |
| 580 |
} |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
return $previous; |
| 583 |
} |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
/** |
| 586 |
* The value of every setting the shared files are built from, by path |
| 587 |
* |
| 588 |
* 'section' for a section shared whole, 'section.key' for a single key. Each |
| 589 |
* entry says whether the setting is stored and what it holds, so an absent |
| 590 |
* key and a stored one never compare as equal. |
| 591 |
* |
| 592 |
* @since 2.11.7 |
| 593 |
* |
| 594 |
* @param array $options Configuration. |
| 595 |
* @return array |
| 596 |
*/ |
| 597 |
private static function file_settings_values( $options ) { |
| 598 |
$options = is_array( $options ) ? $options : array(); |
| 599 |
$keys = Vigilante_Settings::get_shared_file_settings(); |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
foreach ( Vigilante_Settings::get_main_site_file_settings() as $section => $list ) { |
| 602 |
if ( ! isset( $keys[ $section ] ) ) { |
| 603 |
$keys[ $section ] = $list; |
| 604 |
} elseif ( is_array( $keys[ $section ] ) ) { |
| 605 |
$keys[ $section ] = array_values( array_unique( array_merge( $keys[ $section ], $list ) ) ); |
| 606 |
} |
| 607 |
} |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
$values = array(); |
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
foreach ( $keys as $section => $list ) { |
| 612 |
$stored = ( isset( $options[ $section ] ) && is_array( $options[ $section ] ) ) ? $options[ $section ] : null; |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
if ( true === $list ) { |
| 615 |
$values[ $section ] = array( 'set' => null !== $stored, 'value' => $stored ); |
| 616 |
continue; |
| 617 |
} |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
foreach ( $list as $key ) { |
| 620 |
$set = null !== $stored && array_key_exists( $key, $stored ); |
| 621 |
$values[ $section . '.' . $key ] = array( 'set' => $set, 'value' => $set ? $stored[ $key ] : null ); |
| 622 |
} |
| 623 |
} |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
return $values; |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 629 |
// CACHE MANAGEMENT |
| 630 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
/** |
| 633 |
* Safely run cache operations without breaking the calling flow |
| 634 |
* |
| 635 |
* Wraps cache operations in output buffering and try/catch to prevent |
| 636 |
* WP_Filesystem credential forms or PHP errors from corrupting |
| 637 |
* AJAX responses. |
| 638 |
* |
| 639 |
* @param string $action 'activate', 'deactivate' (a person switched the mode |
| 640 |
* off) or 'deactivate_auto' (the mode expired on its |
| 641 |
* own, from whichever request noticed it). |
| 642 |
*/ |
| 643 |
private function safe_manage_cache( $action ) { |
| 644 |
ob_start(); |
| 645 |
try { |
| 646 |
if ( 'activate' === $action ) { |
| 647 |
$this->add_cache_bypass_rules(); |
| 648 |
$this->purge_page_caches(); |
| 649 |
} else { |
| 650 |
$this->remove_cache_bypass_rules( 'deactivate_auto' === $action ); |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
} catch ( \Throwable $e ) { |
| 653 |
// Cache operations are best-effort and must not break the |
| 654 |
// activation AJAX response, but a swallowed exception is not the |
| 655 |
// same as nothing happening: until 2.11.0 this block hid a missing |
| 656 |
// class and the cache rules were never written from a request that |
| 657 |
// had not loaded the .htaccess manager, with no trace anywhere. |
| 658 |
if ( $this->activity_log ) { |
| 659 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 660 |
'security', |
| 661 |
'under_attack_cache_error', |
| 662 |
sprintf( |
| 663 |
/* translators: 1: activate/deactivate, 2: error message */ |
| 664 |
__( 'Under Attack cache step (%1$s) failed: %2$s', 'vigilante' ), |
| 665 |
$action, |
| 666 |
$e->getMessage() |
| 667 |
), |
| 668 |
array( 'action' => $action ), |
| 669 |
'warning' |
| 670 |
); |
| 671 |
} |
| 672 |
} |
| 673 |
ob_end_clean(); |
| 674 |
} |
| 675 |
|
| 676 |
/** |
| 677 |
* Add .htaccess rules to bypass full-page caching during Under Attack mode |
| 678 |
* |
| 679 |
* Goes through Vigilante_Htaccess_Manager like every other block the |
| 680 |
* plugin writes: lock, backup, validation, read-back, and on a network the |
| 681 |
* check that only a network administrator on the main site rewrites the |
| 682 |
* shared file. Until 2.11.0 this method wrote the file directly, so the |
| 683 |
* administrator of any subsite rewrote the root .htaccess of the whole |
| 684 |
* network by switching the mode on (S5 of the 28 Aug 2026 audit). The mode |
| 685 |
* is switched on by a person from the admin screen, so the write counts |
| 686 |
* as a decision and asks for the capability. |
| 687 |
* |
| 688 |
* A refused write is not a failure of the mode: the challenge, the rate |
| 689 |
* limit and the REST restriction never touch this file and stay on. |
| 690 |
* safe_manage_cache() swallows the WP_Error for that reason. |
| 691 |
*/ |
| 692 |
private function add_cache_bypass_rules() { |
| 693 |
// Loaded on demand by every consumer of the manager, and not by the |
| 694 |
// bootstrap: in an AJAX request where nothing else has needed it, the |
| 695 |
// class is not there and get_instance() throws. |
| 696 |
require_once VIGILANTE_INCLUDES_DIR . 'class-htaccess-manager.php'; |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
$result = Vigilante_Htaccess_Manager::get_instance()->add_block( |
| 699 |
self::HTACCESS_MARKER_START, |
| 700 |
self::HTACCESS_MARKER_END, |
| 701 |
self::get_cache_bypass_rules(), |
| 702 |
'top', |
| 703 |
false |
| 704 |
); |
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
$this->log_cache_result( 'activate', $result ); |
| 707 |
} |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
/** |
| 710 |
* The cache-bypass rules, without markers |
| 711 |
* |
| 712 |
* @since 2.11.0 Public, so the admin can show them when they could not be written. |
| 713 |
* |
| 714 |
* @return string |
| 715 |
*/ |
| 716 |
public static function get_cache_bypass_rules() { |
| 717 |
$rules = '<IfModule mod_headers.c>' . "\n"; |
| 718 |
$rules .= ' Header set Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0"' . "\n"; |
| 719 |
$rules .= ' Header set Pragma "no-cache"' . "\n"; |
| 720 |
$rules .= '</IfModule>' . "\n"; |
| 721 |
$rules .= '<IfModule LiteSpeed>' . "\n"; |
| 722 |
$rules .= ' CacheDisable public /' . "\n"; |
| 723 |
$rules .= '</IfModule>'; |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
return $rules; |
| 726 |
} |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
/** |
| 729 |
* The full block to paste by hand, markers included |
| 730 |
* |
| 731 |
* @since 2.11.0 |
| 732 |
* |
| 733 |
* @return string |
| 734 |
*/ |
| 735 |
public static function get_cache_bypass_block() { |
| 736 |
return self::HTACCESS_MARKER_START . "\n" . self::get_cache_bypass_rules() . "\n" . self::HTACCESS_MARKER_END; |
| 737 |
} |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
/** |
| 740 |
* Whether the mode is active but its cache rules are not in the .htaccess |
| 741 |
* |
| 742 |
* True on a site that owns the shared file (single site, or the main site |
| 743 |
* of a network) and runs Apache or LiteSpeed, when the block is missing: |
| 744 |
* the write was refused, typically on a host where WordPress cannot write |
| 745 |
* files by itself. The admin then shows the block to add by hand. On a |
| 746 |
* subsite the file is deliberately out of reach, so this stays false. |
| 747 |
* |
| 748 |
* @since 2.11.0 |
| 749 |
* |
| 750 |
* @return bool |
| 751 |
*/ |
| 752 |
public function cache_rules_missing() { |
| 753 |
if ( ! $this->is_active() || ! Vigilante_Settings::owns_shared_files() ) { |
| 754 |
return false; |
| 755 |
} |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
require_once VIGILANTE_INCLUDES_DIR . 'class-htaccess-manager.php'; |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
if ( ! Vigilante_Htaccess_Manager::get_instance()->is_apache() ) { |
| 760 |
return false; |
| 761 |
} |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
$path = ABSPATH . '.htaccess'; |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
if ( ! is_readable( $path ) ) { |
| 766 |
return true; |
| 767 |
} |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
$content = file_get_contents( $path ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.AlternativeFunctions.file_get_contents_file_get_contents -- Read-only check of the site's own .htaccess for a marker; WP_Filesystem is not warranted. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
return false === $content || false === strpos( $content, self::HTACCESS_MARKER_START ); |
| 772 |
} |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
/** |
| 775 |
* Record a refused .htaccess write, so a mode active without its cache |
| 776 |
* rules leaves a trace (a refused network write, a held lock, a failed |
| 777 |
* read-back). A WP_Error is not an exception and the catch below never |
| 778 |
* sees it. |
| 779 |
* |
| 780 |
* @param string $action activate or deactivate. |
| 781 |
* @param bool|WP_Error $result What the manager returned. |
| 782 |
*/ |
| 783 |
private function log_cache_result( $action, $result ) { |
| 784 |
if ( ! is_wp_error( $result ) || ! $this->activity_log ) { |
| 785 |
return; |
| 786 |
} |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
$this->activity_log->log( |
| 789 |
'security', |
| 790 |
'under_attack_cache_skipped', |
| 791 |
sprintf( |
| 792 |
/* translators: 1: activate/deactivate, 2: reason */ |
| 793 |
__( 'Under Attack cache rules not written (%1$s): %2$s', 'vigilante' ), |
| 794 |
$action, |
| 795 |
$result->get_error_message() |
| 796 |
), |
| 797 |
array( |
| 798 |
'action' => $action, |
| 799 |
'code' => $result->get_error_code(), |
| 800 |
), |
| 801 |
'info' |
| 802 |
); |
| 803 |
} |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
/** |
| 806 |
* Remove .htaccess cache bypass rules when mode is deactivated |
| 807 |
* |
| 808 |
* Same path as add_cache_bypass_rules(). When the mode expires by itself |
| 809 |
* the removal is Vigilant acting alone, from whichever request noticed the |
| 810 |
* expiry, so the only requirement is being on the main site: there is no |
| 811 |
* user to ask a capability of, and asking one of a passing visitor would |
| 812 |
* leave the block in place until an administrator happened to come by. |
| 813 |
* |
| 814 |
* @param bool $automatic True when the mode expired, false when a person |
| 815 |
* switched it off. |
| 816 |
*/ |
| 817 |
private function remove_cache_bypass_rules( $automatic = false ) { |
| 818 |
require_once VIGILANTE_INCLUDES_DIR . 'class-htaccess-manager.php'; |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
$result = Vigilante_Htaccess_Manager::get_instance()->remove_block( |
| 821 |
self::HTACCESS_MARKER_START, |
| 822 |
self::HTACCESS_MARKER_END, |
| 823 |
$automatic |
| 824 |
); |
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
$this->log_cache_result( 'deactivate', $result ); |
| 827 |
} |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
/** |
| 830 |
* Purge known page caches so existing cached pages are cleared |
| 831 |
* |
| 832 |
* Fires hooks and calls functions for common caching plugins. |
| 833 |
* Failures are silently ignored (cache purge is best-effort). |
| 834 |
*/ |
| 835 |
private function purge_page_caches() { |
| 836 |
/* |
| 837 |
* Every purge below reaches the whole network: the object cache is one |
| 838 |
* for all sites, the cache plugins purge everything they hold, and the |
| 839 |
* SiteGround folder is shared. Until 2.11.8 the administrator of any |
| 840 |
* subsite ran all of it by switching the mode on, as many times as they |
| 841 |
* liked. Found by the audits of the network and of the admin surface for |
| 842 |
* 2.11.8. The mode itself does not depend on it: the challenge, the rate |
| 843 |
* limit and the REST restriction work the same without the purge. |
| 844 |
*/ |
| 845 |
if ( is_multisite() && ! current_user_can( 'manage_network_options' ) ) { |
| 846 |
return; |
| 847 |
} |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
// WordPress object cache |
| 850 |
wp_cache_flush(); |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
// Third-party cache plugin hooks - these are the official hook names |
| 853 |
// defined by each plugin, not ours to prefix. |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
// LiteSpeed Cache |
| 856 |
if ( has_action( 'litespeed_purge_all' ) ) { |
| 857 |
do_action( 'litespeed_purge_all' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 858 |
} |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
// WP Super Cache |
| 861 |
if ( function_exists( 'wp_cache_clear_cache' ) ) { |
| 862 |
wp_cache_clear_cache(); |
| 863 |
} |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
// W3 Total Cache |
| 866 |
if ( function_exists( 'w3tc_flush_all' ) ) { |
| 867 |
w3tc_flush_all(); |
| 868 |
} |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
// WP Rocket |
| 871 |
if ( function_exists( 'rocket_clean_domain' ) ) { |
| 872 |
rocket_clean_domain(); |
| 873 |
} |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
// WP Fastest Cache |
| 876 |
if ( has_action( 'wpfc_clear_all_cache' ) ) { |
| 877 |
do_action( 'wpfc_clear_all_cache' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 878 |
} |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
// Autoptimize |
| 881 |
if ( class_exists( 'autoptimizeCache' ) && method_exists( 'autoptimizeCache', 'clearall' ) ) { |
| 882 |
autoptimizeCache::clearall(); |
| 883 |
} |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
// SG Optimizer / Speed Optimizer (SiteGround) - multiple purge methods |
| 886 |
// Public API function (purges Dynamic + File-based + Object caches) |
| 887 |
if ( function_exists( 'sg_cachepress_purge_cache' ) ) { |
| 888 |
sg_cachepress_purge_cache(); |
| 889 |
} |
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
// Modern SG Optimizer (7.x+) internal Supercacher class |
| 892 |
if ( class_exists( '\SiteGround_Optimizer\Supercacher\Supercacher' ) ) { |
| 893 |
if ( method_exists( '\SiteGround_Optimizer\Supercacher\Supercacher', 'purge_cache' ) ) { |
| 894 |
\SiteGround_Optimizer\Supercacher\Supercacher::purge_cache(); |
| 895 |
} |
| 896 |
if ( method_exists( '\SiteGround_Optimizer\Supercacher\Supercacher', 'delete_assets' ) ) { |
| 897 |
\SiteGround_Optimizer\Supercacher\Supercacher::delete_assets(); |
| 898 |
} |
| 899 |
} |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
// SG file-based cache directory cleanup |
| 902 |
$sg_file_cache_dir = WP_CONTENT_DIR . '/cache/sg-optimizer'; |
| 903 |
if ( is_dir( $sg_file_cache_dir ) ) { |
| 904 |
$this->recursive_delete_dir( $sg_file_cache_dir ); |
| 905 |
} |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
// Hummingbird |
| 908 |
if ( has_action( 'wphb_clear_page_cache' ) ) { |
| 909 |
do_action( 'wphb_clear_page_cache' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 910 |
} |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
// Cache Enabler |
| 913 |
if ( has_action( 'ce_clear_cache' ) ) { |
| 914 |
do_action( 'ce_clear_cache' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 915 |
} |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
// Breeze (Cloudways) |
| 918 |
if ( has_action( 'breeze_clear_all_cache' ) ) { |
| 919 |
do_action( 'breeze_clear_all_cache' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 920 |
} |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
// Generic hook used by some plugins |
| 923 |
if ( has_action( 'cachify_flush_cache' ) ) { |
| 924 |
do_action( 'cachify_flush_cache' ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedHooknameFound -- Third-party hook |
| 925 |
} |
| 926 |
} |
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
/** |
| 929 |
* Set constants and headers that tell caching plugins to skip caching |
| 930 |
* |
| 931 |
* Called during constructor when mode is active, so every PHP request |
| 932 |
* signals to caching layers not to serve or store cached responses. |
| 933 |
*/ |
| 934 |
private function send_nocache_headers_for_plugins() { |
| 935 |
// Standard cache-control constants recognized by caching plugins. |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
// DONOTCACHEPAGE is respected by WP Super Cache, W3TC, WP Rocket, Batcache and others |
| 938 |
if ( ! defined( 'DONOTCACHEPAGE' ) ) { |
| 939 |
define( 'DONOTCACHEPAGE', true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedConstantFound -- Industry-standard constant |
| 940 |
} |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
// DONOTCACHEOBJECT is respected by W3TC |
| 943 |
if ( ! defined( 'DONOTCACHEOBJECT' ) ) { |
| 944 |
define( 'DONOTCACHEOBJECT', true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedConstantFound -- Industry-standard constant |
| 945 |
} |
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
// DONOTCACHEDB is respected by W3TC |
| 948 |
if ( ! defined( 'DONOTCACHEDB' ) ) { |
| 949 |
define( 'DONOTCACHEDB', true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedConstantFound -- Industry-standard constant |
| 950 |
} |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
// LiteSpeed Cache |
| 953 |
if ( ! defined( 'LSCACHE_NO_CACHE' ) ) { |
| 954 |
define( 'LSCACHE_NO_CACHE', true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.NamingConventions.PrefixAllGlobals.NonPrefixedConstantFound -- LiteSpeed standard constant |
| 955 |
} |
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
// Send nocache headers early for any PHP-served response |
| 958 |
if ( ! headers_sent() ) { |
| 959 |
nocache_headers(); |
| 960 |
// NGINX reverse proxy directive - do not cache this response |
| 961 |
header( 'X-Accel-Expires: 0' ); |
| 962 |
// Generic CDN/reverse proxy directive |
| 963 |
header( 'Surrogate-Control: no-store' ); |
| 964 |
} |
| 965 |
|
| 966 |
// SG Optimizer: register our verification cookie as bypass cookie |
| 967 |
// When a verified visitor has this cookie, SG NGINX skips its cache |
| 968 |
// and lets PHP handle the request (where has_valid_cookie() returns true) |
| 969 |
add_filter( 'sgo_bypass_cookies', array( $this, 'add_sg_bypass_cookie' ) ); |
| 970 |
} |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
/** |
| 973 |
* Add Vigilante verification cookie to SG Optimizer bypass list |
| 974 |
* |
| 975 |
* When SG NGINX sees this cookie in a request, it bypasses its cache |
| 976 |
* and lets PHP handle the request directly. |
| 977 |
* |
| 978 |
* @param array $cookies Existing bypass cookies. |
| 979 |
* @return array Modified bypass cookies. |
| 980 |
*/ |
| 981 |
public function add_sg_bypass_cookie( $cookies ) { |
| 982 |
$cookies[] = self::COOKIE_NAME; |
| 983 |
return $cookies; |
| 984 |
} |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 987 |
// JS CHALLENGE |
| 988 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
/** |
| 991 |
* Serve JS challenge page if visitor is not verified |
| 992 |
* |
| 993 |
* Also handles challenge response POST inline to avoid |
| 994 |
* the init-within-init timing issue. |
| 995 |
*/ |
| 996 |
public function maybe_serve_challenge() { |
| 997 |
// Never challenge logged-in users |
| 998 |
if ( is_user_logged_in() ) { |
| 999 |
return; |
| 1000 |
} |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
// Never challenge admin/login/cron/AJAX |
| 1003 |
if ( is_admin() || wp_doing_cron() || wp_doing_ajax() ) { |
| 1004 |
return; |
| 1005 |
} |
| 1006 |
|
| 1007 |
// Check if request is for wp-login.php |
| 1008 |
if ( isset( $GLOBALS['pagenow'] ) && 'wp-login.php' === $GLOBALS['pagenow'] ) { |
| 1009 |
return; |
| 1010 |
} |
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
// Handle challenge response POST first (before serving a new challenge) |
| 1013 |
if ( $this->process_challenge_response() ) { |
| 1014 |
return; |
| 1015 |
} |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
// Check if visitor has valid verification cookie |
| 1018 |
if ( $this->has_valid_cookie() ) { |
| 1019 |
return; |
| 1020 |
} |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
// Check if IP is whitelisted in firewall settings |
| 1023 |
if ( $this->is_ip_whitelisted() ) { |
| 1024 |
return; |
| 1025 |
} |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
// Serve the challenge page |
| 1028 |
$this->render_challenge_page(); |
| 1029 |
exit; |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 |
/** |
| 1033 |
* Process challenge response POST |
| 1034 |
* |
| 1035 |
* Called from maybe_serve_challenge() to handle the proof-of-work |
| 1036 |
* response inline at template_redirect, avoiding the init timing issue. |
| 1037 |
* |
| 1038 |
* @return bool True if response was valid and redirect happened. |
| 1039 |
*/ |
| 1040 |
private function process_challenge_response() { |
| 1041 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing |
| 1042 |
if ( ! isset( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ) || 'POST' !== $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] || empty( $_POST['vigilante_ua_response'] ) ) { |
| 1043 |
return false; |
| 1044 |
} |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing |
| 1047 |
$response = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['vigilante_ua_response'] ) ); |
| 1048 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing |
| 1049 |
$nonce_val = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['vigilante_ua_nonce'] ?? '' ) ); |
| 1050 |
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing |
| 1051 |
$redirect = esc_url_raw( wp_unslash( $_POST['vigilante_ua_redirect'] ?? '' ) ); |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
// The token is checked, never stored or deleted, so a wrong answer |
| 1054 |
// changes nothing for anybody else. See issue_challenge_token(). |
| 1055 |
if ( strlen( $response ) > 64 || ! $this->challenge_token_is_valid( $nonce_val ) ) { |
| 1056 |
return false; |
| 1057 |
} |
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
// Verify the proof-of-work response |
| 1060 |
if ( $this->verify_challenge( $response, $nonce_val ) ) { |
| 1061 |
$this->set_verification_cookie(); |
| 1062 |
|
| 1063 |
// Redirect to the original URL |
| 1064 |
if ( empty( $redirect ) || ! wp_validate_redirect( $redirect ) ) { |
| 1065 |
$redirect = home_url( '/' ); |
| 1066 |
} |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
wp_safe_redirect( $redirect ); |
| 1069 |
exit; |
| 1070 |
} |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
return false; |
| 1073 |
} |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
/** |
| 1076 |
* A challenge token of its own for this page |
| 1077 |
* |
| 1078 |
* Signed, not stored. Until 2.11.7 the challenge nonce was a transient keyed |
| 1079 |
* by the visitor address, reused by every page that address loaded, and any |
| 1080 |
* answer carrying it deleted it before the proof of work was checked. A |
| 1081 |
* client sharing the address, behind the same NAT, or every visitor behind a |
| 1082 |
* proxy with no trusted header configured, could keep the others in a |
| 1083 |
* challenge loop by sending junk answers (wordpress.org automated security |
| 1084 |
* review of 2.11.7). Each page now gets its own token, bound to the address |
| 1085 |
* and to the time it was issued and signed with the secret of this |
| 1086 |
* activation: nothing is shared, nothing is deleted, a refresh no longer has |
| 1087 |
* to reuse a nonce to avoid a loop, and no transient is written per address. |
| 1088 |
* |
| 1089 |
* @since 2.11.8 |
| 1090 |
* |
| 1091 |
* @return string |
| 1092 |
*/ |
| 1093 |
private function issue_challenge_token() { |
| 1094 |
$id = wp_generate_password( 16, false ); |
| 1095 |
$issued = time(); |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
return $id . '.' . $issued . '.' . $this->sign_challenge( $id, $issued ); |
| 1098 |
} |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
/** |
| 1101 |
* Signature of a challenge token for the current visitor |
| 1102 |
* |
| 1103 |
* The 'challenge|' prefix keeps it from ever matching the signature of a |
| 1104 |
* verification cookie, which uses the same secret. |
| 1105 |
* |
| 1106 |
* @since 2.11.8 |
| 1107 |
* |
| 1108 |
* @param string $id Random part of the token. |
| 1109 |
* @param int $issued Time the token was issued. |
| 1110 |
* @return string |
| 1111 |
*/ |
| 1112 |
private function sign_challenge( $id, $issued ) { |
| 1113 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
return hash_hmac( 'sha256', 'challenge|' . $id . '|' . $issued . '|' . $this->get_visitor_ip_hash(), (string) ( $status['secret'] ?? '' ) ); |
| 1116 |
} |
| 1117 |
|
| 1118 |
/** |
| 1119 |
* Whether a challenge token was issued to this visitor, recently, by this activation |
| 1120 |
* |
| 1121 |
* @since 2.11.8 |
| 1122 |
* |
| 1123 |
* @param string $token Token sent back with the answer. |
| 1124 |
* @return bool |
| 1125 |
*/ |
| 1126 |
private function challenge_token_is_valid( $token ) { |
| 1127 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 1128 |
$parts = explode( '.', (string) $token ); |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
if ( empty( $status['secret'] ) || 3 !== count( $parts ) || '' === $parts[0] || ! ctype_digit( $parts[1] ) ) { |
| 1131 |
return false; |
| 1132 |
} |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
$age = time() - (int) $parts[1]; |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
if ( $age < 0 || $age > self::NONCE_TTL ) { |
| 1137 |
return false; |
| 1138 |
} |
| 1139 |
|
| 1140 |
return hash_equals( $this->sign_challenge( $parts[0], (int) $parts[1] ), $parts[2] ); |
| 1141 |
} |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
/** |
| 1144 |
* Verify the proof-of-work challenge response |
| 1145 |
* |
| 1146 |
* @param string $response The nonce value found by the client. |
| 1147 |
* @param string $nonce The challenge nonce. |
| 1148 |
* @return bool |
| 1149 |
*/ |
| 1150 |
private function verify_challenge( $response, $nonce ) { |
| 1151 |
$hash = hash( 'sha256', $nonce . $response ); |
| 1152 |
$prefix = str_repeat( '0', self::CHALLENGE_DIFFICULTY ); |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
return 0 === strpos( $hash, $prefix ); |
| 1155 |
} |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
/** |
| 1158 |
* Check if visitor has a valid verification cookie |
| 1159 |
* |
| 1160 |
* Public so other modules (firewall) can grant verified visitors |
| 1161 |
* bypass on rate-limit checks. |
| 1162 |
* |
| 1163 |
* @return bool |
| 1164 |
*/ |
| 1165 |
public function has_valid_cookie() { |
| 1166 |
if ( ! isset( $_COOKIE[ self::COOKIE_NAME ] ) ) { |
| 1167 |
return false; |
| 1168 |
} |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
$cookie = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_COOKIE[ self::COOKIE_NAME ] ) ); |
| 1171 |
$parts = explode( '|', $cookie ); |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
if ( count( $parts ) !== 3 ) { |
| 1174 |
return false; |
| 1175 |
} |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
list( $ip_hash, $expires, $signature ) = $parts; |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
// Check expiration |
| 1180 |
if ( (int) $expires < time() ) { |
| 1181 |
return false; |
| 1182 |
} |
| 1183 |
|
| 1184 |
// Verify HMAC signature |
| 1185 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 1186 |
$expected = hash_hmac( 'sha256', $ip_hash . '|' . $expires, $status['secret'] ); |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
if ( ! hash_equals( $expected, $signature ) ) { |
| 1189 |
return false; |
| 1190 |
} |
| 1191 |
|
| 1192 |
// Verify IP matches (prevents cookie theft) |
| 1193 |
$current_ip_hash = $this->get_visitor_ip_hash(); |
| 1194 |
if ( ! hash_equals( $ip_hash, $current_ip_hash ) ) { |
| 1195 |
return false; |
| 1196 |
} |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
return true; |
| 1199 |
} |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
/** |
| 1202 |
* Set the verification cookie after passing the challenge |
| 1203 |
*/ |
| 1204 |
private function set_verification_cookie() { |
| 1205 |
$status = $this->get_status(); |
| 1206 |
$ip_hash = $this->get_visitor_ip_hash(); |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
// Cookie expires when the mode expires |
| 1209 |
$expires = $status['activated_at'] + $status['duration']; |
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 |
// HMAC signature |
| 1212 |
$signature = hash_hmac( 'sha256', $ip_hash . '|' . $expires, $status['secret'] ); |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
$cookie_value = $ip_hash . '|' . $expires . '|' . $signature; |
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 |
// Set cookie - secure flags |
| 1217 |
$secure = is_ssl(); |
| 1218 |
$httponly = true; |
| 1219 |
$samesite = 'Lax'; |
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 |
if ( PHP_VERSION_ID >= 70300 ) { |
| 1222 |
setcookie( self::COOKIE_NAME, $cookie_value, array( |
| 1223 |
'expires' => $expires, |
| 1224 |
'path' => COOKIEPATH, |
| 1225 |
'domain' => COOKIE_DOMAIN, |
| 1226 |
'secure' => $secure, |
| 1227 |
'httponly' => $httponly, |
| 1228 |
'samesite' => $samesite, |
| 1229 |
) ); |
| 1230 |
} else { |
| 1231 |
setcookie( |
| 1232 |
self::COOKIE_NAME, |
| 1233 |
$cookie_value, |
| 1234 |
$expires, |
| 1235 |
COOKIEPATH . '; SameSite=' . $samesite, |
| 1236 |
COOKIE_DOMAIN, |
| 1237 |
$secure, |
| 1238 |
$httponly |
| 1239 |
); |
| 1240 |
} |
| 1241 |
} |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
/** |
| 1244 |
* Render the JS challenge page |
| 1245 |
* |
| 1246 |
* Uses external CSS/JS files for CSP compatibility. |
| 1247 |
*/ |
| 1248 |
private function render_challenge_page() { |
| 1249 |
$site_name = get_bloginfo( 'name' ); |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
// A token of its own for this page. An earlier token stays valid until it |
| 1252 |
// expires, so a refresh while the solver runs does not break it. |
| 1253 |
$challenge_nonce = $this->issue_challenge_token(); |
| 1254 |
|
| 1255 |
// Get current URL for redirect after verification |
| 1256 |
$current_url = ( is_ssl() ? 'https' : 'http' ) . '://' . sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] ?? '' ) ) . sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ?? '/' ) ); |
| 1257 |
|
| 1258 |
// Asset URLs (external files for CSP compatibility) |
| 1259 |
$css_url = VIGILANTE_ASSETS_URL . 'css/under-attack-challenge.css?ver=' . VIGILANTE_VERSION; |
| 1260 |
$js_url = VIGILANTE_ASSETS_URL . 'js/under-attack-challenge.js?ver=' . VIGILANTE_VERSION; |
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
status_header( 503 ); |
| 1263 |
header( 'Retry-After: 5' ); |
| 1264 |
header( 'Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0' ); |
| 1265 |
header( 'Pragma: no-cache' ); |
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
?><!DOCTYPE html> |
| 1268 |
<html lang="<?php echo esc_attr( get_bloginfo( 'language' ) ); ?>"> |
| 1269 |
<head> |
| 1270 |
<meta charset="utf-8"> |
| 1271 |
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> |
| 1272 |
<meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow"> |
| 1273 |
<title><?php echo esc_html( $site_name ); ?></title> |
| 1274 |
<?php // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.EnqueuedResources.NonEnqueuedStylesheet -- Standalone challenge page served with exit, outside WP enqueue cycle. ?> |
| 1275 |
<link rel="stylesheet" href="<?php echo esc_url( $css_url ); ?>"> |
| 1276 |
</head> |
| 1277 |
<body> |
| 1278 |
<div class="challenge-container"> |
| 1279 |
<div class="site-name"><?php echo esc_html( $site_name ); ?></div> |
| 1280 |
<div class="spinner" id="spinner"></div> |
| 1281 |
<p class="message" id="msg"><?php esc_html_e( 'Checking your connection before proceeding', 'vigilante' ); ?></p> |
| 1282 |
<p class="message-sub"><?php esc_html_e( 'This process is automatic. You will be redirected shortly.', 'vigilante' ); ?></p> |
| 1283 |
<noscript> |
| 1284 |
<div class="error-msg"> |
| 1285 |
<?php esc_html_e( 'Please enable JavaScript to access this website.', 'vigilante' ); ?> |
| 1286 |
</div> |
| 1287 |
</noscript> |
| 1288 |
</div> |
| 1289 |
|
| 1290 |
<form id="ua-form" method="POST" style="display:none" data-nonce="<?php echo esc_attr( $challenge_nonce ); ?>" data-difficulty="<?php echo absint( self::CHALLENGE_DIFFICULTY ); ?>"> |
| 1291 |
<input type="hidden" name="vigilante_ua_nonce" value="<?php echo esc_attr( $challenge_nonce ); ?>"> |
| 1292 |
<input type="hidden" name="vigilante_ua_response" id="ua-response" value=""> |
| 1293 |
<input type="hidden" name="vigilante_ua_redirect" value="<?php echo esc_attr( esc_url( $current_url ) ); ?>"> |
| 1294 |
</form> |
| 1295 |
|
| 1296 |
<?php // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.EnqueuedResources.NonEnqueuedScript -- Standalone challenge page served with exit, outside WP enqueue cycle. ?> |
| 1297 |
<script src="<?php echo esc_url( $js_url ); ?>"></script> |
| 1298 |
</body> |
| 1299 |
</html> |
| 1300 |
<?php |
| 1301 |
} |
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 1304 |
// RATE LIMITING AND RESTRICTIONS |
| 1305 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 |
/** |
| 1308 |
* Override rate limiting to aggressive values |
| 1309 |
* |
| 1310 |
* Visitors who passed the JS challenge get VERIFIED_RATE_LIMIT, or the |
| 1311 |
* site's own limit if that is higher, so a human loading a page with many |
| 1312 |
* requests through WordPress does not burn the aggressive cap and get a 429, |
| 1313 |
* which used to look like the challenge was failing. |
| 1314 |
* |
| 1315 |
* Until 2.11.8 they skipped rate limiting altogether, for as long as the |
| 1316 |
* mode lasted. The proof of work takes a script a few milliseconds, so a |
| 1317 |
* bot solved it once and then flooded with no limit at all, which is the |
| 1318 |
* flood the mode exists to cap. Found by the audit of Under Attack for |
| 1319 |
* 2.11.8. |
| 1320 |
* |
| 1321 |
* @param int $requests Requests per minute configured for the site. |
| 1322 |
* @return int |
| 1323 |
*/ |
| 1324 |
public function aggressive_rate_limit( $requests ) { |
| 1325 |
if ( $this->has_valid_cookie() ) { |
| 1326 |
return max( absint( $requests ), self::VERIFIED_RATE_LIMIT ); |
| 1327 |
} |
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
return self::RATE_LIMIT; |
| 1330 |
} |
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
/** |
| 1333 |
* A count of their own for visitors who passed the challenge |
| 1334 |
* |
| 1335 |
* The firewall counts and blocks by address. Without the exemption that |
| 1336 |
* 2.11.8 removed, a verified visitor was counted with everybody else at the |
| 1337 |
* same address, so an unverified client behind the same NAT, or any visitor |
| 1338 |
* of a site behind a proxy with no trusted header, got the address blocked |
| 1339 |
* for fifteen minutes and the verified visitors with it. Found by the cross |
| 1340 |
* review of 2.11.8. The key adds the signature of the verification cookie, |
| 1341 |
* which is tied to the address and to this activation: verified visitors |
| 1342 |
* of one address share a count of VERIFIED_RATE_LIMIT, apart from the rest. |
| 1343 |
* |
| 1344 |
* @since 2.11.8 |
| 1345 |
* |
| 1346 |
* @param string $key Key the firewall would use, the address. |
| 1347 |
* @return string |
| 1348 |
*/ |
| 1349 |
public function verified_rate_limit_key( $key ) { |
| 1350 |
if ( ! $this->has_valid_cookie() || ! isset( $_COOKIE[ self::COOKIE_NAME ] ) ) { |
| 1351 |
return $key; |
| 1352 |
} |
| 1353 |
|
| 1354 |
$parts = explode( '|', sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_COOKIE[ self::COOKIE_NAME ] ) ) ); |
| 1355 |
|
| 1356 |
return $key . '|verified|' . end( $parts ); |
| 1357 |
} |
| 1358 |
|
| 1359 |
/** |
| 1360 |
* Override block duration to aggressive value |
| 1361 |
* |
| 1362 |
* @param int $duration Original block duration. |
| 1363 |
* @return int Aggressive duration (15 minutes). |
| 1364 |
*/ |
| 1365 |
public function aggressive_block_duration( $duration ) { |
| 1366 |
return 900; |
| 1367 |
} |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
/** |
| 1370 |
* Send every comment to moderation while Under Attack is active. |
| 1371 |
* |
| 1372 |
* @param int|string|WP_Error $approved Original approval status. |
| 1373 |
* @return int|string|WP_Error Forced 0 (moderation), unless WP itself |
| 1374 |
* flagged spam/error which we keep. |
| 1375 |
*/ |
| 1376 |
public function force_comment_moderation( $approved ) { |
| 1377 |
if ( is_wp_error( $approved ) || 'spam' === $approved || 'trash' === $approved ) { |
| 1378 |
return $approved; |
| 1379 |
} |
| 1380 |
return 0; |
| 1381 |
} |
| 1382 |
|
| 1383 |
/** |
| 1384 |
* Restrict HTTP methods to GET, POST, HEAD only |
| 1385 |
*/ |
| 1386 |
public function restrict_http_methods() { |
| 1387 |
if ( is_admin() || wp_doing_cron() || wp_doing_ajax() ) { |
| 1388 |
return; |
| 1389 |
} |
| 1390 |
|
| 1391 |
$method = isset( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ) ? strtoupper( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ) ) ) : 'GET'; |
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
$allowed = array( 'GET', 'POST', 'HEAD' ); |
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
if ( ! in_array( $method, $allowed, true ) ) { |
| 1396 |
status_header( 405 ); |
| 1397 |
header( 'Allow: GET, POST, HEAD' ); |
| 1398 |
wp_die( |
| 1399 |
esc_html__( 'Method not allowed.', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1400 |
esc_html__( 'Method Not Allowed', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1401 |
array( 'response' => 405 ) |
| 1402 |
); |
| 1403 |
} |
| 1404 |
} |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
/** |
| 1407 |
* Block requests with empty user agent |
| 1408 |
*/ |
| 1409 |
public function block_empty_user_agent() { |
| 1410 |
if ( is_admin() || wp_doing_cron() || wp_doing_ajax() ) { |
| 1411 |
return; |
| 1412 |
} |
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 |
$user_agent = isset( $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] ) ) : ''; |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
if ( empty( trim( $user_agent ) ) ) { |
| 1417 |
status_header( 403 ); |
| 1418 |
wp_die( |
| 1419 |
esc_html__( 'Access denied.', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1420 |
esc_html__( 'Forbidden', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1421 |
array( 'response' => 403 ) |
| 1422 |
); |
| 1423 |
} |
| 1424 |
} |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
/** |
| 1427 |
* Restrict REST API to authenticated users only |
| 1428 |
* |
| 1429 |
* @param WP_Error|null|true $result Current auth result. |
| 1430 |
* @return WP_Error|null|true |
| 1431 |
*/ |
| 1432 |
public function restrict_rest_api( $result ) { |
| 1433 |
if ( is_user_logged_in() ) { |
| 1434 |
return $result; |
| 1435 |
} |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
return new WP_Error( |
| 1438 |
'rest_under_attack', |
| 1439 |
__( 'REST API access temporarily restricted.', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1440 |
array( 'status' => 503 ) |
| 1441 |
); |
| 1442 |
} |
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 1445 |
// HELPER METHODS |
| 1446 |
// ========================================================================= |
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
/** |
| 1449 |
* Check if IP is in the firewall whitelist |
| 1450 |
* |
| 1451 |
* @return bool |
| 1452 |
*/ |
| 1453 |
private function is_ip_whitelisted() { |
| 1454 |
$firewall_options = $this->settings->get_section( 'firewall' ); |
| 1455 |
$whitelist = $firewall_options['ip_whitelist'] ?? array(); |
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
if ( empty( $whitelist ) ) { |
| 1458 |
return false; |
| 1459 |
} |
| 1460 |
|
| 1461 |
// Same matcher as the rest of the plugin. Until 2.9.9 this compared |
| 1462 |
// with a plain === inside a loop, so in Under Attack mode a whitelist |
| 1463 |
// entry written as a CIDR range or a wildcard matched nothing, while |
| 1464 |
// the very same entry worked in the firewall. |
| 1465 |
return Vigilante_IP_Utils::in_list( $this->get_visitor_ip(), $whitelist ); |
| 1466 |
} |
| 1467 |
|
| 1468 |
/** |
| 1469 |
* Get visitor IP address |
| 1470 |
* |
| 1471 |
* Resolved by the same helper the firewall uses, so the whole plugin |
| 1472 |
* applies one proxy policy: the header the administrator marked as |
| 1473 |
* trusted, and REMOTE_ADDR otherwise. |
| 1474 |
* |
| 1475 |
* Until 2.11.1 this method read CF-Connecting-IP, X-Forwarded-For and |
| 1476 |
* X-Real-IP directly, taking whichever came first, without asking whether |
| 1477 |
* the request had actually arrived through a proxy. Any client can send |
| 1478 |
* those headers. Under Attack mode builds four things on this value, the |
| 1479 |
* whitelist decision, the challenge nonce, the signed verification cookie |
| 1480 |
* and the rate limit exemption, so on a site not behind an edge that |
| 1481 |
* rewrites them, one solved challenge could be replayed from anywhere by |
| 1482 |
* repeating the same invented header, and a known whitelisted address |
| 1483 |
* skipped the challenge outright. Reported by the automated security |
| 1484 |
* review of wp.org on 9 sep 2026 and fixed in 2.11.2. |
| 1485 |
* |
| 1486 |
* Behaviour note for sites behind Cloudflare or a reverse proxy: with no |
| 1487 |
* trusted header configured, every visitor now resolves to the proxy |
| 1488 |
* address, which is already how the firewall sees them. Set the trusted |
| 1489 |
* proxy header in the firewall settings to get the real client address in |
| 1490 |
* both places. |
| 1491 |
* |
| 1492 |
* @return string |
| 1493 |
*/ |
| 1494 |
private function get_visitor_ip() { |
| 1495 |
return Vigilante_IP_Utils::get_client_ip(); |
| 1496 |
} |
| 1497 |
|
| 1498 |
/** |
| 1499 |
* Get hashed visitor IP for privacy-safe comparisons |
| 1500 |
* |
| 1501 |
* @return string |
| 1502 |
*/ |
| 1503 |
private function get_visitor_ip_hash() { |
| 1504 |
return hash( 'sha256', $this->get_visitor_ip() . wp_salt( 'auth' ) ); |
| 1505 |
} |
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
/** |
| 1508 |
* Recursively delete contents of a directory (files and subdirectories) |
| 1509 |
* |
| 1510 |
* Used for cleaning file-based cache directories. |
| 1511 |
* Only deletes contents, preserves the top-level directory. |
| 1512 |
* |
| 1513 |
* @param string $dir Directory path to clean. |
| 1514 |
*/ |
| 1515 |
private function recursive_delete_dir( $dir ) { |
| 1516 |
if ( ! is_dir( $dir ) ) { |
| 1517 |
return; |
| 1518 |
} |
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 |
$items = scandir( $dir ); |
| 1521 |
|
| 1522 |
if ( false === $items ) { |
| 1523 |
return; |
| 1524 |
} |
| 1525 |
|
| 1526 |
foreach ( $items as $item ) { |
| 1527 |
if ( '.' === $item || '..' === $item ) { |
| 1528 |
continue; |
| 1529 |
} |
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 |
$path = $dir . '/' . $item; |
| 1532 |
|
| 1533 |
if ( is_dir( $path ) ) { |
| 1534 |
$this->recursive_delete_dir( $path ); |
| 1535 |
@rmdir( $path ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.AlternativeFunctions.file_system_operations_rmdir, WordPress.PHP.NoSilencedErrors.Discouraged -- No WP equivalent for rmdir |
| 1536 |
} else { |
| 1537 |
wp_delete_file( $path ); |
| 1538 |
} |
| 1539 |
} |
| 1540 |
} |
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
/** |
| 1543 |
* Send email notification when mode is activated/deactivated |
| 1544 |
* |
| 1545 |
* @param string $action Either 'activated' or 'deactivated'. |
| 1546 |
* @param int $duration Duration in seconds (only for activation). |
| 1547 |
*/ |
| 1548 |
private function send_notification( $action, $duration = 0 ) { |
| 1549 |
// Use centralized notification recipients |
| 1550 |
$recipients = Vigilante_Email_Template::get_admin_recipients(); |
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 |
if ( empty( $recipients ) ) { |
| 1553 |
return; |
| 1554 |
} |
| 1555 |
|
| 1556 |
$site_name = get_bloginfo( 'name' ); |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
if ( 'activated' === $action ) { |
| 1559 |
$subject = sprintf( |
| 1560 |
/* translators: %s: Site name */ |
| 1561 |
__( '[%s] Under Attack mode activated', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1562 |
$site_name |
| 1563 |
); |
| 1564 |
|
| 1565 |
$hours = round( $duration / 3600, 1 ); |
| 1566 |
$body = Vigilante_Email_Template::alert_box( __( 'Under Attack mode has been activated.', 'vigilante' ) ); |
| 1567 |
$body .= Vigilante_Email_Template::data_table( array( |
| 1568 |
__( 'Duration', 'vigilante' ) => $hours . ' ' . __( 'hours', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1569 |
) ); |
| 1570 |
$body .= Vigilante_Email_Template::p( __( 'The mode will automatically deactivate when the timer expires. You can manually deactivate it from the Vigilant dashboard.', 'vigilante' ) ); |
| 1571 |
$body .= Vigilante_Email_Template::button( admin_url( 'admin.php?page=vigilante&tab=dashboard#vigilante-section-dashboard-under-attack' ), __( 'Go to dashboard', 'vigilante' ) ); |
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
$title = __( 'Under Attack mode activated', 'vigilante' ); |
| 1574 |
$alert = true; |
| 1575 |
} else { |
| 1576 |
$subject = sprintf( |
| 1577 |
/* translators: %s: Site name */ |
| 1578 |
__( '[%s] Under Attack mode deactivated', 'vigilante' ), |
| 1579 |
$site_name |
| 1580 |
); |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
$body = Vigilante_Email_Template::success_box( __( 'Under Attack mode has been deactivated. Your site is now operating with normal security settings.', 'vigilante' ) ); |
| 1583 |
|
| 1584 |
$title = __( 'Under Attack mode deactivated', 'vigilante' ); |
| 1585 |
$alert = false; |
| 1586 |
} |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
// Send to centralized recipients |
| 1589 |
Vigilante_Email_Template::send( $recipients, $subject, $title, $body, $alert ); |
| 1590 |
} |
| 1591 |
} |
